

## IN SEARCH OF THE PRESIDENCY

*Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership From FDR to Carter.*  
By Richard E. Neustadt. (New York: Wiley, 1980). Pp. 286.  
\$6.95. Paper.

*The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* By James David Barber. (Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977). Pp. 576. \$11.95. Cloth. \$8.95. Paper.

*The Presidential Experience: What the Office Does to the Man.* By Bruce Buchanan. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978). Pp. 198. \$3.95. Paper.

*The State of the Presidency.* By Thomas E. Cronin. (Second Edition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980). Pp. 417. \$14.95. Cloth. \$6.95. Paper.

We have met the enemy and they are us.

-Pogo (Walt Kelly)

We give the President more work than a man can do, more responsibility than a man should take, more pressure than a man can bear. We abuse him often and rarely praise him. We wear him out, use him up, eat him up. And with all this, Americans have a love for the President that goes beyond party loyalty or nationality; he is ours and we exercise the right to destroy him.

-John Steinbeck

Andrea: Unhappy is the land that breeds no hero.

Galileo: No, Andrea. Unhappy is the land that needs a hero.

-Bertolt Brecht, Galileo

The American presidency is in a state of flux. No national political institution has been subject to such severe strain or been the object of more criticism. A succession of political shocks, notably the Vietnam War, the urban violence of the Sixties, the Watergate scandal, the Nixon pardon, and the intractable problems of energy and inflation in the Seventies, have contributed to an erosion of presidential authority and political power. Greenstein points out that between 1933 and 1961, three individuals (Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower) held the office for the equivalent of seven four-year

terms. During a shorter time span from 1961 to 1978, on the other hand, five men (Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter) held office for the equivalent of just over four four-year terms. "By the late 1970's," he adds, "the rapid turnover in Presidents had become an important quality of the presidency itself..."

Focusing on the last two decades, James Stanley Young has noted that "Kennedy was murdered. Johnson abdicated. Nixon was overthrown and exiled. Ford was defeated in office, as was Carter. We may be in for a period where we waste every President who comes in. Perhaps we should be reconciled to a series of one-term Presidents," he observes.<sup>o</sup>

The dramatic political shocks and short tenure of office need to be viewed, however, against a larger setting of . profound and widespread changes in the American political system. These changes have been noted frequently by various commentators in our books, scholarly journals, magazines, newspapers, television, radio. Many of them are identified by an impressive group of scholars contributing to *The New American Political System*, edited by Anthony King.<sup>o</sup> King himself draws upon the individual chapters and adds some thoughts of his own in an able concluding chapter.<sup>4</sup> In the realm of political ideas, King suggests that two changes stand out since the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and both affect not merely the outputs of politics but the way in which politics is conducted as well. "The first is the decline of the ideas of the New Deal as the principal organizing themes of American political life."<sup>5</sup> The second is "the altogether new emphasis on the value of participation in politics" which is "not merely in the choice of public office holders but in the making of public policy" as well.<sup>o</sup>

Accompanying these major changes in ideas are many specific

1. Fred I. Greenstein, "Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency," in *The New American Political System*, ed., by Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 64.

2. Cited in Timothy D. Schellhardt, "Do We Expect Too Much?" *Wall Street Journal*, July 10, 1979, p. 20.

3. See King, *System*. The factors of change are elaborated by Samuel H. Beer, Fred I. Greenstein, Hugh Heclo, Samuel C. Patterson, Martin Shapiro, Austin Ranney, Richard A. Brody, Leon D. Epstein, and Anthony King.

4. Anthony King, "The American Polity in the Late 1970s: Building Coalitions in the Sand," in King, *System*, pp. 371-95.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 372-73.

changes in the operation and behavior of our governmental, non-governmental and political institutions. Congress has dispersed power, making it more difficult to transact business. Always a decentralized body, it has become even more decentralized as "the powerful few have become the considerably less powerful many."<sup>7</sup> Television and press journalists are much more disposed to being critical of our national institutions, particularly the President, while the disappearance of the old party organization deprives the President of a potential source of strength.<sup>8</sup> The role of parties has declined throughout the country and presidential politics has become candidate-centered. Changes in the electorate include an erosion of party identification, increases in split-ticket voting, and a loosening of attachments to the act of voting itself. Changes in group politics involve the increasing professionalization in Washington policy making, the mushrooming growth of issue groups, and the emergence of "issue networks." The latter is Hugh Heclo's phrase for the new group life involving specialized policy expertise in federal bureaucracies, Congress, interest groups, and Washington law firms. He stresses that the growth of such issue networks makes the task of presidential leadership even more difficult.<sup>9</sup>

Anthony Ding observes that when the forementioned and other changes are identified and analyzed, certain words appear again and again: "fragmentation," "breaking up."<sup>10</sup> The erosion of the New Deal ideas without the emergence of a new political philosophy, the dispersion of power, the lack of internal cohesion in our groups and institutions, and the prevalence of amorphous issue networks are salient features of contemporary politics. Thus, to the words suggestive of disintegration or breaking up, King adds the phrase "atomization." "American politics have become, to a high degree, atomized."<sup>11</sup>

King concludes that atomized politics is at the heart of our country's political problems. Specifically, he argues:

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 373-74.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 373-95. These changes and the others that follow are mentioned in the King Chapter.

9. Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in King, *System*, pp. 87-124.

10. King, "The American Polity, p. 390.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 391.

American politicians continue to try to create majorities; they have no option. But they are no longer, or at least not very often, in the business of building *coalitions*. The materials out of which coalitions might be built simply do not exist. Building coalitions in the United States today is like trying to build coalitions out of sand. It cannot be done.<sup>1</sup>

The factors of major national shocks, high executive turnover, and major changes in our governmental and non-governmental structures since the time of John F. Kennedy suggest the desirability of reflection and reexamination of three recently revised classics on the modern presidency. Much has changed since the first editions of the outstanding scholarly endeavors of Neustadt, Barber, and Cronin, and recent events and changes afford them the opportunity to clarify, to amend, and to offer new thoughts. A fourth book, a slim but most original new contribution by Bruce Buchanan, is also reviewed because it complements quite nicely the work of Barber.

Review essays frequently tell the reader more about the reviewer than the books under review. Moreover, they sometimes tend to one or another extreme. Sometimes they are little more than a love feast with the reviewer lavishly praising all facets of the work, and finding no weaknesses. At the other extreme is the supercritic who compares the works in question to some ideal research scheme, quite frequently his or her own, and finds them quite deficient and with few redeeming qualities. This reviewer hopes to avoid both extremes and to find somehow the Aristotelian golden mean in reviewing. The format to be adopted will first describe the approach, arguments, and data put forth by an author, followed by an evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses in helping <sub>us</sub> understand the modern presidency. The final section of this essay examines the future needs for scholarship on what is perhaps our most important but least understood political institution. In 1974 Richard Loss wrote in this journal about the dissolving concepts of the presidency.<sup>13</sup> If anything, the institution has experienced even greater strain but has nevertheless survived the trauma of Watergate and the imperial practices of Johnson and Nixon. Now in its postimperial phase, it is an institution embedded in a sea of change and it strongly needs a delineation of its role in the new American political system. In an ef-

12. *Ibid.*

13. Richard Loss, "Dissolving Concepts of the Presidency," *The Political Science Reviewer*, IV (Fall, 1974), pp. 133-68.

fort to gain insights, as to what this role might be, it seems best to first revisit, reexamine, and reevaluate some of the classics in our search for the presidency.

## I

First published in 1960,<sup>14</sup> Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power* was quickly acknowledged as a realistic assessment of how the presidency actually functions. His service as an economist with O.P.A. (1942), and as a staffer with the old Bureau of the Budget (1946-50) and the White House (1950-53) allowed him to draw upon the insights of participant observation with those of more conventional scholarship.<sup>15</sup> A 1976 edition of this work essentially reprinted the eight chapters of the 1960 edition, but added a long introductory essay that focused on Johnson and Nixon and a short concluding chapter on Kennedy.<sup>16</sup> The 1980 edition, a subject of this review, is vintage Neustadt and it updates his thoughts as we move into the Eighties.

Neustadt notes at the outset that presidential weakness was the underlying theme of his original work, and that it remains his theme today. More specifically he argues: "Weakness is still what I see. Expectations rise again and clerky tasks increase, priorities are needed more than ever but are harder to maintain, and prospects for sustained support from any quarter worsen as political parties wane." (xi). In developing his theme, Neustadt opts to keep the original eight chapters essentially intact, striking only an occasional word or a misused "hopefully." Chapter 9 is virtually identical to the JFK afterward in the 1976 edition. Its intent is "to provide the terms for judgment of a President's performance on the job in retrospect" (xii). Chapter 10 is the essay reflecting upon the performances of Johnson and Nixon. Initially published as an Introduction to the 1976 edition, it is now placed, Neustadt concedes, "much more logically, after the analysis that it revisits" (xiv). This chapter is intended as a

14. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

15. Loss, "Dissolving Concepts," p. 155.

16. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership with Reflections on Johnson and Nixon* (New York: Wiley, 1976). Neustadt's initial reflections on Kennedy originally appeared in "Kennedy in the Presidency: A Premature Appraisal," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIX (September, 1964), pp. 321-34.

commentary on the original book. In his own words:

It adjusts details but not essentials. Despite appearances, Johnson and Nixon found their power as contingent and variable as that of others. Judging by their experience, my proffered line of thought appears less useful than I had hoped; this does not render power less contingent. So I think it was for them as for the others, at least strategically, looking ahead. (xii)

Neustadt's chapter 11 is entirely new and adds new illustrative material to the entire work. Among other things, it summarizes changes, identifies exacerbating problems, brings the analysis into the TV age, and assesses Carter's trouble. It is a perceptive commentary that strengthens Neustadt's contribution to our understanding of the contemporary presidency.

