

# *Edmund Burke, Karl Marx, and the Contemporary Third World*

*Daniel J. O'Neil*

THE THESIS that I propose herein is that the philosophy of Edmund Burke would provide a model preferable to the once fashionable Marxist model for solving Third World problems. Numerous Third World nations purport in some sense to be socialist. The non-socialist usually contains opposition factions that appeal to Marxist ideology. In many respects the Marxist attraction is understandable. The theory of imperialism evolved by Lenin enables Marxists to attribute national failure and national backwardness to Western colonialism rather than to the indigenous culture; it also facilitates a demand for reparations to be paid by the West. Further, because Marxist ideology promises rapid economic and social transformation, it possesses a chic appeal and gives one a sense of being progressive and on the side of the future.

\*

It is no secret that post-colonial Third World history has been far from awe-inspiring. There is a significant discrepancy between the promises of the anti-colonial activists and what has actually happened in the contemporary Third World. Current problems confronting that world might be divided into three categories: (1) legitimacy problems, (2) developmental problems, (3) cultural conflict problems. Legitimacy involves

both nation-building and constitution-building. Numerous Third World states are artificial entities created by the colonial experience. People having different tribal loyalties, languages, religions and historical experiences often are impressed into an artificial union while the sole unit to which personal loyalty attaches is often the family, tribe, or village. Consequently, the new leaders desire to forge a sense of common nationality—*i.e.*, they promote nation-building.

A second legitimacy problem is that of constitution-building. How comprehensive should the constitution be; what should it include and exclude? How does the constitution acquire popular acceptance? What should be the rules of the political process? What governmental structures will be instituted? What foreign model, if any, will be emulated? What is the relevancy of foreign experience? Is it possible to combine features of western constitutionalism with the indigenous traditions?

Akin to the legitimacy problem is that of development. Generally there is a high level of economic expectation stemming from the promises of the anti-colonial effort as well as from media advertisements and portrayals from developed areas. How might this level of expectation be reconciled with existing resources and political reality? How should such

deficiencies as limited resources, one-cropism, non-existent capital be addressed? What is the solution to the unequal developmental growth rate between the cities and countryside? How might the mass migration of the overcrowded cities be contained? Finally there exists the value question: Why develop? Might continued conformity to tradition better serve the interests of Third World people?

A third problem area is that of cultural conflict. Few new nations are culturally homogeneous; many are torn by cultural divisions that encourage violent disruptions. Is cultural pluralism possible? Can people having different cultures live harmoniously in a single state? Are there institutions and policies that facilitate such an objective? This is a major problem in developed countries where the resources exist to co-opt the dissatisfied. How much greater the potential for conflict where such resources are lacking and where there is struggle for mere subsistence!

In attempting to cope with these three problem areas Marxism presents a particular slant. In essence, Marxism is a nineteenth century European philosophy that envisages European development as the model for the entire world. Embracing the Enlightenment dogmas and viewing the world as a clock or machine with predictable laws of social and economic behavior, Marxism appeals to reason, science, secularity, and a progressive view of history. In doing so, it ignores or rejects important elements of Third World traditionality. The organismic principle—the belief that man is a link in a continuous human chain and that he has a mystical unity with the cosmos and the deity—is alien to Marxism. Tribal loyalties and extended family ties are dismissed as outdated or obstructionist. Religion is excluded as a reactionary force destined to oblivion. Thus Marxism condemns in the name of

modernity important components of Third World culture that provide beauty, mystery, a sense of the tragedy of human existence, and general psychic support. Instead Marxism proposes identification with the messianic mission of an industrial proletariat that exists in few Third World societies. In essence, then, appeals to Marxism are appeals for rapid westernization.

Burke's philosophical orientation contrasts drastically with that of the Marxists.<sup>1</sup> Burke viewed the Enlightenment with skepticism; he appealed to an older tradition that extended through Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, and Richard Hooker. Perceiving human nature as a mixture of good and evil he denied the possibility of future perfectibility. While human reason had its function, it was "but a part, and by no means the greatest part" of human understanding. Likewise important were emotion, prejudice, and collective historical experience—the accumulated wisdom of a people. Burke described the world as a mysterious and uncertain arena. He depicted society in organic rather than mechanical imagery and noted the importance and difficulty of maintaining order. Identification with the religious heritage, traditional institutions, and primordial loyalties contributed to stability. Viewing change as essential to survival of the system, Burke distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate change. The former would be gradual, evolutionary, modest in objective, and consistent with a people's history. The latter would be based on the abstract thought of the present generation, would reject the past in the name of fundamental transformation, and would raise the level of popular expectation. Lacking certitude about future development and skeptical of laws of historical progress, Burke advocated a flexible approach to politics. In essence his thought provided guidelines or hints for political behavior rather than a solution to every problem.

