

PLOTTING THE ELECTORATE'S COURSE IN DANGEROUS WATERS

Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. By Walter Dean Burnham. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970). Pp. xii, 210. \$6.50 cloth, \$3.95 paperback.

The Emerging Republican Majority. By Kevin B. Phillips. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1970). Pp. 482. \$3.95 paperback.

The Real Majority. By Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. (New York: Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan, 1971). Pp. 356. \$7.95 cloth, \$2.95 paperback.

The study of voting behavior, as an academic enterprise, is little more than a generation old; it spans, and is the most notable exemplar of, the "behavioral revolution" in American political science.¹ The amount of energy invested in the study of voting, utilizing the methods of survey research and sophisticated analysis facilitated by computers, has grown in geometric proportions, particularly since the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research was established in Ann Arbor to provide not only data storage but the training of graduate students. Prior to this institutional foundation, studies of national samples by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center,² building upon the work of Lazarsfeld and his associates in individual communities,³ had estab-

¹Pioneer articles in the field appeared as early as 1916, authored by such as Stuart A. Rice and William F. Ogburn. Their work began within the Department of Sociology at Columbia University, then dominated by Franklin H. Giddings. Rice's *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928) laid out many of the basic issues. For a history of the endeavor based on a consideration of four classic voting studies, see Peter H. Rossi, "Four Landmarks in Voting Research," Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 5-54. But it seems appropriate to date the full scale academic study of voting from the examination of voter choice in Erie County during the 1940 election performed by Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates. P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

²Angus Campbell, et al., *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966).

³*The People's Choice*, op. cit.; B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

lished with impressive authority the conventional academic explanation of American voting behavior.

The major elements of that explanation are familiar to the reader and need be incorporated only by reference. First is the overriding importance of party identification as the principal correlate of the voting decision, and the relation of party identification to measures of socio-economic status. Second is the relative ignorance of the voter on specific issues and his frequent inability to differentiate between party positions on those issues. Third is the insignificance of the independent voter, who has no strong sense of party identification. Building upon this description of voter motivation, it is possible to view partisan division within the nation as relatively stable, to define a "normal vote," and to classify presidential elections as maintaining, deviating, reinstating, or realigning.⁴ There had been no realigning election during the period for which survey research data was available, but history, and V. O. Key,⁵ suggested its possibility. Lazarsfeld's work was accomplished during the final two Roosevelt elections, while the Survey Research Center's definitive work was carried out during the two Eisenhower Administrations. Eisenhower's elections were "deviations" that did not affect the underlying partisan attachments of the electorate.

Emerging from saturation in the quantitative data of *The American Voter*, the best expression of this conventional interpretation, the reader is likely to feel that the American electoral system is remarkably stable, and that voter behavior is largely determined by the psychological impact of social forces represented by income, occupation, education, religion, sex, age, race, and place of residence.

The interpretation of elections provided by the masters of survey research has been variously criticized as being essentially ahistorical, for drawing its explanatory concepts too heavily from the field of psychology, and for assuming a too deterministic pat-

⁴The tripartite classification of maintaining, deviating, or realigning is delineated in *The American Voter*, *op cit.*, Ch. 19. The term "reinstating" was adopted to describe the presidential election of 1960. See P. E. Converse, A. Campbell, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, No. 2 (June, 1961), pp. 269-280.

⁵V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17 (1955), pp. 3-18.

tern of electoral decision-making. There are signs that this conventional understanding of voting behavior is being modified by the students of those who established it.⁶ But an assumed stability of the system, and the casual assumption that change will be incremental, rather than cataclysmic, have permeated the standard texts. Any student who has paid attention to riots, bloodshed, and the propensity of segments of the population formerly marked as apathetic to protest oppressive social forces, is likely to charge political science with a credibility gap.

The three works considered here offer modifications of the conventional interpretation. They are written largely outside the mainstream of survey research, although they make use of relevant opinion data. Each was originally published in a hardcover edition for a specialized audience and has been reissued in a paperback edition, with a view toward wider sale, particularly in the college market. Burnham's study of *Critical Elections* was written for his political science colleagues. His explicit purpose is to introduce a dimension of historical awareness into the quantitative-behavioral study of American politics. If his colleagues are pleased with the result, he will not deter them from assigning the book to their classes.

Kevin Phillips' book was originally published, early in 1969, by Arlington House for the Conservative Book Club. Associated by critics with the presumed "Southern strategy" of the Nixon campaign (Phillips was consultant to Campaign Manager Mitchell during the campaign and joined the Administration thereafter), it became something of a *livre célèbre* in late 1969 and early 1970; the paperback edition was an obvious way to realize the potential created by the publicity. When the strategic implications of the book had been pursued without success by President Nixon in the 1970 Congressional election campaign, the President announced "a new American Revolution" and *The Emerging Republican Majority* vanished from public discussion. As this review is written, George Wallace has won the Florida Democratic primary election, President Nixon has asked Congress for a moratorium on busing

⁶See, for one example, David E. RePass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLV, No. 2 (June, 1971), pp. 389-400. Reanalyzing open-end responses in the SRC data for 1960 and 1964, RePass found that salient issues had almost as much weight as party identification in determining voting choice. RePass completed his doctorate at the University of Michigan in 1965.

to achieve school integration, and the thesis of Phillips' book is again of compelling interest. It may be the best available account of the strategic propensities of President Nixon's campaign managers.

The authors of *The Real Majority* are a political scientist (Scammon) and a journalist (Wattenberg). Richard Scammon served President Kennedy as Director of the Census Bureau and has published the six volumes of *America Votes*, among other works. Ben Wattenberg served on the staff of Lyndon B. Johnson. Scammon and Wattenberg wrote their book in obvious rejoinder to Phillips. Their central thesis is that the American electoral majority is not conservative; it is located in the attitudinal center. To the extent that their book has a partisan purpose, it is to urge Democrats to eschew radicalism and forget any attempt to win an election by forging a coalition of dissident minorities. The paperback edition of their book—produced to exploit the fame won by the hardcover version—contains an epilogue about the election of 1972 that makes this purpose even more explicit. (Richard Scammon quickly explained on television that the main significance of the New Hampshire primary was the surprisingly large vote won by George McGovern, who is not a centrist—unless the center has moved.)