Neustadt's approach is empirical and didactic with the main focus being personal power: how to get it, how to keep it, and how to use it. It is a tightly reasoned analysis based on his own participant observation, extensive interviews, widely publicized case studies, a careful reading of available diaries and memoirs, Gallup polls, government documents, newspaper and magazine accounts, and other scholarly works. The underlying perspective is presidential weakness, that the presidency is not as powerful as many fear nor should its strengthening be cause for alarm. The formal institutional powers were fragile and were quite weak in light of presidential responsibility. In order to make the formal powers work for him a President must acquire informal and personal power to influence governmental action.

Thus, Neustadt's central theme is power as persuasion. "Presidential *power*," he tells us, "is the power to persuade" (10). A President must operate in a governmental system of "separate institutions *sharing* power," (26) and he must be sufficiently alert and tenacious to avoid threats to his own power. He must also work constantly to enhance his power by effective bargaining.

For Neustadt, the dilemma of the President is his vantage point in the system. It is both his weakness as well as his strength. On one hand, he is an invaluable clerk whose services are indispensable all over Washington and throughout the country. No one else's services suffice. "Our Constitution, our traditions, and our politics provide no better source for the initiatives a President can take." (7). In effect, each President has five sets of constituents: "from Executive officialdom, from Congress, from his partisans, from citizens at large,

and from abroad" (7). Their membership is overlapping, and individually they do not match the President's electorate; "one of them, indeed, is outside his electorate" (7). If they need him, Neustadt asks, why is he not assured of everyone's support? His answer is:

that no one else sits where he sits, or sees quite as he sees; no one else feels the full weight of his obligations. Those obligations are a tribute to his unique place in our political system. But just because it is unique they fall on him alone. The same conditions that promote his leadership in form preclude a guarantee of leadership in fact. (8)

Neustadt explains that those constituent groups so dependent on his services may or may not extend him political support at any given point in time:

Lacking his position and prerogatives, these men cannot regard his obligations as their own. They have their jobs to do; none is the same as his. As they perceive their duty they may find it right to follow him, in fact, or they may not. Whether they will feel obliged *on their responsibility* to do what he wants done remains an open question.(8)

Presidential weakness in Neustadt's world was and still is the order of the day. Despite what newly elected Presidents and their staffs might think, the power of command is limited. A President does not attain results merely by giving orders, regardless of his constitutional or statutory powers. Rather, he must bargain-his power is the power to persuade. Neustadt's thesis is illustrated by a quotation from President Truman who, contemplating Eisenhower's ascendancy to the presidency, said "...he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' *And nothing will happen.* Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating." (9). Neustadt's analysis of presidential power also echoes Truman's description of his own experience. "I sit here all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense enough to do without my persuading them....That's all the powers of the President amount to." (9). Neustadt utilizes three well-known and well-documented cases of command (Truman's recall of MacArthur, Truman's seizure of the steel mills, and Eisenhower's use of Federal troops at Little Rock) to illustrate that command is not a method suitable for everyday employment and should only be used as a last resort (9-25).

While favoring a Hamiltonian view of the presidency, Neustadt is

aware and emphasizes the reality of the Madisonian view, particularly as the latter constrains presidential power. The remainder of the original text is devoted to illustrating how to bargain and to maximize power prospects. It includes a discussion of how choices guard a President's power prospects, and what a President must do to make the right choices. Separate chapters are devoted to two important political resources—namely professional reputation (44-63) and public prestige (64-79) and how they can be used in the bargaining process. Case studies on Eisenhower's budget policy and Truman's military-diplomatic policy on Korea are presented to show "how *not* to extract power out of choice. The Presidents in both cases failed to make their choices serve their influence. They failed because they left out of account the stakes for them, in person." (109). For Neustadt a President must want to maximize his power. Otherwise, despite his other qualities, he is not fit for the office. Thus, he further stresses that "the lesson of these cases is, that when it comes to power, nobody is expert but the President; if he, too, acts as layman, it goes hard with him." (109).

The prototypical effective President for Neustadt was Franklin D. Roosevelt, with a rare combination of sense of purpose, ambition, self-confidence, and political experience. In Neustadt's judgment:

No President in this century has had a sharper sense of personal power, a sense of what it is and where it comes from; none has had more hunger for it, few have had more use for it, and only one or two could match his faith in his own competence to use it. Perception and desire and self-confidence, combined, produced their own reward. No modern President has been more nearly master in the White House. (118-19)

If Roosevelt is the model of effectiveness, Eisenhower is presented as ineffective, a Roosevelt in reverse. Eisenhower's power sense is described as "blunt in almost the degree that FDR's was sharp" (120). According to Neustadt, Eisenhower "could not quite absorb the notion that effective power had to be extracted out of other men's self-interest; neither did he quite absorb the notion that nobody else's interest could be wholly like his own" (120). In short, Eisenhower is viewed as a model of how-not-to-succeed. In his new reflections in Chapter 10, particularly after looking back after the Nixon Presidency, Neustadt is willing to concede that Eisenhower's concern with his own popularity and the prestige of the office "seems a more impressive contribution than it did before" (169). While making this concession he still observes that "Eisenhower's



quietude seemed more conservative in terms of policy than I, for one, deemed prudent. So I still think it was. We paid for damming up reform until the flood of the mid-Sixties." (189). Finally, while noting Eisenhower's contribution to the office, it should be noted that Neustadt does not retract his 1960 analysis of Eisenhower's style or his largely negative evaluation of his performance in office. He still leaves in print a rather condescending observation about American voting behavior in the Eisenhower era and suggests that "the striking thing about our national elections in the Fifties was not Eisenhower's personal popularity; it was the genuine approval of his candidacy by informed Americans whom one might have supposed would know better" (142).

Despite Vietnam, Watergate, assassination, riots, inflation, energy problems, etc., Neustadt says that he still feels "about the same" about presidential power with a few refinements (162). More specifically, he maintains the view that "the power of a President today derives from roughly the same sources a generation ago, is comparably limited, similarly frustrating, more changeable than ever, yet as central to our system as before, a far cry from congressional government" (163). Nevertheless, Neustadt discusses areas for altered emphasis or reinterpretation.

First are two factors that can affect in striking ways the sources of a President's potential power, namely perceptions of legitimacy and sentiments of loyalty (163-70). Legitimacy is viewed as a link between prestige and formal powers, while loyalty is regarded as a source of influence and hence also a trap. It is here that Neustadt finds the Eisenhower Presidency as more attractive than he did previously (168-69).

Second are factors of institutional detail, the so-called fine print of the system, that affect the relative advantages of Presidents in seeking what they want from others. Neustadt identifies nine such changes that he feels are representative since 1960 (170-77 and 193-94). These include the tightening of a President's appointment schedule; presidential press relations; a President's relations with members of his Cabinet; a President's consultations at times of gravity and stress with the bipartisan Establishment; the continuation of hostilities once forces are engaged without a declaration of war; the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974; presidential renomination; and the growth of full-time senior and junior members of the White House staff.

Third are changes in the policy environment, the prominent issues

and actors the bring forth, which can affect a President's advantages (177-80). In the mid-Seventies, Neustadt singled out three such issues for particular attention. These included the inheritance of Johnson's Great Society programs legislated in the Sixties, the economic issues of the Seventies, and the decline of bipolarity abroad accompanied by nuclear proliferation.

Fourth are the human qualities with which a President confronts his problems in office. These include his temperamental fitness for the job, and the enormous consequences of a lack of fit such as Johnson and Nixon (180-85). Neustadt admits that his original emphasis on the need for experienced politicians of "extraordinary temperament" was "singularly unhelpful" (180). He now concludes that "perhaps the quality of experience counts more than the quantity. Roosevelt's experience though less than LBJ's was far more relevant to *presidential* power" (181). He assesses the human qualities of Johnson and Nixon in negative terms and states that "the simple lesson then, is to beware the insecure" (183). Neustadt expresses admiration for the work of James David Barber on presidential character, but he stops short of accepting Barber's typology. He is particularly hesitant about the classification of Johnson, Nixon, Wilson, and Hoover as "active-negative" Presidents, and remarks that "this sweeps too far for me. I admire but am doubtful of a scheme that crowds these four into a single square." (183). Nevertheless, Neustadt embraces Barber's call for a temperament characterized by a sense of humor, as well as Barber's suggestion of examining more carefully the pre-presidential political and managerial experiences of presidential candidates (184).

Fifth are the difficulties that Presidents had with power as a source of clues to policy (185-93). Neustadt contends that in the cases of Johnson and Nixon, "their power calculations seem to have moved them toward the very policies that later dragged them down" (163). Neustadt feels that is precisely against such inexperienced performances that his original formulation tried to warn.

In power as a source of clues to policy, we are informed that short-run tangibles seem to have overwhelmed the long-run risks, and that the sensitivity to their power stakes did not work for Johnson and Nixon. Hence, Neustadt concludes that his original argument is still valid "but not nearly as helpful as I once had hoped" (189). He still maintains, however, that

A President remains as much in need as ever of some sources he can call his own for questions to illuminate the judgments and criteria served up to him by others. I would not for a moment cease my advocacy of his power-stakes as such a source. (189-90).

Neustadt then suggests a process of backward mapping (visualize the outcome of a policy option, specify the last act necessary to produce it, backtrack and identify the other necessary steps to assist a President in looking into clues to power problems they otherwise might miss) (190). He recommends forward planning as well (191).

Sixth are the developments of the "institutionalized Presidency," including the previously mentioned growth of the White House staff (193-202). Neustadt pays particular attention to the weakness of Nixon and Johnson, and uses Roosevelt as an affirmative role model *in this case*.