\*

Marxism describes the nation-state as an instrument of exploitation (superstructure) that is destined to wither away. The individual's loyalty to the nation-state should be secondary to his class loyalty. Consequently, Marxist theory is very suspicious of nationalism and there is tension between orthodox Marxist ideology and the nation-building process.

In contrast Burke's writings are saturated with a spirit of nationalism. He surrounded the state with an aura of mysticism, leading some scholars to interpret him as a predecessor of the later organismic theorists. He viewed love of country as natural, and he saw the country as something other than mere physical locality. "It consists in a great measure, in the ancient order into which we are born,"<sup>2</sup> and is "an idea of continuity which extends in time as well as in numbers and in space."<sup>3</sup> He wrote that

... next to the love of parents for their children, the strongest instinct, both natural and moral, that exists in man, is the love of his country: an instinct, indeed, which extends even to the brute creation. All creatures love their offspring; next to that they love their homes: they have a fondness for the place where they have been bred, for the habitations they have dwelt in, for the stalls in which they have been fed, for the pastures they have browsed in, and the wilds in which they have roamed.<sup>4</sup>

While Burke's works are filled with passages of veneration for Britain, his nationalism was not ethnocentric. He had a similar love for Ireland and many of his political failures related to this loyalty. He saw much to admire in the France of the *ancien régime* and believed a viable France necessary for the well-being of Europe. In particularly biting passages he castigated the British failure to appreciate Indian nationalism and cited the destructive policy of Warren Hastings. Burke discerned a transcending force at work in the evolution of the nation and

he approached all ancient nations in awe and wonder. Alfred Cobban contends that Burke's respect for nationalism makes his acceptance of so many revolutions understandable.<sup>5</sup> For Burke saw the Polish, American, Sicilian, and Indian uprisings as nationalistic assertions led by the natural leaders of the people in behalf of their traditional liberties. Thus he justified the use of force for the conservation of the national tradition.

Burke combined his nationalism with a belief in a European commonwealth representing a single civilization. This civilization, while pluralistic (due to peculiar local customs and mores) was united by a common Christianity and by similar legal systems. It was united by the intercourse of centuries and by shared historical experience. Burke hated Jacobinism because he feared it was destructive of this European unity. It ripped France from this common tradition by destroying those factors that united the "European republic" and by attempting to create a new, alien, and militant civilization. The old unity, affinity, and understanding would vanish, he predicted, and the wars and conflicts of the future would mark an unprecedented violence, religiosity, and lack of restraint. He grieved in the belief that the European commonwealth was disintegrating before his eyes.

In the other area of legitimacy—constitution-building—Marxism seems to offer little wisdom, viewing the process as an exercise in exploitation. Burke, too, entertained serious reservations about the significance of constitution-building in the abstract. During a period when others were obsessed with contractual theorizing, he shunned that exercise. He was reluctant to speculate about an original contract, believing that the origin of the constitutional order should be surrounded by a veil of mystery and should not be examined too closely lest the state's legitimacy be questioned. Similarly, the assumptions forming the basis

of order should be scrutinized only hesitantly. A public discussion of such questions indicated a sickness and an instability of the political system and predicted a dire future.

Burke felt that the constitution should stem from and reflect the culture and circumstances of the particular country. No absolute case could be made for any particular constitutional form and, given certain circumstances, even democracy might be acceptable. Nevertheless he entertained a special affinity for the "mixed" form of government, and much of his energy was expended in an effort to defend what he considered a mixed system against its enemies on the democratic left and monarchial right. He feared carrying any principle to its logical extreme, and he believed that a mixed system checked this tendency. Also, a mixed system was consistent with his view of the complexity and interrelationship of society. Of the British constitution, the mixed system *par excellence*, he wrote:

The whole scheme of our mixed constitution is to prevent any one of its principles from being carried as far as, taken by itself and theoretically, it would go. Allow that to be the true policy of the British system, then most of the fault with which that system stands charged will appear to be, not imperfections but excellencies which it has studiously sought. To avoid the perfections of extreme, all its several parts are so constituted, as not alone to answer their own several ends, but also each to limit and control the others: insomuch that take which of the principles you please—you will find its operation checked and stopped at a certain point. The whole movement stands still rather than that any part should proceed beyond its boundary. From thence it results, that in the British constitution, there is a perpetual treaty and compromise going on, sometimes openly, sometimes with less observation.<sup>6</sup>

In contrast to the evolved British balance, Burke noted that the new French

revolutionary regime had destroyed the French "balances and counterpoises" and had attempted simplification by subordinating all political considerations to one principle.