Three books, then. One conservative Republican, one moderate Democratic, and one quantitative-behavioral and scholarly. All are animated by the same purpose: to understand the political present and predict the future. Phillips takes great pains to demonstrate that the emergence of a new Republican majority is inevitable, the product of cyclical movement in American history. He displays 143 charts and 47 maps to document his case. Karl Marx did not elaborate the concept of dialectical materialism with any greater industry, in order to make his point. However, like Lenin, Phillips is eager to join the forces of history, and hurry them along, in 1972. Scammon and Wattenberg analyze the election of 1968, test the lessons learned against the results of municipal elections in 1969, and describe the kind of campaign that should win in 1972. They present themselves as hard-headed realists who let the facts speak for themselves. Walter Dean Burnham is concerned with much more than the 1972 election; he is concerned with the survival of the nation. He looks into the future and sees fascism. If Kevin Phillips and the authors of *The Real Majority*

are involved in plotting the prevailing winds and current, then asking pilots of the partisan ship to follow them, Burnham has surveyed the chart to see the shoals that lie ahead. If natural forces work their will, he sees small hope for a safe passage by the Ship of State.

This imagery is suggested by the books themselves. Scammon and Wattenberg are intrigued by the name presumably given to the study of voting by an Oxford classicist, psephology, derived from *psēphos*, the colored pebbles cast into Greek ballot boxes. Observing the movement of pebbles on the beach, they wish to discover whether the motive force was an electoral tide, or only a wave. They finally conclude, of the 1968 election, that "a tide rose in the South; some whitecaps were seen elsewhere" (page 211). Phillips is equally enamored of aquarian simile. He writes constantly of voting streams, waves, and tides. He is even led to indulge in such an implausible metaphor as "a handful of . . . states swam against the current" (page 31). These were the recalcitrant areas that gave a larger share of their vote to Hubert Humphrey in 1968 than to John Kennedy in 1960. Burnham is not attached to tidal metaphors, but the "mainsprings" of his title suggest a mechanistic conception of political history. He describes the periodicity of systemic change and applies measures, such as the test for differences between means, to election returns and electoral turnout since 1828, in order to determine the crucial points of change.

Kevin Phillips also seeks to understand the present and predict the future by examining voting returns since 1828. He discovers that there have been four cycles of one-party dominance, lasting either thirty-two or thirty-six years, with an eight-year occupancy of the White House by the minority party during that time. He concludes that the Nixon Administration is destined to mark the beginning of a new Republican era. There is striking similarity between the cycles Phillips describes and those discussed by Burnham. Rather than thirty-two or thirty-six years in duration, Burnham finds the cycles to be from thirty to thirty-eight years in length. They agree on the key Presidential elections that mark previous changes: those of 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932. As Burnham points out, the crucial nature of these years has been noted by historians. It is hard to deny that some kind of upheaval preceded the elections of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, McKinley, and Franklin

D. Roosevelt, and that American politics was not quite the same after each was inaugurated.

The crucial difference between Burnham and Phillips lies in their explanation of the reasons why a cyclical phenomenon should occur. Phillips says that past cyclical change has been marked by a revolt of the periphery, or frontier, against outmoded ideologies propounded by the centrally-located Establishment. Liberalism, the attitude which guided Eisenhower, as well as Roosevelt and Kennedy, is now most firmly entrenched in the Northeast and some regions settled by New Englanders; these are the states that "swam upstream" in 1968. It is time for another turn of the cycle.

Without mentioning Phillips by name, Scammon and Wattenburg treat his thesis with contempt:

But the ripples, the waves, the big waves, are not necessarily yet a tide. . . . That there have been tidal shifts in American politics every third of a century for the past century or so is a quaint historical fact. If there is another tidal shift that shows up in the seventies, it will not be because a third of a century has elapsed, but because one political party is responding with more fidelity to the considered wishes of the people—and that, after all, is what democracy is about. (page 184)

Phillips is not, in fact, entirely guilty of the charge. He never claims that a Republican majority is at hand merely because the years have rolled around on the calendar. Rather, he claims that this political realignment was triggered by the identification of the Democratic Party with the Negro socio-economic revolution. He claims that blacks and the Northeastern Establishment have reached an entente, if they have not actually forged an alliance, and the social change occurring as a result has stimulated a "populist conservative" reaction by middle Americans.

Scammon and Wattenberg's rejection of cyclical explanations is shared by the exponents of the conventional survey research studies. As commanding a figure as Angus Campbell attacked this tendency on the part of historians. In particular, he criticized a cyclical theory expressed by A. M. Schlesinger.⁷ Schlesinger wrote that political history since 1841 can be divided into fifteen- or sixteen-year

⁷Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., titled his essay, "Tides of American Politics"; the tidal image seems inescapable. It was published in the *Yale Review*, Vol. 29 (1939), pp. 217-230.

cycles of alternative liberal and conservative Congressional policies, resulting from shifts in predominant public sentiment. Campbell charges that Schlesinger makes a false assumption that voters go to the polls with clear intentions regarding the legislation they want. Writes Campbell,

Social theorists commonly feel the need of an underlying psychology to support their explanations of the behavior of the total society. As long as no direct evidence from the individual level is available their psychological suppositions cannot be tested and some of them have passed into the domain of what Professor Galbraith calls "the conventional wisdom." For the past twenty years, however, it has been possible to assess the individual motivations of the voters directly.⁸

Campbell then points out that Schlesinger's prediction of a conservative legislative swing in 1948 did not come to pass, either then or in 1952. The first Eisenhower election, he writes, was not at all like the "highly charged situations of 1856-60, 1896, and 1932-36." Rather, it was the product of accumulated frustrations; the voters wanted "a new bunch of fellows to run things" rather than specific policy changes. He concludes,

The electorate seems quite capable of expressing its intolerance of circumstances it finds exasperating and it sometimes responds strongly to the personal qualities of an attractive candidate but it is not well enough informed to follow a deliberate program of choice between conservative and liberal alternatives in governmental policies.⁹

This description of the uninformed American voter may mark a high point of what is here described as the conventional academic explanation of American voting behavior. However, Angus Campbell concludes the cited article by calling for the integration of historical evidence from past elections with present survey data. This is precisely the kind of enterprise in which Walter Dean Burnham is engaged. Burnham analyzes poll data and recent elec-

⁸Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 26 (1964). Reprinted in E. C. Dreyer and W. A. Rosenbaum, eds., *Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966), pp. 354-365, 362.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 364.

tion returns to determine whether the present electoral era indeed marks a critical realignment, similar to the five previous realignments he describes, which could produce the sixth party system of American history. Burnham finds that the salience of issues, as perceived by the electorate, rises dramatically during a time of realignment. This is in contrast to more normal times—studied by Campbell and his associates—when turnout is modest, group coalitions supporting the major parties seem stable, and party identification is a permanent characteristic of individual voters.