Neustadt finishes his reappraisal of power (203-07) by making four suggestions as to how "support for Presidents might be enhanced and stabilized, and relatively soon" (203-04). These include constitutional reform, a retreat with lower expectations, a television personality, or a revival of parties-in-government. He does not see constitutional reform moving beyond the discussion stage; nor does he believe that we could sustain for long, a lower expectations posture. His notion of a revival of parties-in-government depends on *convergent* local impacts (his emphasis) inducing over time a convergence of criteria for nominations for Congress and President (206-07). There appears to be little evidence that such a convergence is occurring today. Moreover, as Cronin points out, "Neustadt here seems to ignore the fact that incumbency in congressional elections has become so powerful that there is relatively little a president can do to affect who gets elected to Congress. Moreover, it would appear that congressional elections have increasingly little to do with national issues and presidential politics."<sup>17</sup> In short, Neustadt is left awaiting a President who will master the medium of television and "mobilize suburbanites across the country, partisans for *him*, with influence themselves in interest groups of many sorts (including what are now-called "public" interest groups) and also in assorted firms or unions" (205).

As this review essay is being written, one presidential candidate,

17. Thomas E. Cronin, "Presidential Power Revised and Reappraised," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXXII (December, 1979), p. 387.

Republican Ronald Reagan, seems particularly skillful in his usage of this medium and could rise to such a communication challenge. Unfortunately, for Neustadt, chairman of the Platform Committee of the 1972 Democratic Convention, many of Reagan's policy goals will probably be not to his liking, particularly in view of his Eisenhower assessment. In addition, Reagan is not likely to appeal to the same segment of suburbia that Neustadt has in mind nor is he likely to gain extensive political support from public interest groups or unions.

Neustadt's final chapter on the "Hazards of Transition" is a perceptive commentary on the presidency today. His central concern remains presidential weakness, and he does an excellent job of elucidating the constraints on presidential power. In contrast to his position on chapter 10 on lower expectations, he now pleads for the use of a Truman standard, which he concedes is low, in evaluating presidential performance. Giving the nature of contemporary problems and the major changes in American political life, Neustadt feels that we should be more patient with our Presidents and their learning-time in office. Specifically, he says "Yet the standard raised by Carter's critics seems to me too high, higher than realism counsels or necessity compels. Too much is expected of a President in Carter's shoes." (211-12).

In building his case for a more realistic and understanding public assessment, Neustadt calls our attention to the "atomization" that has occurred in American political institutions and which was mentioned at the beginning of this essay. The atomized trends he chooses to emphasize include the dispersion of power in Congress, increasing fragmentation within the executive branch, the proliferation and permanence of interest groups and the increase in professional staffs and growth of "issue networks" (212-14). On the subject of contemporary problems, Neustadt laments that the issues of the Eighties "will almost surely be divisive, not consensual" (238) whereas our country has experienced what he calls "productive" crises in the past that resulted in building a new consensus, such as the sort available to FDR in 1933 and 1942, such crises are not likely to be part of our future. Two possible exceptions that might contain the seeds of an old-style consensus, according to Neustadt, are "sustained fuel shortages and terrorism" (238). Overall, however, he is not optimistic and believes that contemporary issues render even more difficult the job of the President.

Although advancing a strong plea for patience in evaluating the

President, Neustadt puts forth a balanced but critical assessment of Carter's performance for the first two years. He is critical, for example, of Carter's operating style, which he feels is "suggestive of a President more unpolitical in some respects than Eisenhower" (215). On the other hand, he calls our attention to "the very scale, diversity, complexity of his initial legislative program," "much of it redistributive," and bound to run up against the reality that "separated institutions continue to share powers" (215). In more personal terms he finds that Senator "Long was experienced, Carter a novice. Besides Long was defending, not proposing." (215). Another constraint on Carter's power was that his chief objectives "required implementation by executives outside the government, in places where the President's authority was weakest, where his constitutional and statutory powers were attenuated and did not apply: decision-makers in the private sector and in foreign governments" (215-16). Neustadt elaborates on other evaluative points and then introduces two case studies, contrasting Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs to Carter and the Bert Lance affair, to underscore the learning-time feature of a President's initial years in office (220-25).

Neustadt's hope for the country's political future ultimately focuses on what he calls the Washington professional crowd or issue networks (241-43) and the emergence of a President who can master the TV medium to build political support (234-38). His analysis of the latter is especially interesting as he argues that television has probably modified the relationship between the President's resources-professional reputation and public prestige. Twenty years ago, Neustadt argued that the two "factors were autonomous and frequently diverged" (237). Now he believes the opposite, and says that professional opinions aired through the media have a strong impact on public prestige. In short, "prestige seems likelier than formerly to reflect reputation..." (238). Thus, the future effectiveness of a President will depend on his ability "to draw and stir a television audience" and make the most of his popular connection to affect professional reputation, rather than allowing the latter to continually overshadow and influence the former (238). Although he does not view TV as a cure-all, Neustadt suggests that, despite the fact that they are long shots requiring substantial time, skillful presidential media usage coupled with a more cohesive Washington crowd "might yet become pillars of a reconstruction yielding more effectiveness than we have seen of late in White House contributions to governmental outcomes" (243).

In summary, presidential weakness is even more prevalent in an age of institutional atomization and complex policy problems. We need to lower our expectations of presidential performance and grant our chief executives adequate learning time in overcoming the hazards of governmental transition. Hope for the future rests primarily with a President with television talent and the growing coherence and continuity of the Washington crowd or issue networkers. These are some of Neustadt's most recent thoughts on presidential power as we move into the Eighties.

Having summarized Neustadt's argumentation and identified his source material, what now can be said by way of evaluation? To begin with, those critics who have faulted Neustadt for excessive preoccupation with means and not ends will find little change in Neustadt's position in the 1980 edition. Neustadt still seeks to steer away as much as possible from value judgments about the content and consequences of power, and feels comfortable in writing primarily about the means of leadership. Thus, the analysis put forth by Bluhm in 1965 is still applicable today. Although finding much commendable in Neustadt's analysis while developing an interesting comparison between *Presidential Power* and the works of Machiavelli, Bluhm concludes that "a politics of manipulation, however, is an incomplete politics."<sup>18</sup> Bluhm contends that Neustadt goes too far in asserting that policy viability may be the *only* ground on which a substantive decision can be reached. Thus, he emphasizes that "the President and the nation must have a conception of the desirable-of the good-as well as of the possible, or viable, to guide policy. Unless some things are designated *good* by someone, the notion of the *possible* becomes quite vacuous."<sup>19</sup> Similarly the concerns of Richard Loss that Neustadt has allowed himself to become too overly identified with presidential power, and that contrary to Neustadt, what is good for the power of a particular President may not be good for the country or may not result in humane policy (incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II, e.g.) are still relevant today.<sup>20</sup> Neustadt's failure to broaden his focus in 1980, despite his personal criticisms of Johnson's and Nixon's policies, leaves him open to the charge that he "tells his stu-

18. William T. Bluhm, *Theories of the Political System* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 258.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Loss, "Dissolving Concept," pp. 162-63.

dent nothing of the role of ideals in politics, and his lesson is therefore incomplete."<sup>21</sup> What might be said in Neustadt's defense, is Cronin's observation that Neustadt's "ends were and perhaps still remain implicitly embedded in the liberal vision of the 1960s."<sup>22</sup>

Another frequent criticism of Neustadt's work is that it is primarily impressionistic. Cronin points out, quite correctly in this reviewer's judgment, that this is hardly fair as Neustadt's closely reasoned analysis is based upon participant observations, extensive interviews, diaries and memoirs, etc. and is "replete with rich empirical propositions, many of which taken as a whole approximate an exchange theory of influence relationships."<sup>23</sup> Cronin slightly rephrases and identifies nine of them from the 1976 edition<sup>E<sup>F</sup></sup> and these and others can be extracted from the 1980 edition as well. Although siding with Cronin against the perpetual impressionism indictment of Neustadt, this reviewer is nevertheless disappointed in Neustadt's failure to draw upon the newer and more empirically based works on presidential behavior in his 1980 edition. He is concerned, about the President's public prestige (or what the contemporary literature labels presidential support or presidential popularity) and advances some interesting interpretations of Gallup's presidential popularity data (208-48) via eyeball inspection. His analysis of presidential support could have been improved and been more empirical and systematic, however, had he been willing to draw upon the existing literature. The research of Samuel Kernell, for example, could have helped anchor Neustadt's analysis on more solid empirical ground.<sup>25</sup>

Power is the dominant concern of Neustadt's analysis and a limitation of his new edition is its failure to defend or to expand his concept of power. In the preface Neustadt comments that "the new material for this edition is not even comprehensive in its dealings

21. Bluhm, *Theories*, p. 258.

22. Cronin, "Presidential Power," p. 388.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 388-89.

25. See Samuel Kernell, "Explaining Presidential Popularity," *American Political Science Review*, 72 (June, 1978), pp. 506-22, and also his "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party," *American Political Science Review*, 71 (March, 1977), pp. 44-66. For a useful review of the presidential support literature see Lee Sigelman, "The Dynamics of Presidential Support: An Overview of Research Findings," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, IX (Spring, 1979), pp. 206-16.

with the critics of the earlier edition. The criticism I have heeded is my own, which sometimes coincides with others, sometimes not." (xv). In marching to the tune of his own drummer, it is unfortunate that Neustadt fails to respond to a persuasive criticism that Neustadt's concept of power is limited to command and persuasion via bargaining, and hence neglects many other bases of power such as personal loyalty and subjective identification, organizational ideology, coercion, and symbolic persuasion.<sup>26</sup> In addition, it is further argued that the "absence of referent power in Neustadt's prescriptions is an unnecessary sharp restraint in the use of command."<sup>27</sup> Thus, Sperlich suggests that a dominant image in Neustadt is one of extensive presidential bargaining in order to protect the power stakes. Sperlich's argument is that Neustadt's failure to explore other sources of power leads to a plausible metaphor of system overload by overreliance on bargaining. Thus, a "President who would always bargain and who would carry out by himself all the tasks associated with successful bargaining will not be a President for very long. An immense and consistent overloading of his physical and mental apparatus will produce a breakdown in short order."<sup>28</sup>

Although Sperlich's interpretation might be viewed as excessively literal and as exaggerating the degree to which the President would bargain in Neustadt's political world, his criticism of the latter's failure to develop a more complete concept of power is nonetheless valid. Furthermore, Greenstein observes that numerous presidential decisions in the 1960s and 1970s were essentially exercises of command and that they seemed to belie Neustadt's inferences about commands as evidence of presidential weakness. More specifically, he argues:

First, much attention was paid to types of decisions that seemed not to have concerned Neustadt—namely *routine* command decisions. In later years, these began to be recognized as politically significant. Second, many observers felt that *major* command decisions—decisions of the sort that did concern Neustadt—were becoming substantially more common.<sup>29</sup>

26. Peter W. Sperlich, "Bargaining and Overload: An Essay on *Presidential Power*," in *Perspectives on the Presidency*, ed. by Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown 1975), pp. 418-21.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 419.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 426.

