

#### THE STATUS OF THEORY IN FOREIGN POLICY

*Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente*, by R.J. Rummel. (Sage Publishers, 1972). Referred to as PE).

*The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents and Contradictions of World Politics*, by Franz Schurmann. (Pantheon Books, 1974). (Referred to as LWP).

*The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy*, by Immanuel Wallerstein. (Academic Press, 1976); and *The Capitalist World Economy*, by Immanuel Wallerstein. (Cambridge University Press, 1979). (Referred to as MWS and CWE respectively).

Foreign policy as an area for theory development has been a primarily uncultivated domain. It remains data rich and theory poor. The last major explanations of foreign policy came from the Hobbesian view of the world.<sup>1</sup> This view asserts that international relations are governed by greed and conflicts of power. In this perspective, conflict is inevitable, authority rests with might, and rewards fall to the powerful, the treacherous, and the skillful. To be sure, there is no dearth of writing on foreign policy. Unfortunately, the writings in this area, over the last several years, have rarely attempted to provide solid theoretical foundations for the historical interpretation or policy recommendations they espoused.

Perhaps the reason why new theoretical perspectives have been so slow in developing is that the international system is indeed a Hobbesian world. If this is the case, our explanations ought to be more clearly helping us to understand international affairs in today's complex world. If the Hobbesian view is not particularly fruitful, what then are the alternatives?<sup>2</sup>

1. For the modern-day classic in this area, see: Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.

2. This is an old debate. See: James Rosenau, ed. *In Search of Global Patterns*. (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

There is a clear need to review the literature and to search for a creditable understanding of foreign policy in today's complex world. We will look at three major works which have attempted to provide an understanding and explanation of foreign policy. The first is the standard realist interpretation of foreign policy as represented by R.J. Rummel in *Peace Endangered*. The other two perspectives claim to be quite different. The first perspective asserts that foreign policy is the result of domestic dynamics between interests and ideology, (Franz Schurmann), while alternately, the last view is that foreign policy is controlled by shifts in the structure of economic relations between the nations that make up the international system, (Immanuel Wallerstein). This essay attempts to evaluate critically all three positions. It must begin, however, by setting the ground rules in order to provide a common ground for comparison of the three perspectives.

Samuel Huntington has clearly stated the juxtaposition between foreign and domestic policy.

Domestic policy consists of those activities of a government which significantly affect the allocation of values among groups in society; while foreign policy consists of those activities of a government which affect significantly the allocation of values between it and other governments. The categories are not mutually exclusive. Foreign aid programs place demands on the domestic economy; agricultural surpluses have implications for foreign affairs. Domestic politics serve as a constraint on the formulation of the policies which are primarily responses to the external environment and have their principal impact on the environment. Conversely, international politics serves as a constraint on the formulation of policies which are primarily responses to the domestic environment and have their impact on that environment.<sup>1</sup>

The juxtaposition between domestic policy and foreign policy has been slowly disintegrating over time. Conflict is a result of disagreements over distinctions in the distribution of the values. But as the world becomes more interdependent, the distribution of values between domestic forces and international forces becomes a debate over the same set of distributions. To be sure, some issues take on a strictly domestic task: welfare and civil rights have traditionally been domestic issues. But increasingly, as basic human needs and human rights are recognized as needs and rights which transcend national boundaries, even these distributional questions become intrinsically both domestic and international at the same time.

3. Samuel Huntington. *The Common Defense*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961): Pp. 1-2.

Historically, resource problems in many areas of the world have been solved, at least temporarily, by technology which has repeatedly provided the necessary answers to avert projected calamity. But the world is now undergoing a new phase of crises that are caused by shortages of various natural resources. Global shortages of food and its rising price, the monetary crisis of the developed and the developing world, and the energy crisis, are the most widely recognized examples of international resource problems in the modern world. These blows to the world economy have affected both the developed and the developing countries. The developed world has discovered new interests in food management, in energy management, and in the reversal of economic recession through international cooperation. This international cooperation has created issues over the distribution of values which have traditionally been left to domestic control.

An intrinsic aspect of this growing linkage between the distribution of international values and the distribution of domestic values is the linkage between political and economic processes. This linkage is a consistent theme throughout the discussion of foreign policy for the 1980's. The capabilities of decision makers to integrate these two arenas when seeking solutions to problems significantly shapes the direction of foreign policy. In dealing with these arenas, it is necessary to make distinctions between structure and performance. Structure refers to the persisting framework of relationships through which governmental action takes place. These relationships are both domestic and international. They consist of formal organizations of the government, parties, and special interest groups; the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the political and economic culture; the characteristics of bureaucracy; and other structural components. These components change slowly in normal periods, but they can also change dramatically if crucial boundaries are exceeded. The performance of political systems, in contrast to the structure, is defined in terms of its problem solving capability.<sup>4</sup> Performance is a function of the capability to achieve a wide range of goals in a variety of political and economic environments.

In examining the foreign policy process, most scholars are con-

4. Robert Holt and John Richardson, "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics." in Holt and Turner, eds. *The Methodology of Comparative Research*. (New York: The Free Press, 1970).

cerned with performance. That is, given theorized or observed structures, scholars in the foreign policy field try to identify the effect of one performance measure on another performance measure. For example, analysts may want to know the effect of changing the international investment in a particular country on that country's political support for the investors' positions in the international system. Normally, such studies are more concerned with the effects of such actions on the process, rather than on the structure of the system. For example, few studies would examine the impact of investment strategies on the level of bureaucratic decision making in the country. Yet these kinds of effects are vitally important to long range issues of foreign policy. In fact, the immediate effects of decisions on political support, economic development, and so forth, are considerably less important than their effect on the solutions to future problems.

While the scope of foreign policy research includes both performance and structure analysis, it is our contention that basic attributes do not in and of themselves explain foreign policy behavior. Wilkenfeld, Andriole, *et al.*, argue that "standard attributes such as size and development do not directly determine or cause foreign policy behavior. A state's foreign policy behavior is the product of immediate and more dynamic factors. Long term structural characteristics should be used to classify states."<sup>6</sup> The scope of foreign policy certainly includes reference to national attributes. Indeed, the empirical studies of nations' foreign policies have attempted to classify nations according to particular clusters of characteristics, but the theoretical explanation of foreign policy must include a number of dimensions:<sup>6</sup>

1. spatial
2. temporal
3. relational
- 4 situational
5. substantive
6. behavioral

5. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gerald Hopple, Stephen Andriole, and Robert McCauley. "Profiling States for Foreign Policy Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 11, No. 1 (April 1978) : p. 9.

6. See both: Bruce M. Russett. *International Regions: The International System: A Study in Political Ecology*. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); and R.J. Rummel. *Dimensionality of Nations*. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).

Any foreign policy behavior needs to be explained in terms of the classic question "who does what to whom, where, when, over what, and in what immediate context?" Attributes do not directly deal with relations, situations, or the substance over which much foreign policy is generated.

As nations attempt to deal with resource shortages and with changes in their resource bases, national decision makers are constantly faced with critical economic and/or political choices. Typically, governments must deal with severe shortages of available resources to distribute among the various segments of their society. They are bombarded by forces from the traditional elites to maintain old fiscal support patterns, by industrialists crying for loans and other capital to build manufacturing bases or to diversify, by different ethnic and regional groups asking for local development programs for their regions, by political groups asking to be a part of the political process, and by international lending institutions demanding belt tightening fiscal policies, and so forth. Unfortunately, decision makers are rarely in a position to solve any of the problems, much less all of them. To complicate the situation, there may be strong overtones of governmental instability among many of the less developed countries, if some unidentified and perhaps unidentifiable number of problems are not resolved. Countries with large resource bases have certain luxuries in problem solving. They are able to solve or at least to satisfy minimally, many of the interest groups involved in the domestic and foreign allocation of values. But for most countries, a majority will become dissatisfied with the lack of progress and the perceived inequities in distributing limited values. Decision makers thus cannot realistically separate political issues from economic issues. They must keep the economy strong if they are to keep the economy alive. In many instances policy makers seem convinced that their only options are to use coercive force to prevent dissatisfied, powerful groups from driving them from office.

One of the persistent problems is that the foreign allocation of values directly affects, the leader's ability to redistribute domestic values to meet the demands of domestic interests. This fact of life frequently leads to the dependence upon outside sources.' The task

7. See: Raymond Duvall. "Dependence and Dependency Theory: Notes Towards Precision of Concept and Argument." *International Organization*. Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1978); and Theodore dos Santos. "The Structure of Dependence." *American Economic Review*. Vol. 60, No. 2, (May 1970); and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, Alfred Stepan, ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973); and Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson. *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy*. (New York: Doubleday, 1972).

of decision makers is to find solutions to their short term political problems that will lead, if even slowly, to further reduction of the longer range issues. In these situations, foreign policy decision makers are motivated by a combination of conscious goal achieving behavior and unplanned reactions to domestic and international stimuli. At the conscious level they are motivated by desires to stay in office, to encourage the development of their country, to further ideologically determined goals, and to advance their personal fame. They also spend much of their time reacting to events rather than following conscious, long term strategies. This is particularly true in the developing nations where the utility of long term planning is minimal. Foreign policy decision makers in these situations are constantly faced with new and unexpected problems. They must react quickly and then shift their attention to other concerns just as quickly. While long term plans and goals may provide a background to the distribution of values between nations, there is little more than the basic framework within which day to day actions must be taken.