To Burnham, the exact nature of the present electoral era remains uncertain; Phillips expresses no doubts whatever. He claims we are witnessing the formation of a new Republican majority. To buttress this conclusion, Phillips expands upon techniques used by V. O. Key and Samuel Lubell. From Key he takes the technique of comparing patterns of migration into various states, displaying state maps with the counties settled primarily by population elements from other states, or from foreign nations, and the tendency of their voting patterns to persist over time. Key used this device particularly in *Southern Politics*¹⁰ and a study of voting patterns in Indiana.¹¹ Phillips is apparently unacquainted with Key's work on public opinion¹² and his posthumously published study of aggregate electoral behavior,¹³ both of which might have modified Phillips' concentration upon ethnicity as a prime determinant of voting. Phillips quotes Lubell's works¹⁴ approvingly in nine places and borrows his tactic of examining voting returns by ward or precinct and comparing voting patterns with other measures, such as assessed valuation of the homes. However, he does not follow

¹⁰V. O. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Alexander Heard, *Southern Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1949).

¹¹V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in Burdick and Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior*, *op. cit.*

¹²V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961).

¹³V. O. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1966).

¹⁴*The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper, 1952), which W. D. Burnham labels a "classic," particularly in its treatment of group animosities during the New Deal realignment, and *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York: Harper, 1956). Lubell's most recent electoral study, *The Hidden Crisis in American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970), contains a number of shrewd insights but is unlikely to win classic status.

Lubell's practice of interviewing live voters in the neighborhoods thus pinpointed. In fact, there is no evidence in his book that John Mitchell's expert in voting trends has talked to any voters at all.

Phillips reports in his preface that his book was largely completed prior to the 1968 campaign. Indeed, he won his position on the Nixon campaign staff by submitting portions of the manuscript. Little revision of the book was required before publication, as the 1968 results simply bore out his projections. Nonetheless, the book opens with the assumption, which is central to Phillips' thesis, that the 1968 election was a massive electoral turn against the Democratic Party and that the vote won by George Wallace really belonged to Richard Nixon. Wallace simply provided a way-station for Democratic voters on their way to join the Republicans. So important is this assumption that he hardly pauses to examine it: the oversight is glaring in Chart 1 of his 143 charts. In support of his contention that the Democratic reversal of 1968 was quite like the Republican reversal of 1932, Phillips offers the following data:

SHARE OF THE TOTAL VOTE FOR PRESIDENT

	1928	1932
Republican	58%	40%
Anti-Republican Left	42%	60%
(Democrat and Socialist)		
	1964	1968
Democratic	61%	43%
Anti-Democrat Right	39%	57%
(Republican and American Independent)		

(page 26)

Phillips does not mention the proportion of the total vote cast in favor of minor parties. This permits him to disregard the nature of third parties in American political history; to avoid comparing Nixon's actual vote with that cast for Roosevelt; and to postpone discussing any problems that the Republicans may have in persuading Wallace voters to complete the change-over. In fact, the vote of all minor parties in 1932 amounted to a scant 2.9 per cent of the presidential ballots, while, in 1968, George Wallace received 13.6 per cent of the vote. Thus there is a hidden difference of

some 10.7 per cent between the two elections, which Phillips neither reveals nor explains.¹⁵

To achieve such an explanation is exactly one of Burnham's intentions. He finds that six parties of protest have made their mark in presidential elections since the 1830s, that they have provided early warning of approaching critical realignments, and that the Wallace vote of 1968 is comparable to the LaFollette Progressive vote of 1924.¹⁶

In addition to his notion of cycles, Phillips finds that the variables which best explain voting behavior are ethnicity (with its corollaries, national origin and religion) and regionalism, including the growth of suburbs ringing the central cities. After setting out his cyclical theory in a lengthy introduction, Phillips devotes the bulk of his book to an examination of four regions: Northeast, South, Heartland, and Pacific.

The Northeast, he says, has been since the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson the home of the Establishment and the center of resistance to rising political tides. The very areas which were bastions of Republicanism after the Civil War now vote Democratic; Phillips traces the change-over, marked by the election of Edmund Muskie as Governor of Maine, and made irreversible by the Goldwater nomination of 1964, which made the Yankees (New England and regions in the Midwest and Oregon principally settled by New Englanders) "abandon the party of their forefathers" (page 101). Only one of the Yankee counties which supported Landon in 1936 was found in the Goldwater column in 1964. And the Congressmen from these areas turned leftward. Yankee country is now Democratic, or liberal Republican, territory; time for another revolt centered in the hinterland.

The new cycle gains momentum from the conservative voting trend in the South. Again, Phillips finds the Goldwater candidacy to have been the catalyst of major change; the former one-party South is increasingly Republican, at least in Presidential voting.

¹⁵Phillips' Chart 3, p. 30, summarizes Gallup Poll data for presidential voting by groups since 1952. The 1968 column does show the Wallace vote separately. However, Phillips comments, "These statistics indicate Nixon's 1972 opportunity—acceleration of the Catholic GOP trend and recapture of the conservative Protestants who backed the Republicans in 1960 but bolted to Wallace in 1968." Wallace remains a largely unexamined figure in his pages.

¹⁶*Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*, pp. 27-30.