29. Greenstein, "Change and Continuity," p. 68.



In short, a better formulation of the concept of power is clearly in order.

Another concept that merits additional analysis in Neustadt is that of governing style, particularly as it involves political subordinates and members of the bureaucracy. His model of an effective governing style is, of course, Roosevelt, who guarded his choices and power prospects by a competitive information-gathering technique. FDR's approach was to keep his organizations overlapping and divide authority among them rather than use clear lines of hierarchical organization. Roosevelt also, Neustadt tells us, "tended to put men of clashing temperaments, outlooks, ideas in charge of them. Competitive personalities mixed with competing jurisdictions was Roosevelt's formula for pitting pressure on himself, for making his subordinates push up to him the choices they could not take for themselves." (116). Eisenhower by contrast, is cited as a negative example, particularly prior to the loss of Sherman Adams and John Foster Dulles in the fall of 1958, for delegating too much power in his use of a staff system. According to Neustadt, it "did manage to impart more superficial symmetry and order to his flow of information" but "its workings often were disastrous for his hold on personal power" (117).

Neustadt's use of Roosevelt's governing style as a paradigm merits further analysis. Richard Johnson finds that while Roosevelt's style may have been valuable in domestic policy to combat the Depression, it was not as effective during the war years.<sup>30</sup> Thus, instead of focusing on one governing technique, Johnson urges students of the presidency to examine the formalistic approach and collegial approach along with Roosevelt's competitive approach.<sup>31</sup> Other scholars advancing interesting and differing ideas on this subject include Hugh Heclo, Stephen Hess, I.M. Destler, and Alexander George.<sup>32</sup> It is not the intent of this reviewer to make the case for a particular governing style approach, but rather instead to alert the

30. Richard T. Johnson, "Presidential Style," in Wildavsky, *Perspectives*, pp. 266-74.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 262-300.

32. Hugh Heclo, *A Government of Strangers* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976); I.M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); and Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (September, 1972), pp. 751-85.

reader that one's analysis on this subject must be considerably more comprehensive than that of Neustadt.

A more serious limitation in Neustadt is his assessment of Eisenhower. Even twenty . years after the initial publication of *Presidential Power*, Neustadt still exhibits much of the value orientation of the bumper crop of scholarship on the presidency in the 1960 era, a value orientation that William G. Andrews appropriately labels, "Hallowed be the Presidency."<sup>33</sup> In this school of thought the conventional wisdom was to emphasize the positive features and strengths of the Roosevelt presidency, while using Eisenhower as a negative role model of how not to go about the job. Early revisionist interpretations of Eisenhower's performance, that he was not inept but a skilled politician, have been put forth by journalists Murray Kempton and Garry Wills.<sup>34</sup> Recent scholarly reevaluations have also appeared.<sup>35</sup> The most impressive revisionist scholarship to date is that of Fred I. Greenstein.<sup>36</sup> Whereas much of the previous revisionism has been based on the public or published record, Greenstein uses the many newly available primary sources on Eisenhower's presidency, namely the extensive collection of documents at the Eisenhower Library (the so-called Whitman File, named after Eisenhower's personal secretary, Ann Whitman). The new data include appointment lists, minutes of meetings, notes of pre-press conference briefings, personal letters and Eisenhower's diaries, extensive notes and transcripts of informal meetings, between the President and other politicians, and transcripts or summaries of his face-to-face and telephone conversations, etc. In doing so, Greenstein emphasizes that the misimpression of Eisenhower's lassitude was part of a carefully constructed hidden hand strategy of leadership. Preferring to work through intermediaries, Eisenhower pursued a strategy for minimizing visible partisanship and potential

33. William G. Andrews, "The Presidency, Congress and Constitutional Theory," in Wildavsky, *Perspectives*, pp. 24-28.

34. Murray Kempton, "The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower," *Esquire*, September, 1967, p. 108; and Garry Wills, *Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), particularly pp. 130-38.

35. See Victor DeSantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," *Review of Politics*, 38 (April, 1978), pp. 190-207; Gary W. Reichard, "Eisenhower as President: The Changing View," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 77 (Summer, 1978), pp. 265-81; and Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology*, 1 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 3-20.

36. Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence," *Political Science Quarterly*, 94 (Winter, 1979-80), pp. 575-99.

drains on public support. He was gifted at delegating tasks to others which might take a toll of the limited resources of presidential popularity. Eisenhower mastered a shrewd division of labor, and securely held the reins of power behind strong, often abrasive men, like Sherman Adams and John Foster Dulles. He also managed to hold onto a valuable public impression of him as a man warmer and softer than he really was. In Greenstein's research, Eisenhower's governing style is much more than the superficial symmetry and ineffectual performance contained in Neustadt. In summarizing his extensive analysis of the archival data, Greenstein concludes:

On reexamination, Eisenhower's approach to presidential leadership emerges as distinctive and consciously thought-out, rather than an unfortunate example of artless drift and unthinking application of military organizational principles to civilian leadership. When carefully explicated, this approach promises to add significantly to the repertoire of assumptions about how the expanded modern presidency can be conducted.<sup>37</sup>

Greenstein's research is essential in attempting to correct the widespread misunderstanding of Eisenhower's performance.

Another facet in underestimating Eisenhower is the tendency of liberal academics, sensitized to the Roosevelt activist model of leadership with the President constantly remaining a man in motion, to ignore the significance of inaction or non-action. Eisenhower, for example, exercised considerable prudence in rejecting certain policy options put forth by some of his advisors in 1954 with respect to the use of U.S. air and naval power in Indo-China. Chalmers M. Roberts aptly describes this situation as "The Day We Didn't Go To War."<sup>38</sup> Eisenhower's 1954 decision seems particularly impressive in retrospect, especially when contrasted to the Indo-China decisions of his liberal Democratic successors, Kennedy and Johnson. Very little credit is given to a President who opts for non-action. The academic liberal orthodoxy places a high value on an activist, can do, results oriented President in the Roosevelt mode. Leadership styles like Eisenhower's are accordingly placed on the back burner. Neustadt is not alone, of course, in his substantially incorrect assessment of Eisenhower's exercise of presidential power.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 596.

<sup>38</sup> Chalmers W. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go To War," in *Legislative Politics, U.S.A.*, ed. by Theodore J. Lowi (Second edition; Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 157-85.

His underestimation of Eisenhower's contribution and his insensitivity to the nuances of Eisenhower's leadership, however, pose a barrier to a more sophisticated and comprehensive understanding of the nature of presidential power.

Reviews by their very nature and limitations of space frequently generate a more negative image of a book than the reviewer intended, particularly since much of the scarce space is devoted to the limitations rather than the strengths of the work. Such is the case with these observations on Neustadt. Without question it still remains one of the outstanding classics in the field, and it will be discussed and analyzed for years to come. Neustadt was among the first to break away from the traditional emphases on leadership traits and the compartmentalized listings of the functional tasks of the President. He used organizational and administrative frames of reference to understand presidential behavior, and directed our attention to power as an organizing concept. Although his major concern was presidential effectiveness and not presidential accountability, his work is essential to understanding the contemporary presidency. Insufficiently appreciated is the fact that Neustadt also pioneered the focus on personality, with his emphasis on power sense, confidence, and sense of direction in determining a President's success. As noted previously, he puts forth some preliminary thoughts on what kind of person is best suited for presidential office. In doing so, Neustadt sensitized us to the important questions and stimulated the thinking of other scholars. Such is the case in his focus on what the type of personality is most appropriate for the presidency. This important question was picked up and developed in a book by James David Barber, and it is the subject of the next review.

## II

Who is best suited to serve as President, and what can we anticipate about performance in the White House? The clearest and most systematic answers to these timely and important questions are found in James David Barber's highly original, most provocative, and widely influential book, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. No work since Neustadt has had as great an impact on the literature on the presidency as this exceptionally well written, personality-based theory of Barber's. His study draws on extensive biographical sources to produce psychological interpretations of political behavior. Barber describes

his approach to understanding Presidents as being close to the psychology of adaptation,

...stressing the ways interpersonal experience shapes the person's self-image, his world view, and his political style, and how, in turn, these internalized lessons of experience are turned back to shape subsequent interpersonal experiences. Man copes. To each situation he brings resources from his past, organized in patterns which have helped him cope before. He copes with a situation not only as a structure of realities, but also on a construction of his perception. (x)

Presidential behavior is then best understood by a thorough examination of a person's character.

Barber's argument, he tells us, comes in layers. First, he maintains that "a President's personality is an important shaper of his Presidential behavior on nontrivial matters" (6). Barber is quick to point out that his use of personality is not a deterministic one. He does not say "that once you know a President's personality you know everything," but that personality "is a matter of tendencies" (7).