Burke was never utopian in his expectations of governmental power. He saw a danger in over-dependence upon government which he viewed as a restrictive rather than a creative force:

To provide for us in our necessities is not in the power of government. It would be a vain presumption in statesmen to think they can do it. The people maintain them, and not they the people. It is in the power of government to prevent much evil; it can do very little positive good in this, or perhaps in anything else.<sup>7</sup>

He also spoke against "an over-doing of any sort of administration, and more especially against this most momentous of all meddling on the part of authority; the meddling with the subsistence of the people."<sup>8</sup> He saw the "leading vice" of the French monarchy in its desire to overgovern. Government must prevent interference with the natural development of society, he thought, but it is incapable of stimulating such development itself. Man develops in the state, but the state as an institution plays but a minor role in this development.

From the above one might deduce a number of "guidelines" for Third World countries concerned with the legitimacy problem. This is attempted with deference to the Burkean precept that not every problem has a solution and hence there are some that must remain beyond the reach of the present generation.

### Legitimacy Guidelines

#### A. Nation-Building

1. Nations cannot be constructed according to abstract plans.
2. A sense of nationality is natural and to be encouraged.

3. Such a sense will develop slowly and organically; time is all important.
4. Nationalism need not be ethnocentric.
5. Questions of national origin and national legitimacy should be avoided.

#### B. Constitution-Building

1. Constitutions cannot be created artificially.
2. Constitutions should evolve out of the history and spirit of a people.
3. There exists no universal plan of constitutionalism applicable to all people.
4. A constitution ideally should defer to balance, mixture, and the pluralist principle.
5. A constitution should be limited in objective.
6. Only time can legitimize a constitution.

\*

Marxism, tied to a progressive theory of history, sanctions development in but one direction. It predicts preordained historical stages, defers to the urbanized industrial proletariat, and promises an eventual utopia.

Since Burke did not worship at the shrine of progress and was skeptical of historical determinism, a Burkean approach to development is considerably richer in options. Such an approach might be deduced from a more comprehensive examination of Burke's analysis of change. Burke visualized change as inevitable, as part of the natural order of things. Nothing, he felt, could be "solid and permanent" and to ignore change would be tantamount to "rocking a grown man in the cradle of an infant."<sup>9</sup> Change was intimately related to a society's preservation for "a state without the means of some change is without the means of its

conservation."<sup>10</sup> While recognizing change, Burke distinguished between what might be termed legitimate and illegitimate change.

Legitimate change, often referred to as reform, involved a non-substantive innovation that applied a direct palliative solely to the specific grievance. Even such a limited venture would be difficult, since man has not grasped the mysterious laws underlying the political structure and can never have certitude about the ramifications of proposed changes. Change should be natural, that is, of an evolutionary and virtually unnoticeable nature with ample time to remedy developing flaws. It should be consistent with the temper or spirit of the nation and based upon past experience. It should avoid arousing undue fears or expectations. It should not attempt to do everything at once, but should instead leave possibility for future growth. The change must be of such a nature as to preserve continuity with the past—the link between the living, the dead, and the unborn. It should come early enough to be voluntary rather than the result of coercion and it should be instigated in such a manner and at such a time as to allow society's natural leaders to direct it. Finally it should not be the product of one man or of one generation but instead the cumulative contribution of many persons and many generations.

In contrast to legitimate change, illegitimate change is based upon abstract theory and represents an attempt to remold man and society. All that is old is rejected as being obsolete and reactionary, while a new Procrustean man is to be created and assimilated into a new political order. This entire process is surrounded by maximum excitement, violence, the spectacular, and a spirit of fanaticism. It is in essence a new religion being born, and it resembles in many respects the older left-wing religious sects of a more evangelistic era. But,

unlike these, illegitimate change corrupts the Christian man by eradicating virtue, by conditioning him to a moral hardness, and by atomizing him in a new orderless world. Likewise, it deprives him of his past heritage and of his present happiness, substituting, instead, the optimistic promise of a future worldly utopia.