An examination of the processes of foreign policy making easily leads to contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, there is always a great deal of decision activity. Foreign policy decision makers make critical decisions nearly every day. To some extent, one could observe that the future of these nations is being decided every day. It does not take long to discover that despite all the activity, conditions do not change very much. The amount of control leaders have over their country's future is apparently quite limited. The amount of change emanating from any one decision is also likely to be quite limited. However, the cumulative effects of apparently small changes in foreign policy strategies can have important effects on the overall pattern. It is likely that through the astute linking of many decisions that countries like Brazil have made progress in their development. In other words, appropriate attention to the distribution of values internationally can significantly affect the distribution of values domestically, and vice versa. Consequently, any serious examination of foreign policy strategies must consider the decision process, the performance of the foreign policy decision system, as well as the long term trends, the structure of foreign policy, and the availability of resources, and the attributes of foreign policy.

An analysis of the decision making process must recognize that a series of short run governmental actions may have long-term effects. It is, however, normally difficult to observe them because adjustments can be made quickly enough to forestall disastrous conse-

quences. The sequence of decisions, reactions, new decisions, and so forth, produces uneven economic and political patterns, rather than smooth transitions.

Foreign policy decision makers are faced with three high level decision trade-offs that are only rarely altered:

1. They must decide how to trade off politics against economics;
2. They must resolve the pressures to engage in long-range planning vs. short term reactions to problems; and
3. They must decide whether to focus their attention on segments of the society or to emphasize a broad overview.

Not all decision makers make decisions about these major issues daily. They do provide a background, however, against which actions are taken.

As long as the overall economy is growing rapidly enough, the decision making elites have considerable flexibility within the political-economic sphere. When people are satisfied with their material well being, they are less likely to antagonize the government. Under these conditions, decision makers can build or restructure coalitions and increase or decrease centralization or decentralization with only broadly imposed constraints. But if the growth rate is not forthcoming, there is likely to be conflict arising from any of a large number of sources. Decision makers are well aware that a rapid rate of economic growth will secure their tenure, thus there is a considerable motivation to accelerate the growth rate as rapidly as possible. Unfortunately, nations only rarely have the high rate of growth necessary to provide the government with the needed security. Although decision makers know that they would benefit if the growth curve were accelerated, they are besieged by various groups wanting benefits from the government. These benefits are often inconsistent with the goals of increasing the growth rate. In a cycle that is constantly repeated, they must yield to the groups that would provide support in a flourishing economy. Yet because they must yield to pressure groups, they may be prevented from ever obtaining the desired growth rate.

Much of this conflict has the appearance of a long-term vs. short-term decision. The various interest groups, however, are not necessarily concerned just about the short term benefits that might

occur to them as a result of certain government decisions. In some instances, their focus is on their own long-term goals rather than the long term goals of the general society. If a politically powerful group is lobbying for its own program, this could conflict with the program that might be in the best interests of the larger society. Political survival, therefore, usually means that the decision makers must cultivate some political support group, such as the military, that they can satisfy. It is important to these groups to keep the government in power even if that means political repression. International political processes can penalize repression. International political processes can penalize governments for coarser bureaucratic activity, centralization, or the weakening of democratic institutions, given a renewed interest in human rights. Domestic tolerance for coercive activity is limited also. The strengths of these penalties are determined by a number of countries' specific cultural and social mores. The overall political climate is partly determined by the relative importance of constraints and incentives in these areas.

All governments develop plans against which they must improvise to meet particular contingencies. Even under the most carefully orchestrated bureaucracies, plans eventually prove to be little more than general guidelines, however, leaving the person in the field with a fair amount of flexibility in response to circumstances.

Plans therefore always serve as boundaries that guide and restrict the responses of the organization in advance. The expectation is that by directing options in a conscious manner, goals will be achieved. The extent to which plans are real determinants of policy is quite inconsistent, however. In studying the decision process of any nation, one cannot assume that the established development of foreign policy plans are a primary, driving force. It may serve to provide important limits, in some cases, such as when quick reaction forces have not been planned into the military posture of a large country. But in a large number of other cases, it will be little more than a document prepared at periodic occasions to facilitate, for example, the securing of loans or short-term development credits, with little impact on actual decision making. It is important to recognize that decision makers must constantly observe the number of critical processes that will determine the short-term fate of the government. When these measures reach dangerous levels, the government will find it necessary to react to the immediate problem.

Even if the government's primary mode of behavior is reactive,



that does not simplify the decision process. In some instances it actually complicates it. The existence of even fuzzy goals toward which decision makers are committed, provides a simplified decision task. To solve the problem at hand without reflection on future concerns, decision makers are still confronted with a serious problem of determining just how to select a solution. Decision makers' perspectives can range from the very holistic to the very microscopic. They may, for example, look at the entirety of the national polity and economic system, concerning themselves with measures such as gross national product, the balance of payments, and overall political support. At the other extreme, decision makers can concentrate on the problems of specific organizations or sectors of the society. If they adopt the latter tactic, they will generally ignore the implications of their actions on the rest of the society. In this posture, the distribution of values across nations is evaluated directly according to its impact on the sector in the domestic economy which is being emphasized.

If, for example cotton growers in a given LDC were to have a specific problem, a highly focused decision maker would attempt to solve it, while paying only minimal attention to the effect on associated expenditures on food prices in the cities. While this approach may appear unreasonably simplistic, it is not without merit. In many less developed countries, the sectors of society, are so loosely connected that the cross-sectorial impacts are not very significant, and the international linkages may be much more important.

Furthermore, in the poorly studied economies of these nations, it is normally the case, that even if there is cross-sectorial impact it is difficult to measure or has not been identified. Decision makers do not have access to carefully prepared studies or models of their countries.' In fact, it is usually very difficult to locate a reasonably accurate input/output table for most LDC's. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that national decision makers will normally fragment their focus and operate primarily at a sectoral level in domestic actions.

Now we can turn to evaluate the three attempts to explain foreign policy that we have chosen for this exercise. Paying close attention to a number of points raised in this section, we should be prepared to raise a number of questions. How do the authors reviewed deal with

8. See Lance Taylor and Peter Clark eds. *Economy-wide Models and Development Planning*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

the distribution of values within and between societies? Do they emphasize performance or structural considerations? How does each author emphasize the various dimensions of foreign policy? How does each treat the juxtapositions examined here? And finally, are the realities of foreign affairs still firmly entrenched in a Hobbesian type of system?

The three authors we have chosen: Rudolph Rummel, Franz Schurmann, and Immanuel Wallerstein, all represent perspectives which have been well received in the intellectual marketplace today. Reviewing their works, we shall emphasize the specifics that they have focused on, as well as the general perspective that they represent. Our objective is to seek more knowledge about the logical extension of these three perspectives, particularly in terms of their overall capability to explain foreign policy. We shall conclude by trying to pull together an overall perspective which will state the principal assumptions required for the development of a general, explanatory theory of foreign policy.

### R.J. 'Rummel

"The Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world."<sup>9</sup>

"The primary struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union is not a struggle for geopolitical interest, resources or spheres of influence. Nor is it a competition between systems. It is a moral struggle...." (PE, 153).

The first quote is taken from the National Security Council's document number 68 written in 1950. That important document concluded that the Soviet Union was a power which had revolutionary designs on the West. It was a rationalization for a much expanded U.S. defense capability. The document was written at a time when the Soviet military threat was perceived as unrelenting, when power in the international system was equated almost solely with military strength, and when the United States and the Soviet Union were the dominant powers in the world. The second quote, taken from R.J. Rummel's *Peace Endangered*, written almost thirty

9. See, Daniel Yergin. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977): P. 401.

years after NSC-68 contains the same underlying assumptions. For Rummel, and for many other realists of this persuasion, no distinction is made between a nation's ideology and its foreign policy. Furthermore, power is still viewed, substantially, in terms of military capability, and the existence of this strength, when paired with the intent and will to use it, leads to its employment. They believe, as asserted, that a leader's two objectives are to extend the breadth of his rule and the depth of his dominance. Rummel in particular, rejects the Kissinger-Nixon notions that peace is obtained by fostering the emergence of multipolarity.<sup>10</sup> Collections of great powers cannot depend upon each other for military and political support. For Rummel, peace cannot equal power controlled by a web of transactions. Instead, "peace results from political dominance—a dominance not only in military capability, but also in the strength of the nation's interests and the "force of its will" (PE, 56). How does Rummel reach his conclusions? They are the result of an intensive, interactive process between methodology and theoretical perspective. He begins by laying out his view of detente.