Second, "Presidential personality is patterned. His character, world.view, and style fit together in a dynamic package understandable in psychological terms." (6). Here Barber introduced three important concepts. "*Style is the President's habitual way of performing his three political roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework.*" (7). Marked stylistic differences are found among Presidents, and the *balance* among the three varies (7). A President's "*world view consists of his primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time.*" (7-8). "Style is his way of acting; world view is his way of seeing." (8). Character, Barber's core concept, "*is the way the President orients himself toward life-not for the moment, but enduringly.*" (8). As Barber sees it, these three concepts are abstractions from the reality of the whole individual and they form an integrated pattern.

Third, "a President's personality interacts with the power situation he faces and the national 'climate of expectations' dominant at the time he serves. The tuning, the resonance or lack of it-between these external factors and his personality sets in motion the dynamics of his Presidency." (6). It is here that Barber surveys the political environment. By *power situation*, he means the support the President has from the public, interest groups, the party balance in Congress, the thrust of Supreme Court opinion, etc. (8). The *climate of expectations*, on the other hand, refers to the needs thrust on him by the

people, with the three recurring themes being needs for *reassurance*, *for a sense of progress and action*, and a sense of *legitimacy* (9).

Fourth, "the best way to predict a President's character, world view, and style is to see how they were put together in the first place. That happened in his early life, culminating in his first independent political success." (6). Barber feels that "character has its *main* development in childhood, world view in adolescence, style in early adulthood" (10). Seeking to avoid the criticism that his use of character is a deterministic one, Barber is emphatic in claiming that "character provides the main thrust and broad direction-but it does not *determine*, in any fixed sense, world view and style. The story of development does not end with the end of childhood." (11).

Finally, the core of Barber's argument that organizes the structure of his book "is that Presidential character-the basic stance a man takes toward his Presidential experience-comes in four varieties" (6). The most important thing to know about a President or presidential candidate is where he fits among the four types. Barber uses two dimensions or baselines to identify the four character types, and they are "(a) how active he is and (b) whether or not he gives the impression he enjoys his political life" (6). The first dimension captures *activity-passivity*, or the amount of energy invested in the Presidency. The second dimension is *positive-negative* affect toward one's activity." (11).

From these dimensions, Barber generates a typology that identifies four types of presidential character and examines and compares thirteen Presidents, including all of the twentieth-century Presidents except Theodore Roosevelt. An *active-positive* President exhibits both a high energy level and enjoyment of activity. He possesses high self-esteem, is adaptive, and has relative success in relating to the environment. An orientation toward productiveness as a value, the ability to use styles flexibly, and an emphasis on rational mastery are dominant traits of the active-positive. In Barber's judgment, this character-type is best suited to handle the demands of the presidency (12). FDR, Truman, Kennedy, Ford, and Carter are examples.

The *active-negative* President experiences a contradiction between intense effort or energy and low emotional reward for that effort. A tendency to rigidity under certain kinds of pressure, to being compulsive, and to persist in failing courses of action are the trademarks of an active-negative (12-13). Wilson, Hoover, Johnson, and Nixon are examples.

The *passive-positive* President is receptive, compliant, other-directed and he seeks affection in return for being agreeable. Great amounts of energy are *not* invested in the job, and the passive-positive experiences a contradiction between low self-esteem and a superficial optimism (13). There is the danger of drift under a passive-positive, with examples being Taft and Harding.

The *passive-negative* does little and experiences little enjoyment in political activity. There is "a tendency to withdraw, to escape from the conflict and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing vague principles (especially prohibitions) and procedural arrangements" (13). One wonders why this character type is in politics at all. Barber's answer is their orientation toward doing dutiful service as a compensation for low-self-esteem is based on a sense of uselessness (13). Coolidge and Eisenhower are cited as examples.

In a concise summary, Barber notes:

Active-positive Presidents want most to achieve results. Active-negatives aim to get and keep power. Passive-positives are after love. Passive-negatives emphasize their civic virtue. The relation of activity to enjoyment in a President thus tends to outline a cluster of characteristics, to set apart the adapted from the compulsive, compliant, and withdrawn types. (13)

These then are the four major types of presidential character in Barber's typology.

Barber's basic approach is to use extensive biographical data to search for and to identify the patterns of behavior in past Presidents. On the basis of these patterns he can classify past Presidents into one of the four forementioned character types. Finally, he can assess the known behavioral tendencies of a presidential candidate, classify him into one of the character types, and predict that he is likely to behave like his characterological predecessors when faced with similar challenges and situations. It is important to note that Barber makes no claim that his framework is scientific in any precise or rigorous sense. Failure to understand this point has generated excessive heat with minimal light on the significance of Barber's contribution.

Barber's work implicitly challenges Neustadt's notion that a power-maximizing President will be a "good" President, and his brilliant account of the tragic downfalls of three active-negative Presidents (Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson) in Chapter 2 (17-57) presents considerable evidence to substantiate this observation. In the first edition of *The Presidential Character*, Barber's coverage ex-

tended through Nixon and his Nixon prediction enhanced the appeal of an already compelling conceptual framework.<sup>39</sup> Barber opts to leave the original thirteen chapters intact, and then reassesses his accurate Nixon prediction followed by chapters on the Ford transition and a prospective evaluation of the Carter presidency. In classifying Ford as an active-positive (485-97) Barber dispells the fears of those who suspected that active-positive might be a more neutral sounding label for liberals who followed some variant of an FDRstyle. Thus, Barber establishes that his use of the dimensions of activity-passivity and positive-negative are non-ideological. Unlike many political scientists who manage to qualify everything and distinguish nothing, Barber puts himself and his framework on the line once again with a willingness to make prospective valuations on the general behavior pattern of a Carter Presidency (497-539). Overall, Barber gives us a clear statement on the nature of presidential character, and far surpasses the field in helping us identify those individuals most suitable and least suitable for presidential office. What then can be said of this remarkable work by way of evaluation?

Without question, Barber's work is a major contribution, but the extent of how significant any single scholar assesses it to be depends on how rigorous and precise he or she insists a given work must be. In short, the evaluation of significance turns on the old adage that where you stand depends on where you sit. This reviewer is willing to evaluate Barber in terms of the ground rules he himself posits, and finds Barber's contribution to be both highly significant and most impressive.

On the other hand, scholars who insist on higher standards of *reliability* (procedures repeated yield similar results) and *validity* (the measurement reflects the properties and relations it purports to reflect) in social science analysis for both elite and mass behavior are not likely to be overly impressed with Barber's endeavor. Although there is a risk here of demanding that one be more Catholic than the pope, such an orientation will result in honest differences of scholarly opinion, depending on where one sits. Among Barber's most thorough critics are Alexander George and James H. Qualls. In a

39. James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), particularly, pp. 347-442.



perceptive essay on the first edition George insists on rigorous scientific criteria and finds Barber woefully lacking.<sup>40</sup> He questions Barber's conceptualization of character and contends that "neither in *Presidential Character* nor in his earlier writing does he attempt to show his two dimensions are grounded in the specialized literature on personality."<sup>41</sup> Among George's strongest criticisms is that Barber has failed to establish the comparability of situations, particularly in his analysis of the "tragedy-prone" active-negative Presidents. George insists that before one can accept Barber's conclusions, the latter must answer the following three questions with more specificity:

(1) Are the tragedies comparable enough to support the generalization? (2) Is the critical role which Barber assigns to character in his explanation of each tragedy adequately demonstrated? (3) Does a similar psychodynamic pattern ("rigidification") underlie each man's behavior during the events leading to his disaster?<sup>42</sup>

George is suggesting that before Barber can claim that similar presidential behavior stems from similar character, he must establish that the situation faced by each compared President was sufficiently similar. Otherwise, similar behavior may have been caused by the situation rather than by character. Regardless of where one stands on the issue of scientific rigor, one cannot help but hope that in future scholarly exchanges that Barber focuses directly on this criticism. Although not as well written as the George essay, an article by Qualls extends the commentary and offers a detailed methodological critique of Barber (focusing on issues of reliability and validity) from the vantage point of a highly demanding scientific criteria.<sup>43</sup>

Barber dismisses such criticisms as inappropriate and puts forth a stinging retort to his critics.<sup>44</sup> He objects to what he feels is a false sense of possibilities of perfection and reiterates that neither of his books (*The Lawmakers* or *Presidential Character*) "is offered as

40. Alexander L. George, "Assessing Presidential Character," *World Politics*, XX-VI (January, 1974), pp. 234-282.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

43. James H. Qualls, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders," *American Political Science Review*, LXXI (March, 1977), pp. 182-211.

44. James David Barber, "Comment; Quall's Nonsensical Analysis of Nonexistent Works," *ibid.*, pp. 212-25.

some mathematical, mechanical, or definitive treatment of the subject."<sup>46</sup> Barber further laments "the grim trivialization of political science by naive technicians."<sup>46</sup> In defending his work, Barber argues that Qualls has trivialized his Nixon prediction, that he sets up and attacks a straw man, that he indulges in double-barrelled reductionism, and that he is guilty of quantomania.<sup>47</sup> In short, Barber and his critics are running a conceptual and academic race on two separate tracks and their basic views and differences stem from where they sit.

Moving from an overview of the clash of general perspectives on the nature of social science scholarship as it pertains to *Presidential Character*, it now seems appropriate to look at a few specific features of Barber's framework. His typology is most appealing, but one can not help but feel that Neustadt may have been right when he suggested that it was too sweeping. (Neustadt, 183) Some internal differentiation within the active-positive and active-negative categories may be in order. Barber himself found that certain active-positives (Truman and Carter) had stronger tendencies to negativity than others (261-62, 292, and 536). Other scholars find greater variation on personality traits and policy flexibility among active-negatives than does Barber.<sup>48</sup> Hargrove questions the believability of the passive-negative type, and suggests that neither Coolidge nor Eisenhower belongs here as both were more politically ambitious and skilled than Barber is willing to admit.<sup>49</sup> Barber's emphasis on the civic duty feature of passive-negatives is more of an ideal type than he would have us believe.

Although convincing us that character, world view, and style fit together in a dynamic package (6), character is his core concept and he seems to overemphasize it relative to world view and style. More

45. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-25.