Phillips sketches the political history of the region and the pattern of migration into the various states, without drawing clear connections between historical patterns and current realities.¹⁷ Like every student of Southern voting patterns, he finds that the most strongly Democratic counties have been those of the "Black Belt"; but the recent enfranchisement of Negro voters has created a lively politics in these districts, providing a chance for the Republican Party to enroll white voters as blacks come to wield increasing influence in the Democratic Party. Thus the party of Abraham Lincoln would gather in the remaining adherents of white supremacy; the prospect does not disturb Phillips.

The third section, The Heartland, contains 25 states with 223 electoral votes. Phillips subdivides it into the Border, Great Lakes, Farm Belt, and Rocky Mountain States. He repeats his fascinating account of local history, migration patterns, etc. As with the other regions, he sprinkles the account with dogmatic statements, such as "Many Rocky Mountain isolationist voters of 1940 and 1944 stayed home in 1948, destroying the wartime-inflated GOP majorities in Colorado and Wyoming" (page 400). He concludes that the Republicans can win easily in 1972 by carrying the South and the Heartland, plus California. Since this is the case, the Republicans should not bemoan the loss of Negro votes, North or South, and they need not attempt to bring the out-of-step Northeast back into the grand coalition of regions.

Scammon and Wattenberg give the back of their hands to Phillips' calculus:

There has been much talk of a Southern Strategy, a Border State Strategy, a Sun State Strategy, each supposedly designed to corral enough states to win an election for Republicans. Those are excellent strategies to convince your opponent to use. As for the authors, our geographic strategy is an elementary one called Quadcali. It is the essence of simplicity. If one draws a *quadrangle* from Massachusetts to Washington, D. C., to Illinois, to Wisconsin, and then adds in *California*, it includes a majority of Americans. Where Americans live, they vote. Where a majority of them live and vote is where Presidents are elected. (pages 68-69; emphasis in the original)

¹⁷Nelson W. Polsby points out that Phillips' "entertaining digressions into the minutia [sic] of local political lore" have little to do with supporting his thesis. See "An Emerging Republican Majority?," *Public Interest*, Vol. 17 (1969), pp. 119-126, 121.

Having introduced this geographical concept, Scammon and Wattenberg hardly pursue it, although they point out that their Quadcali will have, after the 1970 census, about 300 electoral votes, with 266 needed to win, and the area tends to vote Democratic. One's impression is that Quadcali was included in part to provide an excuse for printing maps in their book, since Phillips' book is laden with so many examples of the cartographer's art. Importantly, they suggest that the influence of regionalism in American politics has been reduced; Americans seem to react in similar ways to the newly relevant social issues, regardless of region or other demographic variables (page 207).

The Pacific States are the third region examined by Phillips, and his most loving attention is devoted to California and to his conception of the Sun Belt. The latter is the area of mushrooming middle class population that includes Florida, Arizona, Texas, and Southern California, as well as parts of Louisiana, Tennessee, Alabama, and Oklahoma. He views this largely suburban voting population as newly affluent, seeking the leisure activities that the sun country provides, well educated, and often connected with space and defense industries. Yet its motivation is not so different from that found in growing suburbs throughout the nation. Indeed, he argues that the areas of fastest growing population—the suburbs and the Sun Belt—are the natural home of the emerging Republican majority; the Democrats are locked into the “decaying cities”:

... the new Southwest, behind its wall of total air conditioning, is as ill-disposed to slum subsidies as the new middle classes marshaled behind the crabgrass curtains of Levittown and Park Forest. (page 440)

Much of the sun country is composed of states that are or were traditionally Democratic in their voting allegiance; but Phillips feels that the Republicans can win their support readily by policy plays around right end that will discourage third party activity. “[T]heir elected officials embody a popular political impulse which deplores further social (minority group) upheaval...” (page 437). Nixon should be “Middle American enough to largely head off [George] Wallace” (page 23). The new majority is solidly middle class; the Republicans need only align their policies to middle-class wishes, paying less (or no) attention to the urban poor—particu-

larly blacks—and the fashionably liberal upper class in its silk stocking districts. This implication of Phillips' analysis drew the fire of his critics, who claimed he was calling upon the GOP to "write off" the Northeast and the cities to concentrate on something like a "Southern strategy." In his preface to the paperback edition, Phillips takes some pains to refute this charge:

The book does not represent—or purport to represent—the past or present "strategy" of the Nixon Administration. Critics who say it does ignore the fact that it makes *no* strategic or policy recommendations. If its statistics, analyses and projection [sic] suggest courses of action, they merely parallel the role of market research from which an advertising campaign can be blueprinted.

... I wrote a clinical book, projecting trends and not moralizing over their occurrence. (page 23)

The pose of moral neutrality, of letting the "facts" speak for themselves, is of course not new to political science. In the present case, as in others, the pose permits the author to ignore some very hard questions. To what degree is a party, or a President, responsible to all the people, rather than to a party constituency only? What are the implications of President Nixon's early—but now forgotten—pledge to "bring us together"? Phillips would build a partisan majority by exacerbating the most serious social tensions in the nation. He writes at one point (after promising no policy recommendations):

... Maintenance of Negro voting rights in Dixie, far from being contrary to GOP interests, is essential if southern conservatives are to be pressured into switching to the Republican Party—for Negroes are beginning to seize control of the national Democratic Party in some Black Belt areas. (page 464)

Phillips' argument here may be quite correct; the point is that his political perception is essentially amoral. He would build a majority by accentuating social divisions. Concentrating on winning the next election, he would encourage Republicans to abandon the task of healing social wounds. If those wounds, untreated, are indeed mortal, what he seems to dismiss as an irrelevant moral question turns out to be a highly practical one, as well.

The charge of concentrating on the next election at the expense of long-range considerations may also be leveled at Scammon

and Wattenberg. Their book gained quick fame for the unexceptional discovery that the majority of American voters are "unpoor, unyoung, and unblack"; the electorate is also, they remind us, "middle class, middle aged, and middle minded." While Phillips sees Middle America as the near-inevitable base of a new Republican majority, Scammon and Wattenberg would remind Democrats that they cannot expect the support of the majority without listening to it.