Burke thought he observed all of the symptoms of illegitimate change in the French Revolution. The French philosophers thought in terms of abstract theory to which they forced human conformity. They demanded simplicity and minimized difficulty. They rejected their past and attempted to build from scratch. Instead of constructing on the old foundations, they tried to pull society up by its roots and begin again. Rejecting their traditions, they denied their origin and they became a rootless, orderless people, possessing only a cold abstract metaphysical theory. Lacking concern and appreciation for order in society, they destroyed or mutilated those institutions conducive to stability and to cultural productivity. They turned their government itself over to men lacking in sympathy for human weakness and lacking in practical experience. Their entire effort was unnatural, Burke contended, and would lead not only France but all of Europe to greater suffering than had been experienced formerly. Out of this unnatural disorder and uncontrollable chaos, a strong man would arise who would attempt to direct the movement and temper the disharmony. Burke lamented that something new, dangerous, and diabolical had been unleashed and the world never could be the same again.

In contrast to French revolutionary destructiveness, Burke cited the English "Revolution" of 1688 as a "necessary" or legitimate change designed to prevent a revolution. It was pragmatic and it respected the traditional institutions and the traditional order. In fact, it was directed against the forces desirous of

upsetting the *status quo*. It was not based upon abstract theory and was limited in its effect. It was in essence a most reluctant revolution. "The Prince of Orange, a prince of blood-royal in England was called in by the flower of the English aristocracy to defend its ancient constitution, and not to level all distinctions."<sup>11</sup> Likewise, he observed that "we took solid securities; we settled doubtful questions; we corrected anomalies in our law."<sup>12</sup> The social order, the state, and the church were seen as substantially the same after 1688 as before, but "better secure in every part."

Often vindicated by subsequent history, Burke's perceptive insights on change enable the deduction of developmental guidelines applicable to the contemporary Third World.

### **Developmental Guidelines**

1. Man has the choice of opting for or against development.
2. If development is chosen the commitment should be presented in terms unlikely to raise the popular level of expectation.
3. Developmental efforts should be designed to blend change with traditionality.
4. The developmental pace should be such as to allow continuous scrutiny of the results and possible reversal of the process.
5. Developmental efforts should be led by the natural leaders of the society.

Marxist orthodoxy minimizes the importance of domestic cultural conflict. Differences based on language, religion, and/or race are to be subordinated to class concern. Sympathy for a minority culture apparently relates to its economic credentials. A minority perceived as feudal or religious can be deprived of its culture in the name of progress. Marxism

often attributes domestic cultural cleavages to capitalist manipulation and predicts they will disappear after the revolution. The "divide and rule" thesis does have a potent appeal to the anti-colonials since it blames cultural conflict on the imperial power. Unfortunately these conflicts remain after de-colonization and then are often accentuated. In fact domestic cultural conflict seems far more important than class conflict in the contemporary Third World.

Burke's approach provides a very different focus to the problem of cultural conflict. Burke rejected a monistic politics and avoided the attempt to subordinate all considerations to one principle. The endeavor to transform the polity into one platonic family was alien to his philosophy as were attempts at utopia building or divinization. To level all citizens in terms of one dominant culture to create the "new man" would conflict with the thrust of his writings.

Consistently, Burke deferred to the *status quo*. He accepted man as he was. Citing man's propensity to anarchy and the difficulty of maintaining order, he considered it presumptuous to tamper with a society that had survived and had provided at least a minimum of justice. The cultural pluralism of the British Empire should be accepted and in fact he often cited the Quebec precedent of religious toleration in urging greater concession for Irish culture. The minority cultures deserved tolerance in so far as they could cite the noble principles of age, continuity, and survival in their defense. Better to accept the inconvenience of the existing disunity than to attempt to level and thus introduce evils yet un contemplated. Ireland, he noted, despite years of persecution, was still full of "penalties and papists." Burke's commitment to the *status quo*, to order, and traditionality thus allows a place for minority culture.

Burke's position on political institu-

tions also seems relevant to the problem of cultural conflict. He favored structures that seem to contribute to minority cultural survival. His defense of mixed constitutions, political decentralization, and limited legal innovation implies a political system tolerant of minority cultures. The institutions he favored would discourage democratic levelling as well as governmental attempts at forging cultural homogeneity. The very inertia of the system serves minority interest.