48. George, "Assessing," pp. 257-71; and Arnold Rogow, "Book Review," *American Political Science Review*, LXX (December, 1976), pp. 1300-01.

49. Erwin C. Hargrove, "Presidential Personality and Revisionist Views of the Presidency," *American Journal of Political Science*, XVII (November, 1973), pp. 831-32. On the subject of Eisenhower's ambition, also see the fascinating account of his skillful cultivation of the press before officially declaring for the Republican presidential nomination in 1952 in Theodore H. White, *In Search of History: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Warner Books, 1978), pp. 356-63.

attention should be paid especially to style, or the way of acting. In the case of some Presidents or prospective Presidents, a more intensive exploration of style may prove more revealing than an exhaustive analysis of character. This reviewer believes that is particularly true of Barber's analysis of Carter. Observations about his style seem more revealing on his performance in office than his high level of activity and positive feelings about the job. With remarkable prescience Barber observed that Carter's "stylistic weak point is negotiation" (538), but very little space was allocated to developing this line of thought. Given Anthony King's observation (cited earlier) as to the difficulty of building coalitions in an era of atomized politics, a greater emphasis on style would have been more insightful as to the prospects of the Carter Presidency. In fact, the very existence of atomized politics suggests that we pay more attention to the political style variable in assessing future presidential prospects.

A final caveat about Barber's contribution concerns his interpretation of Eisenhower, classified as a passive-negative. He informs us that Eisenhower is "best approximated in the passive-negative category," (156) and that he was a "more complicated mix" (146). Barber acknowledges that Eisenhower's "case presents certain difficulties" (156) and that "he comes as close as any President to being one who strays beyond our crude categories, enforcing the reminder that the forest can sometimes hide the trees." (157). Although Barber's assessment is more generous than Neustadt's, he appears to have been unable to penetrate the trees. The revisionist work on Eisenhower cited earlier, particularly that of Greenstein, leads this reviewer to conclude that a reasonable *prima facie* case can be made for Eisenhower as an active-positive rather than a passive-negative. Like Neustadt, Barber's keen analytic sensitivities seem blunted when analyzing Eisenhower's low profile, sophisticated, and subtle style of leadership. Eisenhower's style was deceptive and it encouraged his political opponents consistently to underestimate him. Regrettably, it similarly encouraged as well the tendency of talented scholars like Barber to underestimate his performance in office.

Despite the forementioned limitations, *Presidential Character* remains the single most impressive work of scholarship in the presidential area since Neustadt, and no university course on the presidency is complete without an extensive discussion and analysis of it. Barber's emphasis on character focuses on what individuals bring to the office. An equally fascinating possibility is to shift the emphasis and ask what the office does to the man. This is precisely the focus of

a recent, brief, and creative book by Bruce Buchanan. Due to its thrust, it serves as a useful companion and supplement to Barber and hence merits review.

### III

Buchanan's goal is to formulate a comprehensive treatment of the psychological environment of the presidency and thus what the presidency does to Presidents. By systematizing our understanding of the psychological demands on a President, these demands in turn "can serve as criteria for assessing the general psychological suitability of candidates for the office" (6-7). "Coping with these pressures without succumbing to them is," he argues, "the central problem of the presidency from the point of the president" (7). Buchanan is worried that the presidency is dangerous not only to the President but to the stability of the political system as well. "The job is dangerous to whoever holds it because it makes unmeetable demands on the personal resources of any single human being." (7).

His overall argument consists of four general points, "First, there is an essential, trans-historical presidential experience, capable of influencing any incumbent, and tending to influence most of them in characteristic ways." (2).

"Second, the origins of this common experience are essentially constitutional." (2). Hence, any effort to change the psychological pressures or forces surrounding the President would require fundamental constitutional change. Third, the experience of concern is essentially *psychological*. Buchanan believes that there is a fourfold "environmental press" that is created and sustained by the role requirements of the presidency (2-3). Fourth, the definition of the presidential experience is reduced to basics and an effort is made to bracket out all that is nonessential, accidental, transitory, or ephemeral. Buchanan is left with four components or influence-vectors: stress, deference, dissonance, and frustration. These components are commonly experienced in other demanding occupations, though rarely in the same configuration. "But the centrality of the presidency in this political system, as well as the unmatched visibility of the president, magnify their intensity quite beyond any normal experience." (5). Finally, Buchanan speculates as to possible changes in the structure and procedures of the presidency "to minimize or arrest the dynamics of influence described in this book" (8).

Buchanan's approach is systematic and empirical, and he draws on a wide range of data to argue his case. These include psychological theory, psychological field studies, historical material, other works on the presidency, contemporary case studies, etc. Unlike Barber, he chooses to describe the presidential experience in the language of the behavioral sciences rather than in the language of history or the presidency itself (5-6). His use of the concept "environmental press" comes from the theoretical work of psychologist Henry A. Murray (9-10).

Buchanan begins his analysis by identifying four generic, trans-historical functions of any presidency, namely the functions of symbol, partisan policy advocate, mediator between interests, and crisis manager (15-21). Each of these functions, leads to the four consistent types of exposure: deference, stress, frustration, and dissonance (22-32). Recurring exposures to stress, deference, dissonance, and frustration in the face of his responsibilities exhausts physical and emotional energies and threatens the validity of the President's self-concept (28). Components of the latter include his competency, power, public standing, basic values, etc. Buchanan's fear is that these exposures might eventually result in some rather unattractive modes of behavior.

The next four chapters take each exposure one at a time, and explains and analyzes them. In the process of doing so, Buchanan specifies the negative mode of behavior that each of the four exposures might generate. Stress, for example may strain physical and emotional resilience to the breaking point (33-52). It "threatens both the well-being of the president *and* the effectiveness with which he performs his functions." (46). Deference may nurture systematic distortions in the perceptions of the self and of external events (53-75). Dissonance might encourage the use of secrecy, misrepresentation, and lying as weapons in the struggle for political success and survival (75-100). Frustration, on the other hand, can erode any values or scruples that interfere with the preservation of presidential power and dominance, including the canons of democracy (101-24). Within each chapter Buchanan asks what can be done and spells out in a helpful way, possible structural changes and/or changes in personal practices or modes of behavior available to Presidents that could contribute to the containment if not reduction of the psychological pressure.

In Chapter 7, Buchanan supplements Barber on the question of identifying suitable candidates for the presidency (125-57). He

develops a case for using the self-esteem concept found in self-concept theory as an alternative to Barber's characterology, though he notes that Barber incorporates many of its assumptions in his case analysis of individual Presidents. Buchanan's argument for using the self-concept theory is that it "has been more fully developed, and thus has more systematic explanatory power" (133). "Second, because of its relation to the empirical self-esteem literature, self-concept theory has more grounding in research. Third, because self-concept theory evolved in part from research showing how people respond to environmental pressures, it makes for a better "fit" with the psychological environment of the presidency" described earlier (133-34).

The final chapter (158-78) engagingly examines proposals for change, including the removal of certain functions from the office, the installation of a plural presidency, changing citizen attitudes, and the use of a legislative question and censure motion. His analysis is thoughtful and most informative. He concludes, however, that none of the reforms are likely to be adopted in the near future. Any reform to alter substantially the psychological experiences of the President would require major structural and probably fundamental constitutional changes. Overall, Buchanan has written a systematic, thoughtful, and delightful book that is well-argued and grounded in psychological theory and empirical data. It is a superb supplement to Barber, and the personality oriented approaches to the presidency. Although individual books on the presidency have touched on select aspects of the problem he confronts,<sup>50</sup> none to date offers as comprehensive a treatment of the psychological environment of the presidency.

Since Buchanan's contribution is a pioneering endeavor and his case is presented with the utmost brevity, the evaluative comments will correspondingly, be brief. First, his overall conceptualization needs more empirical verification. This is particularly true of his introduction of self-concept theory, which is plausible and persuasive, but needs to be applied to the experiences of individual Presidents in a careful and thorough manner comparable to what Barber does for his character typology. Second, Buchanan has analyzed his four

50. The most notable of these are George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: World, 1970); and Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

psychological exposures one at a time, in much the same fashion that Rossiter and earlier writers explicated the functions or roles of the office. The key or crucial point then and now is their cumulative impact for presidential behavior. In Buchanan's case he needs to deal with the cumulative psychological impact of these exposures rather than a separate treatment of each. Future analysis might, therefore, look at the four exposures simultaneously as applied to individual Presidents. Finally, although he too finds Buchanan's work commendable, George Edwards has pointed out that a "problem is the lack of consideration of alternative explanations for the impact he finds."<sup>51</sup> Edwards looks at several of the psychological exposure interpretations of Buchanan and suggests plausible alternatives.<sup>52</sup>

In summary, Buchanan is off to an impressive start but there must be considerably more testing, refinement, and development before it can have the impact on the field of a Neustadt or Barber, or before the self-concept theory is widely accepted as superior to Barber's character typology. Having reviewed power and personality approaches, it is now appropriate to turn to a sweeping revisionist interpretation of the presidency that focuses on institutional considerations and policymaking.

#### IV

Thomas E. Cronin's *The State of the Presidency* was first published in 1975.<sup>53</sup> The first edition was widely acclaimed as one of the best works written on the subject, and the new edition adds a considerable portion of new material to update his analysis and to offer more extensive coverage on a variety of presidentially related topics. Cronin incorporates a good part of Carter's present term in the White House as well as recent discussion of the single six-year presidential term. Despite the new material, he does not alter his account of essentially how the presidency works. While Barber's book remains the single most original and impressive scholarly contribution on the subject, Cronin's work is the most comprehensive and probably the best for use as a classroom text.