The second famous discovery reported in *The Real Majority* is the Social Issue, which the authors claim has taken its place beside the Economic Issue as a leading Voting Issue that can determine elections. (Scammon and Wattenberg use capital letters even more liberally than does Kevin Phillips.) These two concepts are concerned with the structure of the electorate and the substantive issue content of campaigns. The authors also propound their "strategic idea," which is that voters tend to seek the center of the ideological spectrum and shun the extremes. The balance of the volume is devoted to further propounding these three ideas and tracing their function in the 1968 Presidential election and selected local elections in 1969.

The Social Issue is never defined very precisely; the authors would argue that it cannot be precisely defined, as its contents will vary from time to time and place to place. It consists of voter reactions to the phenomena of crime, drugs, the pressures for recognition of racial minorities, and the disruption of social processes caused by demonstrations against the Vietnam War, riots on college campuses, etc. Scammon and Wattenberg feel that the majority has favored the Democratic Party on the basis of the Economic Issue since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but that neither major party has yet found a way to gain permanent benefit from the Social Issue. The electorate, in general, may be considered liberal on the bread-and-butter Economic Issue, and "tough" on the Social Issue; voters are eager to enjoy personal prosperity in an orderly society.

The Scammon-Wattenberg tour of the 1968 campaign concentrates on the attitudes of voters, in contrast to the comments of those who interpreted voter attitudes. They conclude, of the New Hampshire primary, that "the candidates and the press were talking Vietnam; the voters were not voting it." Rather, they were voting in response to the Social Issue, particularly the increasing prevalence of social disruption and crime, which they knew about from

television, although New Hampshire had hardly been swept by a crime wave.

From New Hampshire, the trail leads to Wisconsin and the rest of what the authors label "the prove-little primaries." They point out that Robert Kennedy's campaign in Indiana did not represent the triumph of "Bad Bobby" over "Good Bobby"; it was simply Kennedy's drive toward the attitudinal center of a particular electorate. And they feel that, in spite of Eugene McCarthy's good showing, Kennedy clearly won the right to represent at the National Convention those Democrats who were opposed to continuing the then incumbent Democratic Administration. However much they may have been disillusioned by Lyndon Johnson, it is not clear that Democrats as a party were prepared for a total repudiation of Johnson's record and the leftward turn represented by a Kennedy nomination. The authors cite a Gallup Poll which found Hubert Humphrey the majority choice of rank-and-file Democrats on the eve of the Convention. Similarly, ordinary Republicans wanted Nixon, not the "extremist" positions of either Rockefeller or Reagan. The authors argue that Conventions choose a candidate who represents the attitudinal center of the party (not of the electorate). If Humphrey had failed to win the nomination on the first ballot, they speculate that Robert Kennedy—had he lived—might have put together a winning Convention coalition of left and center. But his campaign would have driven quickly to the center of voter attitudes, in order to prevent potential Democratic voters from pinning on Nixon or Wallace buttons.

Scammon and Wattenberg see the post-Convention period as a double, and concurrent, drama, which posed two questions: why did Humphrey almost win? and why did Nixon almost lose? Humphrey nearly won because so many voters, attracted to Wallace on the basis of the Social Issue in September, came home to Humphrey because of the Economic Issue in November; bread-and-butter won out over law-and-order. Nixon almost lost because Wallace attracted some protest votes that would have been Nixon's; because Nixon had to battle on both the Economic and Social Issue fronts; and because he proved to be a lackluster candidate. However, the election clearly demonstrated the potency of the Social Issue.

Scammon and Wattenberg do not see coming electoral battles as being primarily a conflict between generations. The average

age of *voters* is still 47, and this will be little changed, even with the 18 year old vote. Furthermore, the young segment of the essentially unyoung electorate has a poor record of participation and is divided within itself. The class differences between young people are greater than any differences between youth and their own parents. This was marked by the fact (well documented also by the Survey Research Center)¹⁸ that the strongest support for George Wallace in 1968 outside the South came from non-college voters of college age.

Furthermore, the authors of *The Real Majority* are not sure that the support of young activists is beneficial to candidates. In some circumstances (despite the success of "Clean Gene's" troops in the 1968 primaries), it can be political poison to be associated with young people. In addition, the young activists may not even bring along their peers. The authors quote CBS poll data to the effect that self-identified "revolutionaries" are a very small proportion of college students, and that the "conservatives" slightly outnumber the "radical reformers." Young people inevitably age, and "[t]he onset of orthodontistry for their children usually coincides with the making of two more deradicalized reformers" (page 53). However, their conclusions about young voters are offered as "thoughts," for the authors realize that the supporting evidence is not as impressive as for some of their other conclusions.¹⁹

The Real Majority explains more of the nature of contemporary American presidential politics than does *The Emerging Republican Majority*, and it does so in a brisk and entertaining manner. However, the book presumes that the major parties are largely unchanging in nature, and that politics-as-usual will continue to be the order of the day. The Social Issue remains just that: an issue

¹⁸Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIII, No. 4 (December, 1969), pp. 1083-1105.

¹⁹One observer who disagrees is Frederick G. Dutton, former Kennedy aide and current Regent of the University of California. In his *Changing Sources of Power* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), Dutton argues persuasively that college youth may indeed stimulate a new, and more decent, politics. Dutton is pontificating from the *cathedra* of a political statesman; the book is only frustrating from a scholarly viewpoint. His sources are only vaguely identified, and, when he argues from opinion data, Dutton rather blithely combines Gallup and Harris percentages.

which must be included in the partisan calculus; candidates must find the center ground on this issue, as with the Economic Issue.

The centrist argument is based on the assumption that attitudes are distributed on a bell-shaped continuum, with the majority in the middle. When only two parties or candidates are contending for the vote, and one takes an extreme position, it is an easy matter for the opposition to occupy both the middle ground and the opposite extreme, capturing the support of a majority. But what happens when attitude distribution is bi-polar—when, as happened after the 1968 Tet offensive, voters were displeased with events in Vietnam, but were divided between those who preferred withdrawal and those who favored using maximum force to win quickly? The opposition candidate (Richard Nixon) cashed in on dissatisfaction with the incumbents without detailing his “plan” to end the war; and the Republican platform was a model of ambiguity.