Likewise Burke's tolerance of cultural diversity can be deduced from his commonwealth writings. He viewed the European continent as one Christian commonwealth united in religion and law. An eighteenth century ecumenist, he minimized the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism, contending that the area of agreement was far more significant.<sup>13</sup> He felt that the different European legal codes started with similar assumptions. He anathematized the French revolutionaries for attacking the traditional religious and legal systems and thus undermining the basis of European unity and introducing new conflicts. He sought a British commonwealth that would be flexible enough and tolerant enough to embrace the cultures of the Quebec and the Irish Catholics. Burke thus possessed a sensitivity that enabled him to perceive a basis of unity where his contemporaries perceived only divisiveness.

Burke's approach to cultural conflict can best be seen in his writings on religion. Given the importance of religion in the Third World and the relationship between religion and cultural identification, this question is important to those appealing to either Burke or Marx. Burke felt that religion was vital to both man and society. Seeing man as spiritual by nature, he believed that a void would result from depriving him of his religion.

We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious ani-

mal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot prevail long.<sup>14</sup>

Religion provides man with spiritual knowledge, a moral code, and a degree of security thereby integrating him into a society. Burke interpreted it as a civilizing force instrumental in taming man. It is a constructive force that teaches man to control and discipline himself. It sets before him a noble standard and warns of the consequences of its violation. It leaves an impact upon "our manners, our civilization, and all the good things" of society, and it actually was seen as the "basis of civil society and the source of all good and of all comfort." It offers a rationale to individual existence and provides a bond uniting the different classes of society. It reconciles man to acceptance of his status in society as the will of Providence, and it places before him a vision of a future life in which the ills of this world will be rectified, with the just rewarded and the wicked punished. It preserves continuity with the past heritage while serving to stimulate present cultural productivity. Religion in essence is necessary to an ordered society.

Having considered the relevance of religion, Burke warned of the alternative to the Church. Since religion was natural and necessary, the Church's abolition would generate new secular sects possessing the fanaticism of the old creeds but lacking nobility. Burke never tired of predicting that if the persecution of Catholicism should succeed in destroying or discrediting the old faith, its adherents would be vulnerable to the appeal of the new secular creeds. For their own protection, the Christian denominations must stand together. The days of spirited, destructive competition must end now that the Jacobin enemy stood within the gate.

Although committed to religious establishment, Burke still cited the feasibility

of religious toleration. He saw the goal of the state as the good life and refused to sacrifice that objective to religious orthodoxy or religious unity. He had few scruples about imposing religious limitations if order in society demanded such, and his policy toward the dissenters ordinarily related to their politics. His usual plea, however, was for a degree of toleration based upon an ambivalent rationale. Sometimes he championed tolerance in terms of justice, but more often in terms of expediency. He felt that religion was "the grand prejudice, and that which holds all the other prejudices together," but that religious certitude was lacking.<sup>15</sup>

Burke noted that tenets accepted in good faith in some areas were proscribed in others, and that the ancient religion of England itself was now out of favor. The unity of Christendom was destroyed, probably for all time, but men who differed on questions of faith could still unite in the desire for public order. For Burke the possibility of acquiring religious certitude was too small to justify sacrificing peace to religious unity:

I will not enter into the question how much truth is preferable to peace. Perhaps truth may be better. But as we have scarcely ever the same certainty in the one that we have in the other, I would unless the truth were evident indeed, hold fast to peace, which has in her company, charity, the highest of the virtues.<sup>16</sup>

Likewise he wrote:

... a government may bear without blame, not only very ill-grounded doctrines, but even many that are positively vices where they are *adulta et pravalida*. The good of the commonwealth is the rule which rides over the rest; and to this every other must completely submit.<sup>17</sup>

Burke further urged religious toleration on the grounds that the sectarian differences were minute when compared with the new secular sects. Catholicism



shared all of the essential dogmas of the English Church, differing only by addition to the ancient creed. Not only were the significant religious traditions linked theologically, but

. . . all the principal religions in Europe stand upon one common bottom. The support that the whole of the favoured part may have in the secret dispensation of Providence, it is impossible to tell; but humanly speaking, they are all prescriptive religions. They have all stood long enough to make prescription, and its claims of legitimate prejudice, their main stay.<sup>18</sup>

Thus he called for an end of sectarian conflict and a united Christian front against the Jacobins, who, he believed, despised all religions.

From the above can be deduced guidelines for Third World countries confronting the problem of cultural conflict based upon racial, religious, and/or lingual differences.

