

reviewed by STEPHEN SLOAN

Clandestine Collection in An Open Society: The Problem of Reconciliation

Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection, edited by Roy Godson. National Strategy Information Center, Washington, D.C. \$8.50 paper, x, 232 pp.

The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency, by James Bamford. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. \$16.95. 464 pp.

THE revelations of the questionable domestic and foreign activities of the CIA and other agencies have generated an often acrimonious debate on the role of intelligence in a democratic society. While the debate has often engendered more heat than light, it has promoted a growing interest in understanding the techniques of intelligence and the exploration of key policy issues. Roy Godson's edited work, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection*, and James Bamford's *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency* complement each other in discussing the operational and political dimensions of an instrument of statecraft that has often been shrouded in mystery or incorrectly perceived by a public that is attracted to the exploits of James Bond. Godson's book is a useful text on one aspect of the intelligence process — clandestine collection, while Bamford's very extensive study provides a fine description and analysis of how the NSA has refined such a collection process to a very sophisticated art and science.

Dr. Godson's book is the fifth in a series of works sponsored by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, which is dedicated to promoting teaching and research in the field. As in the case of the other volumes, this book contains papers written by participants in seminars dealing with different aspects of the intelligence process and also includes comments by discussants and other members of the respective meetings. While Godson notes that "collection is perhaps the most difficult aspect of intelligence to discuss openly" (p. ix), he aptly suggests that such discussion is necessary if the system is to be improved. He contends that the first targets of collection "should be those which pose the greatest immediate danger to US survival, namely Soviet military power in *all* (italics the author's) its dimensions" (p. 17). In so doing he raises a fundamental question relating to what should be the scope of collection activities. When one uses the term "all," does that primarily deal with such matters of direct military concern as weapon systems and orders of battle, or does it also encompass such areas as transfer of technology with potential military significance and related problems of cor-

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porate espionage? The policy issue is, therefore, brought into focus. What are the legitimate targets of clandestine collection — the barracks or the board room? Where are the limits of inquiry in the civil sector? The problem of scope is further complicated by the barriers imposed on an intelligence service when it attempts to collect information from a closed society or from what can be called "denied areas." It is here where the value of technical as contrasted to human collection may be particularly vital, although the author notes that a number of human sources including refugees, defectors and third country nationals are essential in acquiring data in authoritarian systems.

In the chapter, "Collection in More Open Regions," Robert Chapman also addresses the issue of scope by suggesting that too much emphasis may be placed on collecting information from "second priority countries" (p. 42). Yet, even if one were to assume that there could be an agreement on rankings, changes in the international environment, particularly in the short run, can make such ordering difficult. Who would have assumed a few decades ago that the ministates of the Persian Gulf would loom so large in U.S. strategic thinking? The author does make a strong case for his view that our capability to collect information from third world countries has been eroded in part by the elimination of programs to provide funds, personnel and training for foreign security services. However, the policy issues again intrude when one considers the Carter administration's view that such aid might be counter to its policies concerning the promotion of human rights. The author also raises disturbing questions concerning the Soviet Union's penetration of various religious organizations, particularly those promoting liberation theology. However, care must be taken to differentiate between independent measures that various organizations take in regard to righting perceived wrongs and the charge that they are unwittingly being manipulated by a foreign power. The cur-

rent debate around the disarmament movement reflects this concern.

Eugene F. Burgstaller's paper in the chapter on "Human Collection" is quite insightful. He ably deals with the problems associated with the conditions that have resulted in a reluctance on the part of various potential sources to provide information because of their concern over whether the U.S. has the will and capacity to protect them. He also touches on the problem of scope when he notes that the intelligence community must not only now deal with increasingly complex targets of collection in industrializing third world countries but also with others who, irrespective of their low level of development, are embarked on programs to give them a nuclear capability.

The chapter on "Technical Collection" is useful for it provides an overview that can assist the reader in placing the activities of the National Security Agency in the context of the broader aspects of the intelligence process. The author summarizes this type of intelligence collection especially in reference to photo interpretation. After reading Bamford's book, one can appreciate how far we have come since the days when the U2 represented the state of the art.

Angelo Codevilla makes a solid case for the view that our intelligence community "established to help prevent war, has devoted too little attention to what it would do once war broke out" (p. 129). He indicates how the requirements for both tactical and strategic intelligence could put a strain on the collection process when it attempts to cut through "the fog of war." He also notes that the headquarters of the collectors should be hardened to survive an outbreak of hostilities and suggests that the computers of the NSA be placed in deep caves. After reading Bamford's description of the massive size of these facilities, one wonders if such an undertaking would be either technically or economically feasible.

The final chapter, "Collection in the Intelligence Process," by William R. Harris,

suggests that the intelligence community, which is now essentially subsidized, should take a clue from the private sector by requiring the consumers of intelligence — either military or civilian — to pay for the information they receive as a means of making the system more efficient. This paper will be of interest for those in the study of security administration.

In the appendices, a chapter entitled "The Collectors," from Cord Meyer's *Facing Reality: From World Federations to the CIA*, enables the reader to share the experience of an individual who was deeply involved in the development of the modern intelligence community. We are well-advised to consider his following statement:

"The best assurance American citizens can have that their tax dollars spent on foreign agent operations are not being squandered in romantic adventures of the James Bond variety lies in an independent oversight of such operations, conducted in both within the executive branch and by the Congress." (p. 206)

One could add that such oversight may also be required to lessen the potential excesses of activities that may result when intelligence agencies are not held liable for their actions.

Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection, as in the case of the other volumes in the series provides a fine text for both the teacher and student of the intelligence process.

Yet, while the Godson book provides a good overview, there is an interesting omission that may directly relate to Bamford's work. While the participants at the seminar on clandestine collection included a number of individuals who were either currently active or had served in the intelligence community, of the 74 seminar members, which also included academics, businessmen, congressional staffers and others, not one was listed as being a current or former member of the National Security Agency. This may be in keeping with Bam-

ford's contention that the NSA has an "overwhelming passion for secrecy" (p. 2). Given the agency's desire to avoid disclosures of its activities, the author has effectively employed his skills as an investigative writer to probe the workings of a sensitive organization. It is certainly understandable that members of the intelligence community in particular may decry what they regard to be an unwise exposure of a number of subjects that may relate to matters of both domestic and international security. However, while there may be a thin line between what may be regarded by some to be an irresponsible exposé and by others to be good reportage, Bamford's book falls into the latter category. The author should be commended for writing a highly readable and fascinating account of an organization which he maintains has replaced the CIA in importance and power.

Chapter 2, "Prelude," gives an excellent account of the development of technical intelligence from the pioneering work of cryptologist Herbert Yardley and the American Black Chamber to the exploits of code breakers in World War Two and the establishment of the NSA in 1952. We see that as early as the end of the First World War there was a problem of reconciling the requirements for collection with laws dealing with the right of individuals to have secure means of communications. The government's acquisition of cable traffic in spite of the constraints of the Radio Communication Act of 1912 is a good illustration of questionable practices in the pioneering days of electronic communication.

Chapter 3, "Anatomy," enables the reader to appreciate the magnitude of the facilities of the NSA. The wealth of detail includes the unique problems associated with destroying vast amounts of classified documents and illustrates one of the problems of security in this information age. The account of how \$1.2 million was spent on an unsuccessful "classified waste destructor" serves to indicate how difficult

it is to budget for the unique requirements of the agency. The section on the organizational framework of the NSA is particularly useful. Through his thorough reporting, Bamford gives us a look at the inner workings of an organization about which until now very little was known except for its title.

Chapter 4, "Penetration," discusses defections and other breaches in security that make the plots of spy novels boring in comparison. The scandal surrounding Joseph Petersen and the defections of Bernon F. Mitchell and William F. Martin serve to underscore that even the most secretive of agencies was subject to the damages created by compromising critical information.

Chapter 5, "Platforms," is an exceedingly readable account of 21st century techniques and equipment that enable the NSA to practice the most sophisticated form of technical collection and analysis. The description of the intercept stations and the use of satellites point to a technological revolution that makes the account in Godson's book pale in significance.

Chapter 6, "Targets," deals with one of the most sensitive aspects of intelligence — how is it determined which individuals and groups would be subject to surveillance? The accounts of how "watch lists" were drawn up to monitor the messages of foreigners and Americans overseas raises serious questions concerning the protection of individual rights. The problem was amplified when in 1963 "NSA had begun to turning its massive ear internally" (p. 254). The discussion of the development of Minaret which included a program to establish a "watch list" on individuals and organizations "who might foment civil disturbance or otherwise undermine national security" (p. 254) brings into focus the problems associated with the operation of domestic security programs in an open society. The account of how J. Edgar Hoover opposed the attempts of the NSA to obtain the cooperation of the FBI in providing wiretapping assistance is particularly

interesting given the fact that perhaps more than any other man in Washington the former director maximized his position by knowing that information meant power. It is also a classic study of bureaucratic infighting in the intelligence community.

Chapter 7, "Fissures," provides an interesting account of how the secrecy of NSA was undermined as the intelligence community at large had to live with the demand for public disclosure and accountability. It is interesting to note that while "the Ford administration and the NSA may have looked at the Pike and Church committees with considerable apprehension, they viewed the Government Information Subcommittee and its behatted chairwoman, Bella S. Abzug, with downright horror" (p. 302).

In the light of the disclosures of serious security violations in the British equivalent to NSA, the Government Communications Headquarters, Chapter 8, "Partners," is particularly disturbing. Given the very close cooperation between the two organizations, one must wonder about the magnitude of the damage that has resulted from the Prime affair.

Chapter 9, "Competition," will be of interest to the members of the academic community and others interested in science and public policy. The discussion of how NASA attempted to maintain its monopoly on cryptological development and related fields from "free wheeling academics" (p. 305) by seeking to control grants in this area that were given by the National Science Foundation raises the vexing problems of balancing the need for freedom of scientific inquiry with the requirements for national security. The account of how inventors of a new type of voice scrambler, under the provisions of the little-known Invention Security Act received a form with the words SECRECY ORDER instead of a patent provides yet another illustration of how the government attempted to maintain control in a sensitive area of technological innovation.

In the final chapter, "Abyss," Bamford

very effectively deals with the fundamental problems associated with protecting the individual's right to privacy from increasingly sophisticated technological eavesdropping. His discussion of the role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court illustrates the challenges created when there is an attempt to create legal institutions that must deal with technological developments that were not dreamed of in the corpus of the law. The author warns us about the dangers we may face in the form of "technotyrranny" (p. 379).

How a democratic society can protect its

own citizens from the growing technological capability of the government to pry into their own affairs without at the same time crippling the valid requirements for both domestic and foreign intelligence in this dangerous period is especially pertinent as we approach the year 1984. Bamford has raised valid and disturbing questions.


Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's and the *Puzzle Palace* help to strip away the myth surrounding intelligence and provide substance for a vital and on-going debate that should be of concern to all of us.

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