Attitude clusters could also, at least in theory (and French practice), be multi-polar, with a party to represent each. However, ours is a two party system, and both parties can read the danger signs in opinion data. When a hodge-podge of issues (crime, drugs, race, judicial leniency, ecology, “welfare abuse,” urban decay) are combined into one Social Issue, the result is that voters who feel strongly about one are canceled out by voters who feel strongly about others, at least in the eye of the candidate. Concerned above all with protecting their electoral passage by not rocking the boat, candidates who heed *The Real Majority* will avoid strong positions that might offend voters—or, more importantly, campaign contributors. No wonder the two party system tends to survive. By acting as if the majority were gathered at the apex of a bell-shaped curve, candidates concentrate on image-projection at the expense of issues, and the parties betray their birthright as vehicles of change. Theodore Lowi states that the electorate, conceived of as the audience of the campaign pitch, is an artificial majority.²⁰ It only resides in the center because issues are lumped together, and a variety of strongly held (and conflicting) opinions are averaged out.

²⁰Theodore J. Lowi, “The Artificial Majority,” *The Nation*, December 7, 1970, reprinted in Michael A. Weinstein, ed., *The Political Experience* (New York: St. Martin's, 1972), pp. 191-197.

Walter Dean Burnham suggests that the Social Issue represents no less than a clash of opposing cultures. If so, such averaging out—indeed the normal compromising style of American politics—is called into question. Where, then, is the center position? Scammon and Wattenberg are silent.

The authors do tell us that the center is a “moving center” and that it is the responsibility of political leaders to move it. In their Epilogue, written for the paperback edition, they distinguish between electoral politics and the politics of public policy formation, intimating that perhaps the center can be moved in between elections (as we all join John Gardner in *Common Cause?*), even if it cannot be moved during campaigns. They repeat their instructions to political leaders in italics: “*Listen to and lead the Center. Both. Not either/or*” (page 315).

But they do not describe political leadership, beyond their injunction to seek the center. The most useful idea about leadership in the social scientists’ conceptual arsenal is probably the concept of charisma. But Scammon and Wattenberg denigrate the concept (which they equate with “popularity”), at least as used by journalists. They are no doubt correct in feeling that much nonsense was written about Lyndon Johnson’s charismatic failures. But they offer no substitute explanation of the mystical power of political leadership. Charisma is fine, they say, as long as the candidate is first perceived to be “a man of the center” (page 159). Exactly how this “man of the center” is to go about moving “the moving center” remains unspecified. In fact, if candidates crowd each other for a middle position, unwilling to accept the risk of offering new visions, political leadership is abdicated.

Phillips claims that an historical partisan realignment is in progress; Scammon and Wattenberg say that the waves have yet to become a tide, and the impact of the Social Issue on partisan fortunes remains unclear. But both books presume that the parties will continue to be much the same kind of organizations they have been heretofore; there is no feeling that a partisan realignment is perforce accompanied by dislocations reverberating throughout society.

Precisely that sense—which is, in fact, a sense of impending doom—animates *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. Like Phillips, Burnham is concerned with cyclical change in the American political system. He applies sophisticated

mathematical techniques to pinpoint the time of change, both on the national scene and for selected local areas (particularly the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as a case study). Unlike Phillips, who is charged by Scammon and Wattenberg with depending on the calendar alone to bring change, Burnham explains precisely why such cyclical change occurs.

The reason is that the American political system, growing from the Lockean tradition which severely limits the scope and competence of government, has shown remarkably little real development since its foundation in the eighteenth century. The economic system, on the other hand, has been perhaps the most dynamic in the world. The operation of the economic system has systematically excluded group after group from sharing in the bounty reaped by the industrial exploitation of America's natural resources. When the disadvantaged groups seek redress for injustice through the political system, the response is slow and uncertain, until economic collapse or some other event triggers the conflict that results in partisan realignment. These realignments, taking place in 1828, 1852-56, 1896, and 1932-36, have been so complete that they provided us with five separate party systems.

The beginning of a new party system is often signaled in advance by the activities of third parties of protest; its arrival is sealed by a change in the constellation of groups making up the supporting coalitions of the major parties. Politics then settles down for a period of relative calm, participation by voters declines, and issues do not particularly agitate the voters. Such were the Eisenhower years, when the conventional academic explanation of American voting behavior was developed. The politics of pluralism, consensus, and the balancing of interest groups predominates, and the system gives an appearance of stability. But the appearance is deceiving, for pressures are building up, demands being formulated, that the system of politics-as-usual cannot respond to satisfactorily. In another thirty or forty years, rapid and violent change will come.

Burnham points out that changes in the party system have been associated with other institutional changes. The time following the Civil War, in which neither party emerged as clearly the majority, saw the rise to preeminent power of the Supreme Court, allied with the corporations which had come to dominate the economic system. With the collapse of the Populist challenge in 1896, the

Republican Party entered upon the same alliance, and the fourth party system identified by Burnham was formed. Stability again seemed the norm. The forces then ascendant viewed "the masses of great cities" with disfavor, and state after state tightened its voter registration requirements and disenfranchised aliens. "Good government" forces attacked the city party organizations and usually succeeded in weakening them. Although the electorate was officially expanded by the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, Burnham cites evidence that the measure was supported by middle class leaders anxious to counterweight the voting power of urban, immigrant males through the participation of their own ladies in the electoral process.

Burnham does not state categorically that we now stand on the threshold of the sixth party system, but he cites much evidence that we do. The unusual nomination of Barry Goldwater by the Republicans in 1964 was an early warning; an even more impressive warning was the 1968 support for George Wallace, which is comparable to the Populist vote of 1892. Burnham notes that Wallace did better than the Populists outside the South.

When groups perceiving injustice mobilize to present their demands, a counter-mobilization also takes place; and the forces that resist fundamental change may win out, as happened in 1896. Burnham's explanation of the mobilization and counter-mobilization now taking place is simple and compelling. Borrowing concepts from David Apter,²¹ he states that the present division in American society is not the traditional one between upper, middle, and lower classes. Rather it is between the technologically competent (the growing, cosmopolitan, professional-managerial-technical elite), the technologically obsolescent (production workers, white collar workers, and older elites who preserve traditional middle class values), and the technologically superfluous (those who dwell in urban ghettos and Appalachia, prevented by social barriers from acquiring education or skill).