### **Cultural Conflict Guidelines**

1. Cultural conflict cannot be attributed solely to one factor—*e.g.*, economics.
2. Man must be accepted as he is; cultural transformation is improbable.
3. Given concern for order in society, traditional minority cultures must be tolerated.
4. Order can be reconciled with cultural diversity; often there exists a basis for unity beneath the apparent cultural diversity.
5. Acceptance of pluralist theory, institutional decentralization, and limited government can be utilized to reduce cultural conflict.
6. Mass democratization accentuates the existing cultural conflicts and thus is no solution.

\*

Marxism represents a peculiar Western European philosophy that is alien to most of the non-Western philosophical schools. A carrier of the spirit of the European Enlightenment, it is materialistic, optimistic, monistic, progressive, and secular. It is in conflict with vital ingredients found in the more spiritual and traditional non-Western modes of thought. Its theory of imperialism and promises of rapid transformation make it attractive primarily to the marginal, alienated, and westernized elites found in the new cities of the Third World. But it has little applicability to the genuine problems of legitimacy, development and cultural conflict.

Edmund Burke's far more universal philosophy seems better qualified for addressing contemporary Third World problems. It encourages a flexibility lacking in Marxism, and it supports a tolerance for traditional indigenous culture inconsistent with Marxist monism. There are no certain answers contained within, no predestined plan of development or promised utopia. From it, however, can be deduced guidelines for addressing crucial Third World problems.

1. Burkean scholarship is divided over the question of Burke's methodology. One school, stressing his belief in "expediency" and rejection of "metaphysics," considers him a predecessor of the later utilitarians. See: C.E. Vaughan, *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy Before and After Rousseau* (New York, 1960), pp. 1-63; Harold J. Laski, *Political Thought in England From Locke to Bentham* (London, 1932), pp. 165-215; John Morley, *Burke* (London, 1923); Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1962), II, 185-214; George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1954), 607-619. A more recent school of Burkean scholarship interprets Burke's view of expediency and metaphysics in terms of the traditional Aristotelian belief in contingency, and in the conflict between form and substance. This school places Burke in a line of continuity with Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Richard Hooker. For this viewpoint, see Francis Canavan, *The Political Reason of Edmund Burke* (Durham, N.C., 1960); Peter Stanlis, *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law* (Ann Arbor,

1958); Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), 294-323; Charles Parkin, *The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought* (Cambridge, Eng., 1956). Ernest Barker, *Essays on Government* (Oxford, 1956). My interpretation of Burke's methodology leans to the latter school. 2. Edmund Burke, *The Works of Edmund Burke* (London, 1882). Cited hereafter as *Works*. "An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," (1791), III, 80. 3. "Speech on Reform of Representation in the House of Commons," *Works*, VI, 146. 4. Edmund Burke, *The Speeches of Edmund Burke* (London, 1885). "Speech in the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, Esq." (June 5, 1794), II, 141. 5. *Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1929), 100. 6. "An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs" (1791) *Works*, III, 110. 7. "Thoughts and Details on Scarcity" (November, 1795), *Works* V, 83. 8. *Ibid.*, 109. 9. "Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol" (1777), *Works*, II, 33. 10. "Reflections" (1790), *Works*, II, 295. 11. "Speeches on the Army Estimates" (1790), *Works* III, 278. 12. *Ibid.*, 279. 13. Burke's affinity for Roman Catholicism

must be noted. His family background was largely Catholic. His mother and her family were Catholic, as were his father-in-law and many of his closest friends. He had been reared in Catholic Ireland and never really escaped the influence of his youth. His approach to Scripture, ritual, and church authority was certainly closer to Rome than to Geneva or Canterbury (for example, *Works*, VI, 101). He showed a sympathy for the French and Irish churches that he seldom showed the English dissenters. He consistently defended the Catholics, stressing the correctness of their basic principles: loyalty to heritage, prescription, veneration for antiquity. He stood in awe before the ancient Church that had survived the Reformation and that linked the past and present. Hence his enemies anathematized him as a Jesuit in disguise. 14. "Reflections," (1790), *Works*, II, 363. 15. "Letter to William Smith, Esq." (January 29 1795), *Works*, VI, 52. 16. "Speech on the Acts of Uniformity," *Works*, VI, 98. 17. "Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, M.P." (1792) *Works*, III, 309. 18. "Letter to William Smith, Esq." *Works*, VI, 52.