The initial formulation for detente, Rummel states, was based on a view in the United States that a relaxation of tensions between the two countries would result from an increase in cooperative ties (named Detente I), and that peace would follow from agreements on arms control (Detente II). Rummel states that both of these conceptions of detente have been naïve and illusory, and that instead of increased cooperation, these conceptions of detente have led to and caused an increase in Soviet military capabilities and have resulted in military capabilities which are superior to those of the United States.

The conclusions are based on various factor analyses. These factor analyses have led Rummel to a number of relevant beliefs.

First, when the concept of detente is equated with the notion that cooperation leads to peace, analyses show, that increasing commercial ties and transactions does not correlate with a reduction in conflict. Rather, as Rummel states, "a knowledge of the level and nature of the cooperative transactions between a major power and another nation does not enable one to predict or forecast the level and nature of conflict." Hence, his conclusion follows that "cooperation does not buy peace" (PE, 56).

10. See Henry Kissinger. *The White House Years*. (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1979), for his philosophical position.

The second formulation of deterrence which argues that restraining military capabilities leads to peace, is also questioned. Rummel does find that "the most militarily powerful nation tends to have the most conflict behavior directed toward it" (PE, 54). But he continues to demonstrate that knowing the military capabilities between two nations does not allow us to predict their conflict behavior! As Rummel states, "there is no constant relationship between a particular kind of difference in military capability and conflict" (PE, 44).

Instead, Rummel argues for a very different definition of power. According to Rummel, "interests, credibility and capability form a triangle of power. When we speak of a balance of power in international relations, it refers to a mutual balance among these three elements. And it is this balance that undergirds the cooperative relations between nations" (PE, 49). Military capability is not the only component necessary for understanding foreign policy intentions; interests and credibility are equally important. These characteristics are defined as the strength of commitment and the force of a nation's will. For Rummel, we must not only know what a nation can do, we must know how willing it is to exert its energy for specific interests. From this definition, it appears self-evident that we need more than military power. "We must desire peace enough to fight for it." Peace results from political dominance, a dominance not only in military capability, but also in the strength of a nation's interests and the force of its will" (PE, 56). We feel compelled to point out that this statement is not the result of a factor analysis. Its truth value is not inductive or deductive. It is the product of assertion.

This same assertive stance brings Rummel to still further deviance from his data. As he states, "The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union is a protracted conflict in which the central and long-run goal of Soviet leaders is to defeat Western freedoms and bring the world under totalitarian influence and control." (PE, 153-154).

These conclusions, interestingly enough, stem from an analysis that allows Rummel to assert that conflict and cooperation go hand in hand. Rummel's analysis emphasizes the processes of interaction between nations and the balance between desires, abilities, and determination. For Rummel, these are intrinsically wound up in the attributes of nations. Some, such as military power, are directly related to attributes.

Based on an analysis of Soviet and U.S. military strength and capabilities, Rummel concludes that the balance of military strength

has shifted from the United States to the U.S.S.R. Further, he asserts that "Detente II has led to an American inferiority in arms, an unprecedented unilateral disarming process at a time when Soviet leaders have not slackened their animosity towards our fundamental values" (PE, 81).

Utilizing his data on military capability, he found that in the aggregate, Soviet capabilities have overtaken U.S. capabilities. He states that detente, as defined and implemented by the United States, has led to an increase in Soviet military capabilities vis-à-vis the United States, and furthermore, that the goal of the Soviet Union's policymakers is to subjugate the West. He has shown that when all indicators of military strength are combined, in specific ways, the Soviets have a greater capability than the U.S., but he has not found it necessary to discuss the fact that in a war with the Soviet Union, selected weapons would be used, and that the particular combinations of weapons which make up his indices of military capability would not likely be employed in anything like the same mix.

The major factor holding Rummel's conception of foreign policy together is not a mathematical one. Rather it is Rummel's ideology: an ideology which is untested. He believes that Soviet intentions are to dominate the U.S. and the West.

The present juncture of U.S.-Soviet relations is reminiscent of the period in 1950 when NSC-68 was prepared. The Soviets' military capability at that time, which had just increased tremendously with the development and testing of their atomic bomb, frightened U.S. policymakers. For many scholars and policymakers in 1950, this increased military capability of the Soviets, implied the intention to use it against the West. The document, NSC-68 made this assumption, "It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice," the authors of the document stated, "that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the Cold War," and further, that the Soviet Union "mortally challenges" the U.S." (Yergin, 402).

The words and orientation are echoed in Rummel's *Peace Endangered*. He says in his conclusion, "the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States is a protracted conflict in which the central and long-run goal of Soviet leaders is to defeat Western freedoms and bring the world under totalitarian influence and control" (PE, 153-154).

Neither Rummel nor the policymakers who prepared NSC-68

have shown that the Soviet Union's foreign policy is based on the long run goal to dominate the West. Certainly Soviet ideology expounds this philosophy; just as U.S. policymakers make it clear that the "free world" will be defended. But the connection between this ideology and foreign policy is neither discussed nor proven. Instead they are assumed to be inseparable.

Rummel presents an interesting mix to decipher. He asserts that decision makers and attributes mix in very interesting ways to make foreign policy. For him, the context of foreign policy is peripheral to the who, whom, and objectives of the interaction. Policy makers do calculate, but they seek rather uniform concerns in a game which is only for the strong at heart. This is indeed a Hobbesian world, a world which is frequently inhabited by the weak at heart. For those there is nothing but destruction at the hands of the jackals. In this world politics dominates economics, and international distributions rarely affect domestic distributions of values. His juxtaposition of long-term and short-term interests is hard to identify in that he considers time to be encapsulated in the present.

But whatever the horizon, vigilance to the pursuit of power and the willfulness to employ it skillfully are the essential components of his conception of foreign policy. decision making. This is a sectoral focus at its "best." Rummel is not concerned with the finer points of economic viability. He is interested in the development of a better fighting machine and in the willingness to employ it.

Rummel's world of foreign policy leads to the comparison of numbers, and in part to the counting of weapon systems. But power as a concept in international affairs is much broader than this. In the analysis of several hundred attributes of nations, Rummel himself has found that military attributes are tightly clustered with economic attributes. Therefore any attempt to deal with power would require very sophisticated calculations of attributes which would span a much wider horizon.

Rummel's emphasis on the military implies an economically sectoral focus which he has not defended at all. For his solution to emphasize expenditures in the military sector may cause both economic and political instabilities directly affecting a nations' will to fight, which is a critical element of his theory.

Turning from the power basis aspect of Rummel's position, we need to focus upon intent and capability. Rummel has empirically demonstrated certain differences between the USA and the USSR on indices of military capability. We have questioned both the ex-

elusiveness of the variables and the meaningfulness of the combinations into indices. But of more importance for the theory Rummel is putting forth, power is the result of a mix of capabilities, interests, and credibility. How does one identify interest and credibility? As we have shown, Rummel provides few answers. Realists have always had difficulty with this point. Rummel certainly asserts Soviet intent and credibility, but it is a much more difficult task to demonstrate it in the same manner he demonstrates weapons build-up. The classic realist position has been to assert worst case positions that capability equals intent.

There appears to be two problems for anyone wishing to develop indicators of intent and credibility. The first is the classic problem of science. If one starts down the path of proving one's assertions, much will be found to confirm one's suspicions, regardless of whether the Soviet Union is thought of as an expansionist, war prone conspirator, or as a conservative, development-oriented competitor. Very little good will come out of asserting a position and then marshalling evidence to support this position. What is needed is a careful examination of the mental set of a country and the thorough analysis of the predicted actions against actual behavior.

The other difficulty arises when one contemplates testing interest and credibility. These variables operate in quite a different time frame than do shifts in national attributes and military weapons. Indeed intention can shift from action to action and context to context. A nation's credibility may be great in economic affairs but highly questionable in military affairs.

Rummel appears to have done a fine job of showing that conflict and cooperation are both components of a stable relationship. He has also demonstrated that power has both a subjective and an objective character. While we would disagree with some of the specifics in his measures of power, he has also gone a long way in dealing with the objective side of foreign policy. But his attempt to deal with the subjective aspects are wholly inadequate. We shall have to look elsewhere for these attempts.

### Franz Schurmann

For Franz Schurmann foreign policy is a reflection of "domestic currents of thought." These domestic interests are institutionalized in bureaucracies, and molded into policy which is implemented by the executive or president. These three factors are the key corn-

ponents of Schurmann's theory of foreign policy: interests, ideology, and the role of the executive. The leader, according to Schurmann, plays the key role in the implementation of policy. As Schurmann states in *The Logic of World Power*, "When challenged to make innovative policy, the leader senses certain currents of thought, feeling and aspirations which are commonly held by most or all the members of the constituency. Using these currents as inspiration, and adding a scheme made up of real capabilities of the organization, the leader comes up with a new policy which will give him support from his constituency on both ideological and practical grounds." (LWP, 30).