The mobilization effected in the last decade by the Northern Democratic Party and Republicans like John Lindsay is an alliance between the very upper strata and the very lower. The corporate managers in their penthouses (Phillips' "limousine liberals") have

²¹David E. Apter, "Ideology and Discontent," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 16-46.

determined, partly from a sense of guilt, that the abundance of American society must be shared by the technologically superfluous who—through no fault of their own—are not able to contribute to it. Thus the support for racial integration in Southern schools, “quality education” in the Northern ghettos, welfare reform, and publicly supported housing for the poor.

This upper-lower alliance is resented by the great middle group, the technologically obsolescent. The policies produced by the alliance are contrary to middle class and lower-middle class values of thrift, individual achievement, and independence. Furthermore, the children and grandchildren of immigrants remember that their forbears came to a promised land, and they do not take kindly to denigrations of the flag or other traditional symbols attacked by the fringe elements of the alliance. They have achieved a home and mortgage through personal effort; there is no reason for others to expect comfort (or even subsistence) when they do no work to earn it. Poverty is viewed as a mark of personal failure, not the operation of social forces.

Most importantly—a point Burnham could make more of—the costs of the policies instituted by the upper-lower alliance are largely paid for by the middle groups. The integration of housing does not take place in Westchester County; it happens in the areas surrounding urban ghettos. Publicly subsidized housing may be built in middle class suburbs; it will not be established where the zoning permits only one family for ten acres. The technologically competent send their children to private schools, or flee to the suburbs, when their neighborhood schools are integrated. The “white ethnic” factory worker cannot afford those options. The cost of increased federal budgets is paid by the middle groups in income tax, for they have no capital gains, depletion allowances, or other loopholes which permit the technologically competent to avoid a fair share of governmental costs. (Tax loopholes are, of course, a sign that American government is more responsive to narrowly based, vigorously represented interests, than to “the people,” however defined, whose participation is largely limited to voting.)

Burnham finds that the class correlations with partisanship established by the New Deal are breaking down. The upper strata, once determinedly Republican, turn toward the Democrats. This turn was quite marked in 1964, with the negative stimulus of the

Goldwater candidacy. The Democratic affiliation of the technologically superfluous becomes even more marked. Groups from the broad middle—living and working at a distance from centers of the Establishment—break away from the Democrats, as Phillips described. But Burnham does not agree that they will turn to the Republicans. In 1968, they voted for George Wallace.

The structure of the southern vote in November underscores Wallace's periphery-oriented appeal and, indeed, establishes a peculiar link with mass-based third-party "movements" in the American past. (page 145)

Burnham analyzes recent voting in Baltimore, Maryland, and Delaware County, Pennsylvania, to confirm the existence of an "urban populism" which responds positively to the Wallace appeal, described as neo-populist in content, in addition to the racism at its core. He examines the narrow reelection of John Lindsay as Mayor of New York as a striking example of the phenomenon of middle groups battling the upper-lower coalition. For, while Lindsay captured the most votes, fully exploiting the allegiance of Harlem blacks and Manhattan silk-stocking districts, his total was only slightly over 40 per cent. The vote of the middle groups was split between Lindsay's "law-and-order" opponents, Procaccino and Marchi. Writing in 1969, Burnham concludes:

... The nature of Mayor Lindsay's coalition is such that he may be well advised to affiliate himself with the Democrats, either formally or informally. The structure of recent American political behavior, however, makes it very clear that of the two major parties, the Democratic Party is in much the more serious trouble. Its capacity to retain its hold over enough of even its nonsouthern coalitional elements to remain ascendant in American politics is very much in doubt. (page 166)

This part of Burnham's analysis bears close resemblance to that of Kevin Phillips, and Burnham at one point graciously acknowledges Phillips' status as "spokesman for these threatened middle strata in an administration of spokesmen for them" (page 141). It is indeed the counter-mobilization of the middle against the upper-lower coalition which seems to be taking place. Burnham feels that such a majority will indeed be profoundly conservative, but it is unlikely to be "Republican" in the sense of establishing the ascendancy of the Party as it is presently constituted.

Burnham's explanation is more persuasive than Phillips'. Whereas Phillips speaks of the alliance between limousine liberals and blacks, implying primary importance for racism as a voting motivation, Burnham writes of the new majority as resulting from "polarized cultural conflict." It seems to be Scammon and Wattenberg's Social Issue, more sharply defined. Rather than praising the intelligence of the middle voter (as Scammon and Wattenberg do), Burnham emphasizes the narrow, anti-intellectual, blind anti-Establishmentarian attributes of this "urban populism." However, it is not clear that his emphasis is based on solid contemporary data.

To the extent that the coming realignment results from an either/or contest of cultures, rather than the presentation of economic demands which can be quantified and compromised, the present political turmoil resembles the period of partisan confusion that preceded the Civil War, rather than the realignments of 1896 or 1932-36. Burnham points out that all critical periods have been marked by a high potential for violence; changing the coalitional base of the parties, wrenching an archaic political structure into some congruence with rapid changes in the economy and society, is necessarily painful. Thus, while Phillips is delighted with his emerging "populist conservative" majority, and Scammon and Wattenberg regard their Social Issue as a reality to which the parties must adjust, only Burnham has read the historical lessons and shudders for the future.

In the past, political parties have reluctantly become the vehicles of change, and they are the only elements of the system equipped to perform that role. Burnham reminds us that

. . . political parties, with all their well-known human and structural shortcomings, are the only devices thus far invented by the wit of Western man which with some effectiveness can generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the many individually powerless against the relatively few who are individually—or organizationally—powerful. (page 133)

Burnham questions whether the Republicans and Democrats remain able to perform this noble task. He traces what he labels as the decomposition and disaggregation of American political parties since the turn of the century, when the Populist challenge was beaten back, and the "system of 1896" was firmly established. Before that time, winning elections was a matter of mobilizing the

party faithful; there were few waverers. It made sense to buy votes in selected areas, because it was the sure way to modify "party identifications." The ballot was not then terribly secret, so the reality of one's purchase could be verified. Political campaigning was like a military exercise, with the torchlight parade its characteristic maneuver. After that, the hold of the parties on the electorate began to weaken, and a new kind of campaigning developed, aimed at undecided voters. Campaigning became more a matter of merchandising. "The selling of the President" was an attribute of the campaign of 1916; the activities discovered by Joe McGinniss in 1968 in fact had an ancient lineage.²²

Again, the change of party system was reflected in institutional changes. The seniority system in Congress functions to weaken the party as the "action intermediary" between the people and public policy; the frequent and consistent use of seniority to designate the chairmen of Congressional committees rose markedly after 1896, reflecting the essentially negative public policy orientation of the coalition which ruled until 1933.