51. George Edwards, "Book Review," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, IX (Spring, 1979), p. 217.

52. *Ibid.*

53. Thomas E. Cronin, *The State of the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975).

Cronin was instrumental in criticizing the 1960 school of interpretation (Hallowed Be The Presidency) and cautioning against exaggerated and unrealistic expectations of the modern presidency. Whereas the concern of many of his predecessors was presidential effectiveness, Cronin has been as equally concerned with presidential accountability. Cronin's approach is eclectic, but with a focus on institutions and the policymaking process. More than any other presidential author, Cronin makes us aware of the complexities of American politics, and the constraints on the President. He draws on a wide range of sources, including interviews of over 100 senior White House aides, his own service as a White House Fellow in the mid-1960's, other presidential studies, case studies, current events data, public opinion polls, etc. The result is a synthetic product that is lively, interesting, informative, and persuasive.

His book begins with an identification of the many paradoxes of the presidency. Some of those cited include the public's expectation that the President be decent and just but a decisive and guileful leader, that he be programmatic but a pragmatic leader, that the presidency be taken out of politics, etc. (1025). Presidents are faced with two kinds of conflicting expectations-the desires of the public and the different behavior necessary to cope with different aspects of the job (25). As Cronin aptly puts it, "The paradoxes of the presidency do not lie in the White House but in the emotions, feelings and expectations of us all." (24).

Cronin then moves to a comprehensive description and explanation of the presidential selection process (for both the nomination and the general election), and ends up discussing the pros and cons of various reforms (27-73). One of the more innovative electoral college reform proposals, for instance, is the so-called *national bonus* compromise that "retains the existing 538 state-based electoral votes but adds a national pool of 102 electoral votes that would be awarded as a winner-takes-all basis to the candidate who wins at least 40 percent of the popular votes nationwide" (67). Thus, there would be a combined total of 640 electoral votes instead of the current number of 538. Cronin is diligent in listing the strengths and drawbacks of various plans.

Chapter 3, "The Textbook and Prime-Time Presidency," is an updated version of some of Cronin's most innovative work dealing with where people get their basic images of the presidency (75-118). Included is his original examination of the textbooks of the Fifties and Sixties that exalted the President as an engine of democracy and



created a sense of unrealistic expectations. Cronin goes on, however, to examine how television, the major source of news for most people today, also magnifies the presidency. His plea is "that a more substantive and critical approach to the presidency would not only prepare our young with a more objective understanding of politics, leadership, and civic participation, it could also contribute to a more effective and healthy presidency" (115).

He follows this with a detailed and balanced analysis of the 1976 edition of Neustadt's classic, *Presidential Power*, (119-41) and then presents his thoughts on a job description for the presidency (143-86). It is here that Cronin underscores the serious imbalances in our system. His comprehensive description of the job of President involves an identification of three subpresidencies-foreign policy and national security, aggregate economics, and domestic policy programs-and some seven activity areas within each subpresidency wherein the President is expected to provide functional leadership. These included crisis management, symbolic leadership, priority setting and program design, recruitment of advisers and administrators, legislative and political coalition building, program implementation and evaluation, and oversight of government routines and early warning of problem areas (154-56). Cronin concludes that Presidents in recent years have concentrated on selected areas of the job because of a nearly impossible job description. Specifically he says:

We give our presidents too much to do and too little time in which to do it. In part, however, recent presidents have also been, or so it would appear, lulled into responding to those parts of their job that are more glamorous, more prominent. (183)

Nevertheless, Cronin does not believe that we are likely to reformulate or redefine the job in any measurable way in the near future.

Cronin explores presidential-congressional relations and traces the recovery of Congress from the so-called Imperial Presidency (187-222). He examines in detail the new bases of power for Congress in constraining the President. In the end, he remarks "both the President and Congress have to recognize that they are not two sides out to 'win' but two parts of the same government, both elected to pursue together the interests of the American people." (220). Among the more impressive contributions are his chapters on "Presidential-Departmental Relations" and "The President's Cabinet." Cronin is at his best in delineating the growth and development of

the White House staff and the Executive Office of the President as well as explaining the shortcomings of both (223-96). The difficulty of a cabinet secretary gaining control over the permanent bureaucracy is highlighted by this quotation from Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal who stated:

Out of 120,000 people in the Treasury, I was able to select twenty-five, maybe. The other 119,975 are outside of my control. And not only are they outside of my control in terms of hiring and firing-they're also virtually outside my control in terms of transferring. (242)

Little wonder then that we have experienced the swelling of the presidency.

Cronin adds a new chapter on non-crisis policymaking, a case study of the attempt under President Johnson to establish a National Teacher Corps (297-322). One might question if a case study on Ford or Carter might not be more appropriate, but probably not since Cronin's goal is to communicate a sense of complexity of policymaking. It seems more convincing then to use a best case scenario, where the political conditions were most promising for effective policy formulation.

The flavor of our Madisonian system and the constraints on presidential policymaking in the Johnson era are effectively conveyed.

The next general topic involves a comprehensive treatment of presidential accountability, including the constraining brakes on a President and reform proposals such as the non-confidence or presidential recall proposal, the national initiative, and the six-year nonrenewable term proposal. Cronin is balanced as always in his pro and con analysis of reforms. His final chapter on presidential leadership urges citizens to avoid exaggerated expectations about the President and the process as a whole. It is also an eloquent plea for political participation on the part of others. Cronin's claim is that great leadership at the top can come about only "when there has developed middle-level political or social movement leaders who in effect clarify, define, set the agenda, and mobilize the nation in such a way that presidents must join in and, in effect, both follow and lead." (378). Only then can we feel responsible and avoid savaging our Presidents. "We must refine our expectations of the president and raise our expectations of ourselves." (379). Having summarized the central thrust of Cronin's work, what might be said now by way of evaluation?

The second edition of the *State of the Presidency* reconfirms the wisdom of the widespread acclaim given the first edition. Cronin's chapter reorganization, the retention of the more classic and enduring material such as the textbook presidency (previously labeled "The Cult of the Presidency: A Halo for the Chief"), and the incorporation of a considerable amount of new material (including the Carter Administration) update his analysis without altering substantially his original account of how the presidency works. The strengths of this new edition are many, and the weaknesses few. Among the many strengths are the realism, comprehensiveness, and use of a balanced analysis in discussing proposed reforms.

The *realism* is manifest in his analysis of public expectations coupled with an account of the constraints or brakes on presidential action in a Madisonian environment. His critique of Neustadt for being too preoccupied with presidential effectiveness and not accountability is an appropriate one, although he does note that "Neustadt's optimism about the potential for effective presidential leadership, however, is more tempered in later writings, especially *Alliance Politics*." (116). He likewise commends Barber for correctly identifying the importance of personality and character (32-33), but expresses concern that "stressing desirable personality characteristics may well have a tendency to create merely another kind of textbook presidency tradition" (32). Cronin's fear is that a President can have a healthy personality and yet a deficient world view or a set of undesirable values. He goes on to sensitize us to mechanisms of accountability and how the system will endure. Perhaps more than any presidential scholar, Cronin has alerted us to the dangers of the textbook presidency and what must be done to keep it under control.

Another impressive feature is the book's *comprehensiveness*. Few works cover as much ground in the space utilized, and with such insight and thoroughness. Among the many attractive features are Cronin's focus on institutions, particularly facets of the executive branch; his analysis of the complexity of the policymaking process, and his extremely comprehensive treatment of proposed institutional reforms.

Finally, he has exhibited realism and comprehensiveness while retaining a *balanced approach*. He is consistently careful to identify all arguments on both sides, particularly with respect to proposed reforms. Unlike Neustadt and Barber, he is more positive in his coverage of Eisenhower (e.g., 106-07, 126, 134, 270-71), although his enthusiasm is not nearly as strong as the revisionist Eisenhower

literature previously cited.

Overall, the virtues of Cronin's effort far outweigh the weaknesses, but a mention of some of the latter is appropriate. Although Cronin's individual chapters are coherent, rich, informative, and versatile, the end product on the whole appears less than the sum of the individual parts. Cronin does establish as connecting links the ambivalence of public expectations and the institutional constraints on presidential power. He does so by organizing material around the large questions of presidential effectiveness, presidential accountability, and public acceptance of the current state of affairs. The individual chapters, however, are not as well integrated in the overall schema, and the concluding chapter ends with a general plea for better citizen education and for opinion leaders to accept a greater educational role. In short, it retreats to a high level of generality, rather than pulling together the previous chapters with sufficient specificity. While it would be unfair to conclude that Cronin has no unifying theory, it would not be unreasonable to say that his unified theory is not as well integrated and conclusive as it could be.

A second problem area in evaluating Cronin deals with the question of values. In his analysis of Neustadt's work Cronin asserts:

How you stand on the question of how strong the presidency should be depends usually on what policies you favor and how these policies are advanced or hampered by the president or by Congress. It matters too, of course, whether you like the person who is in the White House. (139)

The problem is that Cronin never states explicitly or completely where he stands on policies, ideology, or presidential preference. He tends to retreat into a third person writing posture on what various authorities, political groups, etc. believe—to the extent that it is often difficult for the reader to identify where Cronin stands. While this has the virtue of being comprehensive and introducing a sense of balance, it also has the effect of failing to illuminate where the author stands apart from higher levels of generality (e.g., the need for lowering our expectations, for Congress and the President to work together, for better public citizenship, for opinion leaders to become educators, etc.)

One suspects that Cronin may also subscribe in his heart of hearts to the political ends "implicitly embedded in the liberal vision of the 1960s," a position he attributes to Neustadt (131). Scattered throughout Cronin's work are positive references to Presidents as

agents of redistribution. He expresses concern, for instance, that "many well-heeled interests continue to enjoy a special advantage in any contest with a president who is a redistributionist" (339). Moreover, his summary section on presidential accountability includes the following statement:

Citizens must insist that their president lend his voice and energies to the weak and the have-not sectors of society. Strengthening the have-not sectors of society and giving a fair hearing to minorities will always remain major responsibilities and an essential part of the legitimacy of the modern presidency. Yet it is well to remember, as most authorities on political change constantly warn, that the way of the reformer, of the catalyst, of creative political change, is always hard: he necessarily fights a two-front war against reactionaries on the one hand and impractical revolutionaries on the other. (336)

Cronin seems to favor "creative political change" and redistributive programs; yet throughout the book he calls for lowering our expectations. Exactly where he would draw the line is not entirely clear, and it is not clear because Cronin fails to be explicit about what the national government can or should attempt to do. Since he himself has stipulated that one's stand on how strong the presidency should be depends on one's policy preferences etc., additional clarification of where he stands seems to be in order.