While Schurmann emphasizes that the roots of interest and ideology are to be found in the society at large, "only executives in organizations can set policies" (LWP, 20). While bureaucratic organizations represent important interests in the society, they rarely can take the lead in developing new policy. Instead, the tendency towards stability and routinization is inherent in these organizations. It is only the executive or president who can develop and implement broad changes in policy.. Yet, as Schurmann asserts, new policies, new changes in organization and orientation must be grounded in domestic interests. "Those who suggest the policies," Schurmann states, "are accepted as leaders only if their message strikes chords of anticipation broadly shared by people of the constituency that has elected to follow them. The great leader, then, is one who senses what is going on in that constituency, composes the requisite music, and directs its execution by an orchestra." (LWP, 29).

But what are these important interests that the leader represents? And how does ideology reflect these interests and become the basis for policy? Schurmann thinks that the "politically significant currents" in society are composed of three matters:

- A. "The material interests of people (particularly work and jobs);
- B. their sense of order, security and justice; and
- C. the social and physical quality of their lives." (LWP, 33).

Each of these factors is encapsulated in the larger organizations of society: corporations and the government are job providers; government organizations (FBI and armed forces, for example) are providers of security; and schools, hospitals, and local and federal bureaucracies, are providers and overseers of education and health.



Individual interests, according to Schurmann, are aggregated in these different organizations. Based on these interests, Schurmann thinks, individuals develop political opinions which are "periodically molded into fixed sets of ideas." These ideas, the more concretized they become, "take on certain qualities of doctrine and so become ideology" (LWP, 35).

Political leaders then, according to Schurmann, in all societies, are rarely the originators of new ideas, but rather take these ideas and mold them; "organize the ideas into a more systematic form," and build political power. Here we have a clear statement of the development of interests.

For Schurmann, then, interests, ideology and the executive are the three key points of a cyclic process: the basic interests of individuals generate different ideologies which are molded into political actions and policies by leaders.

Political ideologies, according to Schurmann are potent and long-lasting. This is because ideologies reflect basic world-views of individuals, and as such, are slow to alter. Thus interests, molded into ideologies, become the basis for long-range domestic and foreign policy objectives. But, according to Schurmann, these currents of thought could not be transformed into policy without a strong executive or president.

Schurmann's book is both historical and theoretical. His theory is drawn from his examination of state-to-state relations since World War II. He concentrates primarily on three different countries: the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, but his main concern is with the United States. In Schurmann's view, the United States has been "the prime mover in this new network (of relations between countries)...since 1945 when the nuclear age began" (LWP, 159). Schurmann sees U.S. policy since World War II as the policy of an imperialist power. The roots of this imperialism, according to Schurmann, are traceable to Roosevelt, and to domestic currents of thought, common during and immediately after the War. According to Schurmann, Roosevelt had a vision of the world, and the power to implement his vision. His vision was institutionalized in the United Nations, in the international monetary system, and reflected in the military posture of the country. The currents, that Roosevelt drew upon, related to matters of "order, security and justice" and were reflected in two different orientations: that of the internationalists and the nationalists.

The internationalists in the United States, focused on the need for

an established international system, particularly a monetary system, while the view of the nationalists current, was the need for military power," with the preeminent need of the first group being order, and the second security" (LWP, 60). The resulting ideology based on these two trends of thought, was containment. The containment doctrine and ideology was fully enunciated by 1947, and became an overarching ideology and world-view for both ideological camps. The outgrowths of this ideology were policies which emphasized weapons development to counter the Soviet threat, the establishment of overseas bases to contain the Soviets, and an economic system which was primarily managed by the United States. According to Schurmann, "containment ideology asserted a kind of global unity which neither the nationalists nor internationalists current was able to do or even wanted to do" (LWP, 103). Out of this ideology arose policies which were imperialistic in nature, and which were the mainstay of American foreign policy until the end of the Vietnam war. Rummel appears to embrace this ideology without clearly stating it. For him it is dangerous for the United States to "allow" the Soviets to break out of their isolationism and to threaten the sense of unity upon which U.S. foreign policy has long been based.

The significance of this new ideology of containment for the development of U.S. foreign policy, for its affect on bureaucratic interests, and for the direction it gave to relations between the major powers should not be underestimated.

The ideology of containment, drawing from both the nationalists and internationalists world-views, acted as a kind of meta-ideology, an overarching world-view for both groups.

As Schurmann points out, however, the impetus for the acceptance of containment as an ideology and policy, was domestic rather than international in nature. As he states, "whether Russia was or was not expansionist is not vital to understanding why the new foreign policy current of containment arose." (LWP, 92). Rather, Schurmann asserts that containment, "filled an ideological vacuum in Washington," and that the "rising national security bureaucracy clustered around the White House needed a view of the world that would fit the policies they were beginning to develop." (LWP, 92).

Thus the government, particularly the executive branch, was able to use this ideological outlook as a bargaining tool in building coalitions comprised of both nationalists and internationalists. Herein

lies the strength and durability of this world-view. It appealed to the major trends of thought in both domestic camps. "The containment world-view was a creative synthesis of the nationalists and internationalists current with elements that fitted the liberal drive towards bigger government and greater spending.... Thus nationalists like Vandenberg could be satisfied that containment never envisioned a sellout of American interests. At the same time the internationalists could be satisfied in the knowledge that containment was committed to the prime need for a free enterprise capitalist economy within the bounds of the free world, that it supported the United Nations, and all efforts at conservative international cooperation in Western Europe, that it favored the revival of capitalist economies in Germany and Japan, and that while advocating foreign aid, it did not favor using it to support socialist practices in recipient nations." (LWP, 104-105).

While the ideology of containment appeared to major portions of both domestic groups, containment dissatisfied some members of both groups. Many nationalists, who were mainly conservatives devoted to anti-communism, and opposed to "big government," favored supporting Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek against communism and became identified with the policy of "rollback." The internationalists were interested mainly in protecting capitalism and the free enterprise system and rebuilding the European economies. They rallied around the Marshall Plan after World War II.

Accommodation towards these two groups became a major part of American foreign policy from World War II until Vietnam, according to Schurmann. The view of the internationalists, on the importance of strong, open economies shaped our policies towards Europe, while the nationalists commitment against revolutionary China, and for the rollback of communism can be seen in our policy towards Taiwan and East Asia in general.

According to Schurmann, the late 1950's "marked,...a major transition in American foreign policy. At the same time that Eisenhower responded to his internationalist inclinations by moving toward peaceful coexistence with Russia, he also gave in to nationalist pressure and moved further toward rollback policies in East Asia." (LWP, 195).

In addition to generating counterattacks by both the nationalists and the internationalists, the policy and ideology of containment led to new sources of bureaucratic conflicts, particularly among the

military service agencies, and led to what Schurmann called, "trade-offs of power for policy." (LWP, 181).

Schurmann asserts that the inter-agency conflicts between the navy, army and the air-force over control of nuclear weapons and control over the formulation of strategic doctrine and military policy, led to the increased power of these agencies in regards to specific areas of military doctrine. The executive branch, through the power of the budget, and by allowing agencies to develop policies and acquire equipment without strict supervision, was able to pursue containment policies and force an easing of cold-war tensions, without the military, who represented mainly nationalist currents of thought, expressing strong discontent. As Schurmann states, "the military chieftains generally accepted the new great power relationships if they got something in return. Naturally, higher budgetary allocations are a prime reassurance to a military bureaucracy fearful of cutbacks." (LWP, 181).

According to Schurmann, chief executives in the U.S. from World War II until Vietnam were able to placate the nationalists and military agencies by making commitments regarding the protection of East Asia. As Schurmann states, "all Presidents, regardless of their particular inclination, have had to make concessions to nationalist and military interests." But even more importantly, Schurmann, observes that "one can say that the predominant form the relationship between the chief executive and the nationalist military alliance took was a trade-off of global policy for regional power." (LWP, 183).

Just as the ideology of containment led to compromises and bargaining with domestic interest groups, it had a major impact on the direction of international relations. The ideology of containment was based on a view of the world as a battleground between the two major powers, the Americans and the Soviets. As Schurmann asserts, containment, "made the nuclear competition between America and Russia the central fact of world history in the eyes of their respective governments. Out of that competition came the notion of a 'nuclear umbrella' which American and Russia each extended over the territories presumed to belong indisputably to its camp. Containment, therefore, viewed the world as characterized mainly by two immense entities in conflict. Each of them, the free world and the socialist camp, was headed by one nation, differing from all others by virtue of its size and power." (LWP, 104). The bulk of Schurmann's analysis is concerned with the evolution and institutionaliza-

tion of this ideology in the U.S., and the effect it had on relations between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union, and finally, its central role in American involvement in Vietnam.

This ideology could never have become a significant policy, however, without a strong executive branch, particularly without presidents who nurtured this world-view. Conversely, the ideology of containment, Schurmann asserts, generated new sources of strength for the executive. According to Schurmann, "the executive branch acquired a monopoly over 'national security policy', and the presidential monopoly over national security policy was the most important achievement of the government during the postwar period" (LWP. 106). Presidential control, particularly over defense matters grew ever more powerful from the period immediately after World War II until the withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam in the 1970's. This same period marked the rule of U.S. imperialism throughout the world, an imperialism drawn from domestic sources, and expressed through U.S. economic and military policies towards other nations. According to Schurmann, the policies of the U.S. in Vietnam, again reflected this ideology and a mix of interests, which had become institutionalized in the U.S. Schurmann asserts that the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam marked the end-point of U.S. imperialism based on containment. It signalled a significant shift in domestic interests and concerns. Schurmann views the major change as a shift towards isolationism, a "withdrawal inward," which was reflected in a change in presidential ideology.