Because the New Deal focused upon pragmatic policies to meet an emergency, rather than diagnosing basic institutional flaws, the long-range trend of party decomposition was slowed, rather than being halted or reversed. A number of previously non-participant groups were brought into the Democratic majority, and a somewhat more liberally oriented coalition of interests took command. But the institutional habits of Congress—seniority assignment of committee chairmanships and ossification in the House Speakership—remain unchanged. The reforms of the New Deal are now recognized as modest in their scope; the political system was patched together, rather than being modified to suit the needs of post-industrial society. Political parties have become less and less effective as instruments of real change, and this fact is increasingly recognized by the voters.

There is a new kind of independent voter now. The conventional understanding of American voting holds that the independent—the voter without a strong party identification—is apathetic, less well educated, less well informed, and less influential. Burnham amasses poll data to show that many within the most politically

²²Joe McGinniss, *The Selling of the President 1968* (New York: Trident Press, 1969).

active strata of contemporary society have not formed a partisan attachment, or their former attachment has weakened. More education is as likely to develop cynicism as party identification. This is remarkably the case within the ranks of the affluent suburbanites, where the Republican Party can no longer count on domination, and among better educated working people, where the hold of the Democratic Party has been greatly weakened, without a corresponding turn to the Republicans. In short, the traditional parties are losing their hold upon the electorate, and this trend is clearly marked since the turn of the century, in spite of the change from the fourth to the fifth party system in 1932-1936. The trend is accelerated by the instant communication of daily crisis, and the human foibles of political leaders, by the modern media.

If parties can no longer capture the support, much less the imagination, of substantial groups within the electorate, and legislative bodies operate according to the premises of "interest group liberalism," as documented by Theodore Lowi,²³ the voters will increasingly regard legislatures as essentially unresponsive to majority interests. We can anticipate a further expansion in the power of an executive branch already possessing unprecedented power. Also—given the appropriate leadership at the time of crisis—we can expect the counter-mobilization of the middle groups against the upper-lower coalition to usher in a reactionary regime. Burnham reminds us that fascist and extreme right-wing movements are linked "with the radicalization of an anxiety-ridden middle class which is threatened with loss of either social values or social status, or both" (page 189). And that is his vision of the most likely course that America will follow.

In Burnham's view, the political system which traces its lineage to John Locke has been only marginally adaptable to the pressures of social change since Andrew Jackson's time. Given the decomposition of the political parties, the critical period upon which we are now apparently embarked may not provide us with a sixth party system, but simply an explosion. Even if full scale warfare is somehow avoided, the causes and consequences of the coming realignment will reverberate throughout society.

If this be true, then the concerns of Kevin Phillips and the

²³Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

authors of *The Real Majority* are irrelevant. They are concerned with winning the next election, assuming that the system is basically stable and that incremental change is sufficient. Burnham calls into question the functioning of the entire system, and he suggests that major change cannot come in time to prevent disaster. A major premise underlying this conclusion, however, is his largely undocumented assumption that "the great middle" groups in American society may be ready recruits into movements of the far right, and that their adherence to Lockean values precludes their support for reforms in governmental institutions—changes toward the central direction of welfare functions—that could begin to achieve social justice.

One could imagine a new agenda for students of American politics. It would focus upon—in the term used by Scammon and Wattenberg—"moving the center." It would be concerned with the nature of political leadership in the American context and any potential the parties still have as vehicles for reform. It would pay more attention to the middle groups—"the silent majority," "Middle America," etc.—than has recently been the habit of political science. These groups would be pursued in their native habitat—Park Forest, Levittown, or Orange County (New Jersey, Florida, and California). These groups comprise a numerical majority. They are the potential clientele of movements toward major institutional change, whether for good or evil. A major element of this search would be an attempt to measure the hold of Locke's individualist notions upon the middle groups, coupled with a challenge of the assumption that the voter is not well enough informed to understand the stakes involved in change.

The basic nature of the studies of political behavior—academic or otherwise—is their strong predilection to see the voters as controlled by, rather than controlling, events. The tidal image is the inevitable result. Change in the system seems a natural force that can be measured, but never deflected. This is particularly true when the researcher shares the low estimate of voter knowledge and will that is part of the conventional interpretation. Observers of aggregate voting behavior are left in the position of Matthew Arnold:

The sea is calm tonight,
The tide is full, the moon lies fair . . .
And we are here as on a darkling plain

Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.²⁴

Whether one is "pebble watching" (Scammon and Wattenberg), engaging in political market research (Phillips), examining cyclical change (Burnham), or measuring "the individual motivations of the voters directly" (Campbell), the image one has is of the observer abstracted from the phenomena he observes, perhaps able to warn of disaster (Burnham) or offer advice to political leaders (Phillips, Scammon and Wattenberg), but still viewing the voter as essentially passive, moved by forces which the observer understands but the voter does not.

Surely it was in reaction to this tradition that V. O. Key wrote, as part of his final legacy to our discipline, "The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that voters are not fools."²⁵

Walter Dean Burnham reminds us that American politics-as-usual is interspersed by brief and violent periods which involve "re-definitions of the universe of voters, political parties, and the broad boundaries of the politically possible" (page 10). If political scientists come better to understand the nature of American political leadership, and the noble as well as the base instincts to which it can appeal, it is just possible that we could aid in making those re-definitions with less than the violence of the past. If new possibilities are formulated in time, and their validity expounded, they need not be forced upon us by the clash of ignorant armies. The gloomy future envisioned by Burnham need not be.

There is a tide in the affairs of men
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.²⁶

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²⁴From "Dover Beach," various editions.

²⁵*The Responsible Electorate*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁶William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, Act IV, Scene 3.