ties; a single ill-judged public criticism of Jewish pro-war propaganda was said to disclose a dangerous anti-Semite.

Strident and overdrawn as was this attack, spearheaded by high officials in the Roosevelt Administration, it had some elements of truth. Lindbergh could accurately be called a "racist," insofar as he thought Nordic unity essential both to world order and to the survival of the parliamentary system which northern Europe had created. He had much the same feeling as Rudyard Kipling for "lesser breeds without the law" and for the Russian "bear that walks like a man." He stressed the close relationship of the English and Germans, concluding that in their fratricidal conflict this country, owing so much to infusions from both, should not take sides. To speak personally, I well recall a long conversation with Lindbergh on this subject, towards the end of the war. He predicted that anything left of Germany would have to be rebuilt, as an ally of both the United States and Britain.

Lindbergh's anti-war manifestoes, as reviewed by Professor Cole, show a great deal of prescience. He foresaw an Imperial Presidency that would consciously deceive the electorate, disregard the Congress, use espionage and police repression against its critics, spend the nation into bankruptcy and engage in overseas adventurism of dubious constitutionality. All this, the Lone Eagle warned, would be done in the name and under the guise of "patriotism." A country slowly emerging from the trauma of Watergate can find much that is extraordinarily timely in these "isolationist" warnings. As Professor Cole summarizes: "He used arguments in attacking Roosevelt in 1941 that were almost identical to those that liberal internationalists would use in attacking President Richard M. Nixon thirty years later."

Lindbergh himself was at least outwardly indifferent to the abuse so abundantly heaped upon him. Early adulation had never turned his head and later defamation seemed to him equally inconsequential. To his aristocratic mind the fluctuating plebei-

an reaction was of far less import than fidelity to what he himself thought true. And in emphasizing this Professor Cole, whose purpose "has been neither to vindicate nor to indict, but, rather, to describe and explain," is forced to some pessimistic doubt. Is there, in this country, a repressive mentality which does not believe in free speech, which demands conformity with the thinking of a Führer in a manner more Nazi than anything of which Lindbergh could ever be properly accused?

In any case, there is no question that the well-organized smearing of Lindbergh was effective. After Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt kept what he called this "copperhead" from any active military participation and little credit has ever been given for the postwar relevance of this dissenter's thinking. Professor Cole's book will help, but the course of revisionist history is uphill. The Book Review section of the New York Times has lately given this work a fair and objective notice. Yet over the review somebody printed as caption the slurring words: "Lindy the peacenik." One wonders what sort of editor could apply that characterization to the man who first flew the Atlantic, alone, unsupported and unafraid.

Reviewed by Felix Morley

Caution or Conquest?


This is not a cautious book, in either title or content, but Mr. James believes that the time for caution has ended. He assembles information on a variety of military and technical subjects, leading him to conclude that the U.S.S.R. enjoys a slowly widen-
ing lead over the United States in all fields of strategic weaponry. His vision of the future is not pretty:

if the current trends continue, by the early 1980’s the Soviets will not only be the most powerful nation in the world, possessing the most numerous and advanced nuclear and strategic weapons systems, but they could initiate a nuclear war and win it.

James advocates many specific changes in the American military-industrial complex, as ways of lowering our costs and improving our performance in the arms race, but few of them will take effect unless an informed American citizenry demands results from Congress. He wants desperately to play a personal role in creating such public pressure—a desire which has brought Mr. James considerable personal hardship and which also causes occasional lapses into sensationalism in the book itself.

He writes most persuasively about the strategic applications of space technology, drawing on his eight years of experience as a systems analyst for Pratt & Whitney Aircraft. His official duties concerned the monitoring of Soviet technical progress, but James also became involved in a curious and little known variety of espionage. Using Pratt & Whitney as his cover, James attended a number of international conferences for space scientists. Soviet and American participants at these gatherings quite routinely elicited information from each other about their latest achievements, above and beyond the more mundane matters which were discussed publicly. On return to the United States, James submitted his findings to the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Air Force, just as his Soviet informants were undoubtedly reporting their discoveries to the KGB and the chief intelligence directorate of the Red Army General Staff.

Such direct, personal contact with Soviet space scientists and spies disguised as *savants* imparts a high degree of authority to Mr. James’ remarks. Even so, he sometimes overdoes an essentially good thing. He includes twenty pages of excerpts from his raw intelligence reports to the CIA, carefully emblazoned with all the trappings which identify classified information. These reports add a certain local color for readers who want to know more about the techniques of intelligence gathering, but they are irrelevant to the thesis which James seeks to prove. Indeed, discussing the whole subject in this fashion may have exactly the opposite effect from what Mr. James intends. His graphic description of American espionage at scholarly gatherings may embarrass our intelligence agencies, provide grist for the Soviet propaganda mill, and feed the anti-military, anti-CIA sentiments of certain circles in the U.S. Congress. Such possibilities may explain why Pratt & Whitney warned James not to write this book and fired him when he disclosed his intentions.

The actual content of the book is just as intriguing as the process by which it came to be written. The author claims to have been “the first intelligence analyst to document, among other things, the existence of an aggressive military-oriented Soviet space shuttle development program.” In this and every other weapons program that he discusses, James sees the United States as either lagging behind Soviet technology or simply not competing at all. The list is long, depressing, and supported by a good deal of technical data. There are at least two cases in which the Soviets have the race to themselves: an unmanned, maneuverable spacecraft system for inspecting and destroying enemy satellites; and a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), giving the Kremlin the ability to put nuclear missiles into orbit around the earth and to deliver them on command. American planners decided to forego both these systems, predicting incorrectly that the Soviets would do likewise.