Schurmann's analysis, unfortunately, ends at this point. He does not discuss the implications of this shift in ideology or how it is likely to affect changes in policy.

*The Logic of World Power* was completed in 1973, before Nixon's downfall, before the rise and perhaps demise of detente. While he sensed a change in ideology, he did not foresee the rising importance of Congressional power and control over foreign affairs, and the "reigning in" of presidential control and authority over defense matters.

Furthermore, while Schurmann's analysis claimed to be cross-societal, he succeeded more in capturing important sources of policy in democratic countries, than in socialist ones. While Schurmann views the Chinese leaders as running an "absolutely democratic" country, recent evidence seems to indicate that perhaps the cycle of interests, ideology and leadership presented by Schurmann is not an accurate representation of policy development in China or other socialist countries.

For example, while Schurmann is able to discuss in the case of the U.S., the domestic sources which led to a policy and ideology of containment, for both the Soviet Union and the Chinese, Schurmann's analysis has a different starting point. In both countries, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism is a given. Schurmann's analysis then concentrates more on the interpretation of this ideology, which is different for the two countries, and on the interplay between this world view and the international environment. In fact for both the Soviet Union and China, Schurmann emphasizes the importance of their response to the international environment (dominated by the imperialist thrusts of the U.S.) as a major determinant in the development of their foreign policies. While domestic groups play an important part in the development of these policies, the ability of interest groups to generate new policies or change existing ones is more limited in these countries, as is the case in the U.S.

Schurmann's analysis of foreign policy development in China and Russia then, focuses more on their responses to international events, viewed through their different ideological positions, than on domestic sources of foreign policy.

In the case of the Soviet's, for example, Schurmann asserts that their foreign policy has reflected almost a mirror-image of U.S. foreign policy. Soviet leaders, like their counterparts in the United States, have tended to view the world as being divided into two hostile camps, made up of capitalist imperialist and socialists. The context of the relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can be viewed as one of threat (from capitalists or socialists) and reaction to this threat by both countries.

The Chinese have also viewed the world in such Manichaeian terms. But the Chinese have also had to contend with the Soviets. First as partners, then as adversaries when the Soviets withdrew their aid and commitments for security in the 1960's.

When Schurmann does discuss politics in both the Soviet Union and China, his view is mostly from the "top down." His discussion of Khrushchev's policies after his successful handling of the Hungarian revolt, and his discussion of the Chinese leaders responses to domestic problems in the mid-1950's, makes this more explicit:

The reverberations of the events in Eastern Europe and Khrushchev's new domestic line continued to pose challenges to his rule until early June, 1957, when he finally won out over his oponents. Khrushchev's reign remained secure from then until his fall in October 1964. During that period, he began to carry out both the foreign and domestic policies he had been advocating since his rise

to power. Those policies, were, in sum, detente with America, expansion of Russian political and economic influence in the Third World, and a domestic program of all-out stress on high technology industries (for example, space and missile programs), rapid development of agriculture and consumer goods industries, and reform of the archaic Stalinist system of political rule, centralized administration, and repressive social control.

China's domestic problems were, of course, quite different from those of Russia. Stalin had at least begun to deal with Russian backwardness but virtually nothing had been done in China with a backwardness far worse than Russia's ever was. The great event in China in 1955 was the collectivization of agriculture, and no elaborate economic or social analysis is necessary to understand why it occurred. Peace, stability, and industrial development had produced a burgeoning population which soon would exceed Chinese agriculture's limited capacities to feed it. Large-scale capital investment in agriculture was out of the question. Chinese export capabilities were too limited to allow for extensive food purchases abroad. The only hope was to rationalize the fragmented state of agriculture with its tiny family-owned plots by combining them into larger units which could be farmed more efficiently with existing methods. In contrast to Russia, collectivization was by and large a success in China, and by 1957 and 1958 the food situation had greatly improved. But while the Chinese followed Stalin's example in collectivization, they departed from it by launching a program of decentralization of economic controls and administration. Again, unlike Stalin, they saw the need to stimulate the myriads of small-scale enterprises that had always existed in China by taking away the heavy hand of planning and allowing them to produce under some semblance of market conditions." (LWP, 252-252)

For Schurmann, it is the nuclear policy of containment, as stated by U.S. policymakers, which solidified the adversary relationships between these three countries: China, the U.S. and the USSR. The history of relations between the three countries since World War II is grounded primarily in policy responses towards actions stemming from the containment ideology.

While it is indeed true that nuclear policy has determined much of the content and the context of relations among these major powers since the end of the war, a theory of foreign policy must take into account more than this triangular relationship. While Schurmann's conceptual framework adds a great deal to the beginnings of a theory of foreign policy, his scope is too limited. He had disregarded the important role of other countries in the international system, and downplayed the importance that external actions (both national and multinational) can have on the development of domestic and foreign policy. The recent activities of the Iranian government, for example, have certainly affected short-term foreign policy objectives, of at least two of the three superpowers, and may lead to long-run changes in that policy.

In addition, his view of the state, which he says, is the Marxist view of the state turned upside down, (See LWP, 129-137) is conceptually narrow. The state, according to Schurmann, is constantly remade as the interests and ideologies of the members of society change. These interests "infiltrate" the state through the bureaucracies. As he asserts, "the state is made and remade constantly in that new ideologies, new executives, and new bureaucracies constantly keep changing it. In America, it is remade every four years" (LWP, 136-137). Schurmann states that the important source of this change is ideological, and moreover, that it is the ideological interests of the poor and oppressed that lead this process of change. Yet this very assertion regarding change contradicts his emphasis on the long-run nature of ideology and furthermore, overstates the impact that change, based on the ideology of the dispossessed, can have on the organizations and policies of society.

For Schurmann, the cycle of change in policy and direction of society always begins with "domestic currents of thought," and is eventually institutionalized in bureaucratic and policy shifts. Schurmann does not emphasize, however, the reverse of this cycle: that is that organizations and bureaucracies have a tremendous influence on structuring the environment and setting the agenda for policy making, and that interests can develop from the top and filter downward into society.

Furthermore, Schurmann's emphasis on the president or executive as the implementer of broad policy changes, has blinded him from seeing other important actors who impinge upon and affect foreign policy decisions, such as important members of Congress, business leaders, members of covert organizations and non-governmental actors in other countries. Karl Deutsch in *The Analysis of International Relations*, has laid out a rather extensive set of actors and levels of actions, which make up what he calls the national decision system. According to Deutsch, "the nation...can be thought of as a national decision system, and for some purposes of analysis we can visualize the flow of communications and decisions in a very simplified image as a cascade of five levels. We can imagine that each level is formed by a distinct reservoir of public or elite opinion. Each of these reservoirs is linked to a particular complex of social institutions and status groups." " According to Deutsch, there

11. Karl Deutsch. *The Analysts of International Relations*. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968): Pp. 99-111.



are five levels that make up this national decision system: the social and economic elite, the political and governmental elite, the media of mass communication, the network of local opinion leaders, and the politically relevant strata of the population at large. While Deutsch's model needs to be more fully developed, particularly the last category, his breakdown of opinion levels, could prove to be a very useful starting point for further research and analysis on important domestic sources of foreign policy. His diagram of the five levels in interaction, reproduced below, captures an important characteristic of domestic groups: their interconnectedness with each other and with the larger decision environment, (See Diagram One).


Thus, while Schurmann has pointed out important sources of foreign policy that have been overlooked in most discussions of foreign policy, he leaves many areas unexamined. The next author to be discussed, Immanuel Wallerstein, has a very different conception of the state from Schurmann, and concentrates on the economic organization of society, and the position of that society within the world-system.

### Immanuel Wallerstein

It is difficult to deal with Wallerstein by focusing on a single work. Instead it would be consistent with Wallerstein's whole perspective to deal with his own development, to date, as a whole. We will therefore deal with the ideas of Wallerstein as presented in *The Modern World System* and *The Capitalist World Economy*.<sup>12</sup>

Wallerstein takes considerable exception with traditional logical-positivism in the social sciences. He is abhorred by the prospect of separating history, social science, and politics. He is especially negative about the tendency of liberal scholars to consider the development of countries as proceeding through stages. For Wallerstein, the only system to be studied is the world system and its associated world economy. As Wallerstein asserts:

12. See also: Christopher Chase Dunn, "The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality: A Cross National Study." *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 40 (December 1975); and Theodore H. Moran, "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependencistas and non-Dependencistas." *International Organization*. Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1978).