Finally, Cronin is too much of a presidentialist in his view of presidential-interest group interaction. His view of the President, as previously mentioned, is one of a genuine redistributionist battling the well-heeled interest groups who seek special advantage via distributive policy (i.e., particularistic payoffs) (339). This view tends to underestimate the President's role in aiding and abetting interest groups' success in the distributive policy arena. President Carter's political payoff to the National Education Association by pushing successfully for a new \$15 billion Department of Education<sup>54</sup> in return for dedicated service to his campaign is a case in point. Presidents are not always the political Davids fighting the interest group Goliaths, and they consciously reward interest groups who play a key role in their election and reelection by endorsing the distributive policy preferences of these groups.

Overall, the works of Neustadt, Barber, Buchanan and Cronin

54. Richard Reeves, "Carter's Biggest Payoff," *Arizona Daily Star*, May 5, 1980, p. A12.

contribute much to our understanding of the presidency, and they exemplify some of the best work in the field. Still, however, they are not definitive or entirely explicit about the role of the President in our increasingly atomized environment, and the search for what this role can and should be is a continual one. The final section identifies additional research trends and comments on the future needs for scholarship in the area.

## V

Until recently, research on the presidency was frequently regarded as a poor relation subfield within the parent discipline of political science. The area tended to be viewed as the province of historians, constitutional law specialists, journalists, or current events buffs. This has gradually changed, and a virtual research explosion is taking place. Under the leadership of Fred Greenstein, Lester Seligman, Stephen Wayne, Dorothy James and others, a Presidency Research Group has been formed to help disseminate research findings. In 1979 and 1980 it began to hold a number of separate presidential panels at the American Political Science Association national meetings. Equally encouraging is the development and improvement of a separate journal, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (published by the Center For the Study of the Presidency), as an outlet for presidential research. Research on the presidency has come of age.

One of the more dramatic changes has been an increase in the quality and quantity of data available for analysis. The vast literature on presidential support or presidential popularity" is but a single example of the larger trend. Among the other data available are mass surveys on political socialization and attitudes toward the presidency, box scores on presidential success with Congress, electoral. data on presidential coattails, television archives, data on presidential speeches, etc. George C. Edwards III has been particularly influential in his pioneering endeavors to show how quantitative data can be used in an imaginative and sophisticated way. Although many other works could be cited, the works of Lee

55. For a review of these findings, see Sigelman, "The Dynamics," pp. 206-16.

56. George C. Edwards, *Presidential Influence in Congress*, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1980).

Sigelman in reassessing Wildavsky's two presidencies thesis (using key vote box scores) and John Kessell's use of content analysis in studying presidential speeches are particularly commendable.<sup>57</sup> For those less interested in quantitative data analysis, the new presidential archival data is a treasure trove begging exploration. Recent research by Greenstein and Immerman on Eisenhower, and Berman on Lyndon Johnson's White House staffing are examples of fruitful inquiry using such data."

The improvement in available data is matched by the emergence of some rather excellent works on select aspects of the presidency. Although not without problems nor the only recent quality works available, the contributions of Wayne on the office's legislative function, Pious on executive power in theory and practice, and Shull on policymaking are especially noteworthy. Each of these books and other new contributions are useful sources in attempting to formulate what the role of the President can be and should be in our new atomized political environment.

Despite these advances, research is needed in several areas. As Heclo has pointed out, research needs to focus less on headline events and personalities and more on everyday operations of the presidency. It should:

1. concentrate on processes and behavior in the White House and the Executive Office of the President;
2. describe, explain, and evaluate experiences in more than one administration;
3. make use of primary materials and documentation found in Presidential libraries and elsewhere;
4. concentrate on recurring problems that are likely to be relevant for future administrations.

57. Lee Sigelman, "A Reassessment of Two Presidencies Thesis," *Journal of Politics*, 41 (November, 1979), pp. 1195-1205; and John Kessell, "The Parameters of Presidential Politics," *Social Science Quarterly*, 55 (June, 1974), pp. 8-24.

58. Greenstein, "Eisenhower," pp. 575-99; Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles," p. 3-20; and Larry Berman, "Perceptions of Images: Why We Know So Little About White House Staffing In the Johnson Administration," (mimeo) to appear in a forthcoming book published by the University of Texas Press.

59. Stephen J. Wayne, *The Legislative Presidency*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Richard M. Pious, *The American Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1979); and Steven A. Shull, *Presidential Policy Making: An Analysis*, (Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Communications, 1979).

60. Hugh Heclo, *Studying The Presidency*, (New York: Ford Foundation, 1977), p. 52.

Other neglected areas of research include the role of the media and political factors (e.g., interest group support or opposition) in policymaking. Some examples of the type of research that can and needs to be done on the former is exemplified in the works of Brody and Page, Thomas E. Patterson, and Michael Robinson<sup>61</sup>, while an example of the latter would be Tufte's compelling but provocative book on *Political Control of the Economy*<sup>62</sup>. Finally, an excellent bibliographic essay on the strengths and weaknesses of other recent literature has been written by Jeanne Nienaber.

Improvement in data availability and the emergence of high quality new works on select aspects of the presidency is not enough. The field needs to move forward by placing the office in the context of a larger framework or theory. The resolution of the role of the President depends on the interaction of parts in a dynamic environment, and not as if it were a single component in a static situation. Useful baselines or sources for ideas in constructing such a framework would include the work of William G. Andrews on reorienting American constitutional theory, Theodore Lowi's interest group liberalism, and Willmoore Kendall's classic article on "The Two Majorities."<sup>64</sup> These are not the only sources, of course, but they are sufficiently broad and stimulating to start the necessary analysis, discussion, and debates in building such a framework.

The formulation of such a framework should keep the following points in mind. First, as Cronin suggests, the role of public expectations is crucial. Today's presidents face high but inconsistent expect-

61. Richard A. Brody and Benjamin J. Page, "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity: The Johnson and Nixon Administrations," in Wildavsky, *Perspectives*, pp. 136-48; Thomas E. Patterson, *The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose Their Presidents* (New York: Praeger, 1980) and his "The Miscast Institution: The Press in Presidential Politics," *Public Opinion*, 3 (June/July, 1980), pp. 46-51; and Michael Robinson with Nancy Conover and Margaret Sheehan, "The Media at Mid-year. A Bad Year for McLuhanites?" *Public Opinion*, 3 (June/July, 1980), pp. 41-45.

62. Edward R. Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

63. Jeanne Nienaber, "Presidential Behavior," to appear in the *Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. by Sam Long (New York: Plenum Publishing Corp., forthcoming).

64. Andrews, "The Presidency," in Wildavsky, *Perspectives*, pp. 34-42; Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* (Second ed.; New York: W.W. Norton, 1979); and Willmoore Kendall, "The Two Majorities," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, IV (November, 1960), pp. 317-45.



tations from the American public. A reading of recent polls shows the public favoring a balanced budget, tax cuts, and elimination of government waste.<sup>66</sup> At the same time, these very polls also reveal a commitment to a large and diverse array of governmental programs. Many people want to have their cake and eat it too. Alternately they distrust government and oppose its expansion in the abstract, but seem to demand particular programs that benefit them personally. Under such conditions the size and scope of government tends to expand. The President has to decide how to respond in these trying circumstances. In the immortal works of Pogo Possum, the philosopher of the swamp, "We have met the enemy and they are us."<sup>67</sup>

Second, the President is saddled with these exaggerated expectations. This was the consensus of a talented group of presidential scholars and public officials at a conference at the University of Virginia in fall, 1980. The academic conferees included political scientists of the stature of Richard Neustadt, Fred Greenstein, Hugh Heclo, Nelson W. Polsby, David Truman, Don K. Price, and eminent public figures like Herbert Stein and John Gardner.<sup>68</sup> Vice President Walter Mondale believes that the John Steinbeck observation on excessive demands on the President is even more relevant today than when it was written in the mid-1960s during the Lyndon Johnson Presidency.<sup>69</sup>

Third, the ideal would be, as Bertolt Brecht's *Galileo* explains, a land that needs no hero.<sup>69</sup> Such is not the case, however, of the American polity as it enters the Eighties. We continue to search for a man on a white horse and expect more than any President has the power to deliver. Our search for so-called strong leadership and heroes is a continual one. Under such circumstances, the best one can hope for in delineating the role of the President in an increasingly atomized system is a slightly more limited one. A somewhat more optimistic view would hold out the possibility of a little more patience and understanding, and that the so-called political buck

65. See the various issues of *Public Opinion* for recent trends.

66. Cited in Lawrence J. Peter, *The Peter Plan* (New York: Bantam, 1978), p. 32.

67. Don Bonafede, "Not What It Used To Be," *National Journal*, 11 (December 15, 1979), p. 2111.

68. Schellhardt, "Do We Expect," p. 20.

69. The Andrea-Galileo dialogue quoted at the outset of this paper is cited in Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page, *An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968* (New York: Viking Press, 1969), p.311.

neither starts automatically nor ends with the President. It would be more like a circular buck in which political credit and blame does not fall disproportionately on the President. In such a political universe the President's role is a more realistic and limited one. As Greenstein aptly sums it up in a recent and impressive essay on the modern presidency, the President's role would be such that "he neither is, nor can be, nor should be an unmoved mover." <sup>70</sup>

*University of Arizona*

HENRY KENSKI

70. Greenstein, "Change and Continuity, " p. 85.