Unfortunately, as James says, the logic of Soviet strategy and weapons development is quite dissimilar from our own. Not only have Soviet planners developed entire
weapons systems which American officials assumed to be useless, their approach to comparable systems is distinctively Soviet. They stress simplicity, reliability, and cheapness, while American designers opt for lightness and technical sophistication. These differing preferences have crucially affected the progress of the space race. The Soviet Union won a major propaganda victory by putting the world's first artificial satellite into orbit, even though its engines were primitive by American standards. The United States then recovered from its initial defeat, using superior technology to beat the Russians to the moon. In retrospect, however, James sees President Kennedy's emphasis on the moon race as both a blessing and a curse:

It was a blessing because it united the nation's scientific and technological forces to achieve a single objective, but it was a curse because most U.S. planning was centered around the Apollo mission. Consequently, the Apollo program is now completed and the U.S. does not have the launch vehicles to pursue a viable space program for the 1970's.

Cuts in spending, the civilian orientation of NASA, and public apathy have all combined to frustrate any American effort to stay abreast of Soviet power, let alone to maintain the margin of superiority we once enjoyed.

Some of the most trenchant passages in the book describe the defects of the American intelligence system:

The machinery does not exist in the United States where intelligence analysts can be candid with their superiors without placing their jobs in jeopardy. The machinery does not exist where senior intelligence analysts can prepare intelligence assessments for the United States Intelligence Board without first modifying their reports to be fairly consistent with previous assessments, regardless of their validity. . . . And the machinery does not exist where the public can be kept abreast of significant matters concerning U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic developments without the administration in power attempting to censor and control information to its political advantage . . .

Careful reading of the Pentagon Papers or, better still, frank talking with American intelligence analysts can confirm the accuracy of this judgment.

Much more controversial, but still entirely plausible, is James' assertion that "certain empire-builders, for reasons that need not be mentioned here, have been withholding pertinent data from their colleagues and the users of the intelligence. Due to a gross lack of coordination between the CIA and the military intelligence services, the United States is not using its intelligence resources efficiently." Here James chooses vagueness, where precise information would better serve his purpose. Given the nature of the intelligence business, the agencies in question can ignore such general charges just as easily as Mr. James can make them.

The reader should be wary of a few especially inflammatory remarks, usually on subjects a little removed from the author's professional expertise. James remarks, for example, that "by the end of the 1970's Soviet ICBMs will be capable of annihilating the US. land-based ICBM force. The point worth noting is that the Soviets can develop this capability without violating the SALT agreements." (James' emphasis.) This is true, but one must add the vital qualification that the United States can also improve its strategic capabilities without revising the promises made at SALT, if we so choose. James errs, however, in asserting that "as of this writing, the Soviets are strategically superior to the United States." Most Defense Department spokesmen, pessimistic though they are about the implications of the SALT agreements, do not expect that the Soviets will pass from parity to strategic superiority before the end of the 1970's. It is also untrue that Brezhnev
“armed the Arabs with nuclear weapons” during the Middle East crisis of 1973. This mistaken belief springs from a single CIA report which spread through the intelligence community like wildfire, was leaked to the press, but was finally proved false. Had such weapons actually reached Arab hands, the Yom Kippur War would not have ended as soon as it did, nor is it likely that the Israelis would have refrained from a preemptive nuclear strike of their own.

This is an important book, although many comfortable critics will doubtless dismiss it as certain Greeks disregarded the words of Cassandra. Mr. James makes many predictions, some more justified than others, but he will have done the country a real service if only one warning receives adequate discussion: the U.S.S.R. now has the capability to surpass American might in strategic weaponry. James shows repeatedly that America’s impending decline to the status of a second-rate power is not inevitable, but rather the result of very conscious choices. Our economic condition is not so bad that we must allow the U.S.S.R. to outspend us on military research and development by several billions of dollars per year, nor is there any good reason for the common refusal to think seriously about what sort of world it will be if the Kremlin attains its goal of strategic supremacy. Few, if any, reviewers are competent to judge James’ assertion that “the Soviets have added a new element to the equation—space. This is the weak link in our planning structure.” If he is wrong, or if the United States increases its strength in space, his book will probably be forgotten. But if James is right and his message goes unheeded, we may live to suffer the first conquest from space.

Reviewed by G. Paul Holman, Jr.

A Paranoiac Panorama


This book fascinates and challenges readers for all wrong reasons. Its thesis is provocative, pervasive, and yet somehow slippery. The dust jacket boasts boldly the author’s contention:

that a small corporate elite set the tone and priorities of the American government in the years after 1945, fostering the growth of privilege at home and expansion abroad. This direction came under increasing attack as the forces of change gathered strength in the 1960’s. The result was a fundamental conflict over the future of the United States.

One might expect from such a buildup that the author intended to prove his thesis, or somehow to convince his readers that it is true. Not so. Instead he notes once more a phenomenon observed long ago, namely that the rich get richer and that many wealthy people eventually occupy high government positions.

The matter of proving his principal thesis thus having been resolved to the author’s satisfaction, which is to say not at all, the book continues on the assumption that there is such a thing as a corporate elite whose members are calling all the shots, from manipulating the television industry to make the tube the “opiate of the masses,” to exercising control over American universities. According to Wittner, thought-provoking programs have been systematically driven off the airways by withdrawal of sponsorship, to be replaced by programs completely unwanted by the viewers, such as game shows, comedies, Westerns, and cartoons. The American university has fared a little better because it was “a valuable institution, and the corporate elite merely wanted it tamed, not destroyed.”