In order to describe the origins and initial workings of a world system, I have had to argue a certain conception of a world-system. A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension, and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning." (MWS, 229)

The world economy develops structures for dealing with nation-states. These developments lead to the division of the world into three classes: the core, the periphery and the semi-periphery. State structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the periphery. "Which area plays which role is in many ways," according to Wallerstein, "accidental. What is necessary is that in some areas the state machinery be 'far stronger than in others.'" (MWS, 237)

The basic character of the world system is governed by the surplus production of commodities and by a differentiation in the means of production. The creation of a world-system requires: an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question; the development of heterogeneity in products among various zones of the world; and the creation of relatively strong state mechanisms in what would become the core states in this society. This form of world system has occurred in a stable form only once.

The critical element that differentiated the capitalist world-system was that when it was created in the 14th and 15th centuries, it survived. Previous world economies were highly unstable structures which tended either to be converted into empires or to disintegrate. The reason for this stability is that the system had a multiplicity of political systems. This system develops a pattern whereby political structures are relatively strong and enduring in the core states, and relatively weak in the periphery. By a strong state Wallerstein means:

...strength vis-a-vis other states within the world economy including other core states, and strong vis-a-vis local political units within the boundaries of the state. In effect we mean a sovereignty that is de facto as well as de jure. We also mean a state that is strong vis-a-vis any particular social group within the state. Obviously such groups vary in the amount of pressure they can bring to bear upon the state. And obviously certain combinations of these groups control the state. It is not that the state is a neutral arbiter. But the state is more than a

simply vector of given forces, if only because many of those forces are situated in more than one state or are defined in terms that have little correlation with state boundaries. 'MWS, 237)

*The Modern World System* traces the 16th century development of the world economy. The means of production in the first era of the system were clearly agricultural. The core areas capitalized on the forms of production that were not labor intensive. Thus they emphasized pasture lands rather than arable crops. The periphery continued to produce grains which kept their means of production labor intensive and reduced the profitability and productivity of their economies. Wallerstein describe this division of labor:

The difference was less in the peasant's alternatives, though this played a role, than in the landowner's alternatives. Where was he to draw the largest and most immediate profit? On the one hand, he could turn his land over to other uses (pasture land at a higher rate of profit or lease for money to small farmers- both of which meant dispensing with the feudal-labor service requirements) and using the new profit for investment in trade and industry and/or in aristocratic luxury. On the other hand, he could seek to obtain larger profits by intensifying production of staple cash-crops (especially grain) and then investing the new profits in trade (but no industry and/or in aristocratic luxury). The former alternative was more plausible in northwest Europe, the latter in eastern Europe, largely because the slight differential already established in production specialties meant that profit maximization was achieved, or at least thought to be achieved, by doing more extensively and more efficiently what one already did best. Hence, the state authorities encouraged enclosures for posturing, (and truck farming) in England, but the creation of large domains for wheat growing in eastern Europe." (MWS, 79)

Wallerstein continues:

Note then the overall picture. Northwest Europe is in the process of dividing the use of her land for pastoral and arable products. This was only possible as the widening market created an ever larger market for the pastoral products, and as the periphery of the world-economy provided cereal supplements for the core areas. The semiperiphery was turning away from industry (a task increasingly confided to the core) and *toward* relative self-sufficiency in agriculture. The agricultural specialization of the core encouraged the monetization of rural work relationships, as the work was more skilled and as landowners wished to rid themselves of the burden of surplus agricultural workers. Wage labor and money rents became the means of labor control. In this system, a stratum of independent small-scale farmers could emerge and indeed grow strong both on their agricultural products and on their links to the new handicraft industries. Given the increase in population and the decline in wages, it would then follow, as Marx said, that these yeoman farmers "grew rich at the expense both of their

laborers and their landlords." They usurped (by enclosure) the lands of the former, arguing publicly the need to guarantee the country's food supply and then hired them at low wages, while obtaining at fixed rentals more and more land from the owners of large demesnes. We do not wish to overstate the strength of this new yeoman class. It is enough to realize they became a significant economic, and hence political, force. Their economic strength lay in the fact that they had every incentive to be "entrepreneurial." They were seeking wealth and upward mobility: the route to success lay through economic efficiency. But they were not yet burdened down either by traditional obligations of largesse or status obligations of luxury spending or town life. (MWS, 81-82)

Such a system has an obvious dynamic. Nations are classified according to their means of production in core, periphery and semi-periphery. The periphery is the area which produces labor intensive crops and that must rely upon some form of coerced cash crop labor as the means of control. Semi-peripheral areas emerged as concentrating on specialized high cost industrial products, and credit and specie transactions. The core areas specialized in higher level skills favoring tenancy in agriculture and wage labor.

"The key fact is that given slightly differing starting points," Wallerstein asserts, "the interests of various local groups converged in northwest Europe, leading to the development of strong state mechanisms, and diverged sharply in the peripheral areas, leading to very weak ones. Once we get a difference in the state mechanisms, we get the operation of 'unequal exchange' which is enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas. Thus capitalism invokes not only appropriation of surplus value by an owner from a laborer, but an appropriation of the surplus of the whole world economy by core areas." (CWE, 18-19)

The semi-periphery is the key to stability in the capitalist world economy. It is the group of nations whose future is dependent upon both the core and the periphery. It is both the exploiter and the exploited. It is mobility which holds this dynamic together. Countries can fall from the core to the semi-periphery or rise from the periphery to the semi-periphery.

But there are two contradictions in this system, according to Wallerstein. The first deals with the need to remove surplus from the consumption of the masses so as to maximize profit for the few, while at the same time the production of surplus requires that it be redistributed in the form of values. The second juxtaposition deals with the cost of cooption. Whenever the core coops an opponent, they cut their short-term costs of conflict but up the ante for its cooption in the next crisis. As Wallerstein asserts, "the cost of 'coop-

tion' rises ever higher and the advantages of cooption seem ever less worthwhile." (CWE, 35)

This perspective emphasizes the role of the state in a very particular manner. For Wallerstein, "the state functions as a means for particular groups to affect and distort the functioning of the market. The stronger the state machinery, the more its ability to distort the world market in favor of the interests it represents" (CWE, 61). States then are the objects of capture. They have been captured by by special interest groups. To the extent that they are weak (as in the periphery), they are controlled by outsiders (frequently core states but also multinational corporations). This insight into the nature of the system has led to much of the dependencia literature which originally attempted to explain Latin American relations with the United States. But Wallerstein sees an imaginative solution to these problems of exploitation. It lies in the cyclic nature of expansion and contraction in the world economy.

The conflict between the distribution of values within a society and the aggregation of values by a few (the flow of value from many countries to a single country) creates the contraction-expansion cycle in the world economy. As Wallerstein describes in *The Capitalist World Economy*:

As long therefore, as expansion continues, the mode of economic prosperity for producing groups in semiperipheral areas is via the reinforcement of dependency patterns vis-ii-vis core countries. However, when world contraction comes, the squeeze is felt by core countries who proceed to fight each other, each fearing slippage. Now the semiperipheral countries may be courted, as the outlets for core products become relatively rarer. The bargaining relationship of a core and semiperipheral country changes in exactly the way the bargaining relationship between seignior and serf changed in moments of economic contraction in the Middle Ages, in favor of the lower strata enabling the latter to get some structural and even institutional changes as part of the new exchange." (CWE, 89)

This then is the very nature of core-periphery relations in the capitalist world economy. For Wallerstein, periods of economic difficulties lead to a closing of markets in the periphery while prosperity leads to a period of open competition for those markets.

Wallerstein asserts that developments in the semiperipheral countries in the coming decades will indicate whether significant structural and systemic changes will be forthcoming. As he says,

The semiperipheral states in the coming decades will be a battleground of two

major transnational forces. One will be the multinational corporations who will be fighting for the survival of the essentials of the capitalist system: the possibility of continued surplus appropriation on a world scale. The other will be a transnational alignment of socialist forces who will be seeking to undermine the capitalist world-economy, not by "developing" singly, but by forcing relatively drastic redistributions of world surplus and cutting the long term present and potential organizational links between multinationals and certain strata internal to each semiperipheral country, including such strata in the socialist semiperipheral states. (CWE, 117-118)

Potential structural changes, however, may not be confined to the semiperipheral states. Wallerstein maintains that major changes may be forthcoming in Eastern and Western Europe.

Let me, start by making a guess about the geopolitical alignments that will emerge in the next twenty years or so. The guess may be far off, but if we are calculating probabilities and therefore strategies we must at least discuss it. I would start by seeing the likelihood of a link-up between the European Economic Community and the Comecon countries. Such a link-up makes a lot of sense on various dimensions. For western Europe, it would guarantee an immense market and resource base with which to emerge as the leading economic force at the end of the present world economic contraction. For the USSR, it would guarantee the kind of advanced technology it needs to overcome its stagnant economic level. Politically, it could only be based on an updated version of social democracy. But this would of course delight the middle strata not only of western but also of eastern Europe, especially if we bear in mind that social democracy need not mean political liberalism. If such an alliance were able to include parts of the Arab world as well, it would have a fair chance to achieve world hegemony. (CWE, 243)

While Schurmann fails to recognize the importance that organized bureaucracies, and leaders, can play in developing and manipulating interests, Wallerstein misses the significance that domestic and international *politics* have on affecting the distribution of values both domestically and internationally.

Both Wallerstein and Schurmann recognize the importance of the dynamics of politically significant currents in shaping foreign policy. But Wallerstein carries this point further. He argues that the currents are not contained within the boundaries of nation-states. Rather they transcend boundaries. The realization which is left unanswered is whether these points are relevant for all three groups of nations. We think not. The assertion seems natural for the core states, partially true for the semi-periphery, (especially for those groups which deal with the concentration of excess profits), but quite weakly related to developing economies in the periphery.

Wallerstein's conclusions suggest that the end result in the social dynamics of the world capitalist system is victory for one of his forces. He foresees that the socialists will eventually succeed because they will be able to force a redistribution of the world surplus of value. Certainly this is a viable option. There are several problems, however, which Wallerstein does not directly address in achieving his final product. First, redistribution of the world surplus may not affect the multinational corporations links to the semi-periphery at all. For instance, German and French MNC's expansions are quite capable of securing markets in the East and still purchasing resources from the South. Were this to happen, a redistribution of surplus would not go to the Third World but rather to the developed semi-peripheral worlds and the loss in the periphery would maintain itself. The MNC's would merely pass the cost on to the East. It is also the case that such export strategies towards the countries to the East does not guarantee a linkage of economies, as Wallerstein seems to envision. This is especially the case if resources still come from outside the Eastern block.

The second area of concern seems to be the rather limited Western European, Eastern European cluster concepts put forward by Wallerstein. These seem to ignore the possibility of rather large ethnic political groupings affecting peripheral-semi-peripheral interactions in the future. Latin America, Asian and Muslim regional organizations, whether loosely linked or tightly linked appear quite viable, both economically and politically, in the not too distant future. These organizational links may redistribute the interrelationship between the core, semi-periphery and periphery from the hierarchical notions that we see today to a more spoke-like or peddle-like distribution of the future. If this happens, it may or may not affect core relations.<sup>13</sup> Finally, redistribution of the means of production and surplus may not mean that the periphery gets more, but rather it may mean it gets less. As Nye and Keohane observed, "the problems in the future may not be that the north takes the south seriously, but that it ignores it completely. As

13. Johan Galtung. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 8, No. 1, (1971).

14. See Keohane and Nye, "The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research." in C. Fred Bergsten, ed. *World Politics and the International Economic System*. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977).



we have seen in the oil case, multinational corporations have found the limits of direct control in both the Middle East and elsewhere. Direct control by multinational corporations is never permanent but the real impact and power of such corporations is in their ability to control information and in their domestic impact on the ideologies of the leaders. Here Schurmann's position on (ideology seems well taken. Multinational corporations are part of the bargain that a national leader strikes with - domestic sources of support. Primarily, one of the major multinational corporations is in the military hardware supply area. In this area, there is a strong inter-relationship between national security issues and economic issues, and the impact of economics vs. politics becomes much more difficult to untangle for these multinational corporations. Wallerstein never really addresses the nature of conflict. Is it over markets? Is it between the oppressed and oppressors? Or does it stem from the classic social problems of alienation? These seem to be the natural directions in which Wallerstein would go, but it is unclear as to just what role conflict will play in the future relations between the three major sectors: core, periphery, and semi-periphery.

## CONCLUSION

The review of the three major theoretical thrusts here suggest that there is much more similarity between perspectives than appears on the surface. All three authors tend to define power as a political component in the development of explanations of foreign policy. We have suggested that there are three aspects of power: an attribute base, the substantive interests of leadership, and the credibility of positions. These are the three components of Rummel's perspective. In the definition of power bases Wallerstein emphasizes economics, and especially the means of production associated with the capitalist system. Rummel focuses almost exclusively on the military, weapons systems, and manpower, and Schurmann advocates the focus on the political support and leeway which the leadership of a country is able to accomplish.

Interests are by nature a subjective component of power for both Schurmann and Wallerstein. Here Schurmann sees a nation's interests as being a deal struck by a country's leader between opposing political, economic, and military forces within his country. It is an attempt through ideology to assert the specific components or objectives of foreign policy in such a way that coalitions of supporting

forces can be established. For Wallerstein, the interests are simple, they are the enhancement of the economic profit of business interests within each political unit. More specifically, it is the profitability returned to managers from the surplus production of labor.

Rummel leaves interests to be asserted. Yet we are asked to believe that the Soviet Union's sole interest is in conquering the world. This is an obvious attempt to return to the philosophy of containment, but Rummel provides little support for this assertion.

The final component of power is the credibility with which it is wielded. This is the subject which is least developed by all three authors. For Schurmann, credibility is in a large part assessed by the degree of support in the leadership of a country. This credibility is indexed by such instruments as Harris and Roper polls in the United States. Such indicators would allow one to assess the degree to which a president need not overly concern himself with changing directions of his foreign policy. Clearly this is not enough, for other countries will look at credibility not just in the degree to which a president has domestic leeway, but the degree to which he will do what he says he will do. This particular component of power is not well developed by any of the three analysts. Rummel asserts that the Russians will always be ready to use military power when it is in their interest to do so, and Wallerstein believes fervently that a country's pursuit of profit in the form of surplus productivity is a wholly creditable effort in itself.

Another basic component to all three authors is the notion of conflict. All perceive the world in very Hobbesian terms, each political unit is out to enhance its own power and sees no inherent problems in using any means available. Thus power is to be asserted by the powerful if they have the will to do it. Schurmann and Wallerstein "know" they possess such a will. Rummel is less sure, but wishes the U.S. could regain its will to fight.

Market conflicts are also inherent aspects of both Schurmann's and Wallerstein's positions. Conflict over the control of production is essentially associated with Wallerstein. Tests of might and conflicts of pure will are the components of Rummel's vision of conflict.

All three conclusions have empirical implications. For Rummel, the answers are obvious; his is a positivist theory of foreign policy. He would have us collect attributes of nations for measuring the differences. This approach is an off-shoot of much fine empirical analysis Rummel has done in the past. Schurmann sees foreign policy as an issue of the distribution of symbols of foreign policy to

maximize the size of the domestic coalition. This can obviously lead to some of the game theoretic work in cooperative games.<sup>15</sup> This issue is how does a benevolent dictator identify a position which satisfies the desires of a maximum number of positions. Much of the bureaucratic literature,<sup>17</sup> is also relevant to the position that Schurmann is taking. Wallerstein relies more heavily on historical analysis but there is an empirical component as well. He is looking at the reality of the dynamics of a number of economic indicators, trade, productivity, monetary flows, etc. These must be looked at in terms of their change as opposed to their absolute limits. In the long run, the economic models of Project Link relates well to the Wallersteinian position. It is a position which is central to the world modelling effort in Eastern Europe.<sup>18</sup> From all of this we can see that a theory of foreign policy requires at least three components. It requires an attribute component, a subjective component, and a systemic component. Let us develop this a little further.

The attributes of a country, whether measured in terms of military strength (weapons systems, manpower), size of a population, or strength of an economy (GNP, trade flows), can tell us something about the physical capabilities of a country. Yet as we have pointed out, in the case of Rummel's analysis, one cannot deduce interests and credibility from capabilities alone. This first position regarding the determinants of foreign policy can be classified under a larger conceptual heading, termed the rational actor model by Allison in *The Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. According to Allison, theorists of this persuasion view nation-states as unitary actors, and view the outputs of government as representing purposive choices. As Allison suggests, "theorists of international relations focus on problems between nations in accounting for the choices of unitary rational actors.

15. See, Robert Axelrod. *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals With Applications to Politics*. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970).

16. See, Brock and Nesbitt. "Large-Scale Energy Planning Models: A Methodology Analysis." *National Science Foundation Report*.

17. See, Graham Allison. *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971), and Morton Halperin. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977).

18. See E.R. Kaminski and B. Okolski. "A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of the World Economic System." *Oeconomica Polona: Journal of the Economic Committee of the Polish Academy of Science and of the Polish Economic Society*. No. 3 (1979).

Strategic analysts concentrate of the logic of action in the absence of an actor. For each of these groups, the point of an explanation is to show how the nation or government could have chosen to act as it did, given the strategic problems it faced... (The analyst) then fixes the unit of analysis: governmental choice. Next he focuses attention on certain concepts and goals and objectives of the nation or government. And finally, he invokes certain patterns of inferences: if the nation performed an action of this sort it must have had a goal of this type," (p. 5). Furthermore, as Allison states, scholars who utilize this conceptual framework, "assume that what must be explained is an action, i.e., behavior that reflects purpose or intention. Each assumes that the actor is a national government. Each assumes that the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem. For each, explanation consists of showing what goal the government was pursuing when it acted and how the action is a reasonable choice, given the nation's objectives" (p. 13).

Rummel's analysis of the character of Soviet-U.S. relations is clearly based on this type of conceptual model. The Soviet Union is viewed as a unitary actor pursuing aggressive policies with the goal being dominance over the West. He views the action, arms development, as a means towards the final goal of dominance. As we have stated, Rummel simply asserts the end-goal from the initial action, Soviet weapons development. As Allison points out, this is often the method used by scholars of this persuasion. According to Allison, "The fundamental method employed in rational actor analysis is what Schelling has called 'vicarious problem solving.' Faced with a puzzling occurrence, the analyst puts himself in the place of the nation or government. Examination of the strategic characteristics of the problem permits the analyst to use principles of rational action to sift through both commissions and omissions. Evidence about details of behavior, statements of government officials, and government papers are then marshalled in such a way that a coherent picture of the value-maximizing choice from the point of view of the nation emerges." (p. 35).

The rational actor school of thought, and the realist perception of international politics, are not without value for the development of a theory of foreign policy. They are however, much too limited to play the only role in that development. While the rational actor model has been the "classical" mode of thinking in the field of foreign policy for many years, several new conceptual frameworks have evolved which are more useful for the analysis of foreign policy.

Schurmann's analysis represents a break with the rational actor framework, and encompasses a much wider range of actors and interests than the rational actor model. Schurmann's model of foreign policy actually draws on Allison's second and third conceptual models: the Organizational Process Model (Model II) and the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model (Model III). Schurmann has done a thorough job of describing, at least for the U.S., the organizational context of decision-making and interest group bargaining inherent in any major decision and action. Schurmann actually goes beyond Allison's two models and traces the domestic currents of interests and thought that generate the organizational context and the bases for group bargaining. This subjective component of foreign policy decision-making, which until recently was not well understood, is analyzed well by Schurmann. As stated, he has rounded out the argument by focusing not only on governmental organizations and leaders, but has broadened the scope of his analysis to consider other important non-governmental sources of interest and power.

Wallerstein's analysis has also broadened our conceptual framework. The systemic component is an integral part of any general theory of foreign policy. While Wallerstein's analysis emphasizes the underlying dynamics of the economic relations between states and ignores the importance of political relations, he has forced us to view the state in a broader environment. The position of a state vis-a-vis other states (both economically, politically and militarily) must be considered when discussing the components of foreign policy decision-making.

Yet each of these perspectives, while drawing on important sources of material, and contributing new insights to the field, misses several important points. For all the authors, the discussion of the sources of power and the response to power need to be broadened.

The concept of power, which is central to all of the analyses, and is a major component of any political analysis, is operationalized differently by each author.

Power for Rummel resides in the military strength of a country. For Schurmann, power resides in domestic interest groups, the bureaucracies, and ultimately in the executive. Finally for Wallerstein, the economic organization of the system is the main determinant of power within a state and in relation to other states.

What is missing from these three formulations is any discussion of

the response to power exercised by nation-states or by domestic groups within societies. Power is viewed by all three authors as one-sided. The reaction to foreign policy decisions by governmental representatives, by domestic groups within other nations is never fully examined. Instead we are presented with static, unintegrated conceptions of power.

What we have seen in all these cases is the focus upon the act of choice. In each instance we have been asked to focus upon actors who must make choices. The question of who is powerful has always forced us to ascertain what freedom to choose his future each actor possessed.

None of the authors ask, for example, how foreign policy decisions in one state affect domestic politics and ultimately foreign policy decisions of another state. John Burton in *Deviance, Terrorism and War* has begun to develop the idea of the penetration of power. According to Burton, "power is the ability not to have to adjust to environmental circumstances."<sup>s</sup> Furthermore, he asserts that, "So much has 'power' been assumed to be the core topic that there has not been, until recent times, much questioning of its meaning. Where it is now questioned, it is still on the basis of the notion of power being on the continuum from influence to physical coercion. It has been looked at from the point of view of those with power; i.e., it has been defined as the ability to affect social activities, to overcome resistances and the ability not to have to adjust to the environment or to change-the ability to impose the burden of adjustment on others, namely the less powerful. The topic has not included the responses of those over whom power is exercised, the manner in which they have been damaged, deprived of development, the manner in which they respond, either within social norms or by deviant means. Consequently, a degree of surprise seems always to be registered when power comes 'unstuck'. When the United States of America failed in Vietnam, it was a surprise; when minorities rebel and cannot be controlled in multi-ethnic and politically developed societies, there seems to be no reasonable explanation." (p. 133).

Burton's point is an important one, and one that is often overlooked in most analyses of foreign policy. Power is not only exercised, it is responded to by various groups within societies. As Burton says, we are often surprised when power comes "unstuck", as in

19. John Burton. *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979): p. 107.

Vietnam. Not only in Vietnam, but in Iran, most Americans were appalled by the violent anti-American anti-Western actions of domestic groups. What foreign policy decision makers and analysts of policy had failed to realize while the Shah was in power, was that the Shah was not representative of many sectors of thought within Iran, and that American actions had a direct impact on the interests and activities of domestic groups.

Not only have most analyses of foreign policy missed this important part of the concept or the reality of power, many scholars have been too limited in their definition and description of important actors. While Schurmann more than Wallerstein and Rummel emphasizes the importance of non-governmental actors in the policy making process, his perspective however, is also narrowly focused.

Political scientists for too long have concentrated attention on "visible" political actors. As a result, the important role that multinational corporations, for example, have played in influencing political and economic decisions within domestic societies and their impact on relations between states, was not considered until long after many MNC's had been established in developing countries. Similarly, at the present time, the important role that private international banks have been playing in recycling OPEC money as loans to developing countries has not been fully explored. Many other examples of this sort could be cited. The important point, however, is that if we are to develop a generalizable theory of foreign policy, the scope of our research needs to be broadened further to take into account additional important sources of power, and the effect of governmental policies and actions on domestic groups, both governmental and non-governmental, within societies. In fact, if we are to fully understand the complex processes involved in foreign policy decision-making, the dichotomy that has existed in scholarly studies between analyses of domestic politics and international politics needs to be reexamined.

The concept of interdependence, the idea that the political and economic actions of nation-states often transcend national boundaries and influence politics and economics in other countries, has received a great deal of attention recently. As Bergsten, Nye and Keohane have pointed out, "when used by analytical scholars, interdependence focuses on sensitivities of societies and policies to one another."<sup>20</sup> While interdependence as a symbol for some domestic

20. C. Fred Bergsten, ed. *World Politics and the International Economic System*. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 20.

groups has often led to a misperception of the actual effect of international events on domestic societies, and has led to the erroneous conclusion that traditional military concerns are passe and have been replaced solely by economic concerns, the concept of linkages between societies is an important one.

Perhaps the driving force behind these increased linkages between domestic, activities and international events, is the recent politicization of economic issues at the international level. As these economic actions and policies have come to affect national planning and policies, over domestic areas and interests, national governments have increasingly had to develop responses and policies in regards to these issues. As Bergsten, Nye and Keohane suggest, "the increased policy role of national governments combined with the increased internationalization of the world economy has forced a blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign policy and an increase in the number of issues relevant to foreign policy."<sup>21</sup>

Any theory of foreign policy must be able to take into account the important role that actions (political, economic and military), by other countries and by groups within the societies, have on domestic societies and the resultant impact they have on foreign policy. To be successful, it must focus upon the distribution of values within and between societies, and it must understand that this is a dynamic process.

The dynamics make up what is frequently termed the decision process. But it is the process of interaction between groups (both within and between societies) and not the act of choice which is critical. As Schurmann suggests, the process is driven by a series of politically significant currents which underlie the interests of groups in society. These are: their material interests, their sense of order, and their sense of their own and other's social and physical quality of life.

Wallerstein has underscored the fact that different groups (or classes) feel quite differently about these issues and Schurmann has developed the perspective that a nation's foreign policy is a result of an ideology created to form a coalition among competing interest groups.

The best example of this process has been the ideology of containment as expounded by various President's of the United States. Containment ideologies have been an attempt to coalesce a great number of quite different economic and military interests since the

21. *Ibid.*



end of the second World War. The era of containment appears over for now. According to Wallerstein and Schurmann, we are in a transition to something else. For both, there is a sense that social interest groups are becoming more involved in foreign policy. In Schurmann's case, he appears to see a refusal to allow the concentration of decision latitude in the executive on the part of the Congress of the United States. It is not clear that he ever saw such a concentration in either the Soviet or the Chinese cases. For Wallerstein, these new dynamics may mean a questioning of the very basis of the domestic capital interests of foreign policy. He believes it may result in a socialist influence as the basis of foreign policy. For Rummel, such a melange of interest groups and their apparent ability to prevent the president of the United States from maintaining a clear and straight course of action, has meant weakness and the danger of war.

Whatever the outcome of these dynamics, it is clear that we are entering into a new era. Foreign policy is no longer simply a calculation of what independence leadership has, outside of their boundaries, but it is also what latitude they possess at home. Foreign policy is becoming a more complex game played by more interest groups. Analysts are finally broadening their focus from the choices of a few actors to the interaction between multiple interest groups between and within nation-states.

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