
Basic Issues in Kant's Moral and Political Thought

My purpose is to discuss several issues in moral and political thought and, especially, in the "metaphysics" that underlies this thought. My procedure here is to discuss Kant's arguments critically. I will raise questions in his terms and then explore whether the phenomena he relies upon and studies support and are fully articulated by his analysis.

I

Kant begins the substantive discussion of morality in his most widely read practical work, the *Groundwork*, by claiming that our common view is that only a good will could be considered good without limitation.' All other goods, even virtues, can be misused; even complete satisfaction can produce arrogance. This means that the good will and nothing else must be the heart of moral duty, because our everyday view is that moral duty is completely obligatory, and allows no exceptions.

Is it not true, however, that we often say commonsensically that a good will without talent or equipment is feckless, that uninformed good will can be uselessly meddlesome, that good will together with poor judgment is harmful, and that the road to hell is paved with good intentions? If the standard for judging what is good is the result, that is to say, or if the standard is our usual unanalyzed conglomeration of intention and result, the good will is not altogether good.

We can put this problem in another way by saying that the goodness of a good will is not commonsensically separable from its object, from what it wills or intends. Can the will or intention to be

moderate in pursuing pleasure, for example, be divorced from understanding and experiencing what the attraction of pleasure or appropriate pleasure is? At the least, some grasp of an abstract sense or content of good is needed to make the "good" that the good will is willing intelligible: ordinarily, the goodness of the good will apart from its objects cannot in fact be described meaningfully without implicitly accepting some notion of the goodness of its object.

As Kant develops his argument beyond this first commonsensical beginning, he attempts to make truly moral commands as self-enclosed as possible, in the sense that the propriety of the command loses any reference to something outside the command itself. The mere universal form of the maxim that recommends an action, he argues, is what guarantees that following it is moral, apart from the end or goals that the maxim originally was intended to reach or bring about.² In this sense, the starting point of his argument—that only a good will is altogether good—remains fundamental and is even radicalized. Ultimately, Kant attempts to grasp the goodness of the good will, its morality, in terms built up solely from the free, universalizable incentive of will itself.

This, however, leaves a serious question whether the understanding on which Kant settles about what is choiceworthy or good is not too narrow or, finally, unintelligible, or, at the least, whether he implicitly has in mind some notion of goodness that in fact is not meaningful apart from the objects the will chooses or intends. Just as we commonsensically cannot in fact say what we mean by a good intention without at some point having in mind a view of the goodness of what we are trying to bring about, so, too, would Kant's radical defense of the goodness of free will seem to be similarly dependent. It is not clear, in other words, that Kant's view of moral intention correctly grasps the common framework of goodness and choiceworthiness that it explicates.

II

The heart of Kant's actual understanding of morality revolves around several thoughts and concepts that he often fails to describe at any length: form, end, causality, freedom, and universality. Kant's view

is that a moral action must be chosen for a moral reason. A moral reason is one in which the maxim recommending the action is completely universalizable. If it is completely universalizable, it is purely formal and reasonable, and could-or, indeed, must-be selected by *any* simply reasonable being, such as God. No material end, on the other hand, can be certainly desirable. To determine or cause oneself by a universalized maxim, moreover, is to determine oneself freely. More precisely, it is not to be determined by what is outside oneself, by natural causes or laws of motion. It is to determine one's own actions, to push oneself along as one's own efficient cause.

In grasping myself as a purely reasoning universal actor, I see myself as an end, that is, as acting and being only for the sake of myself as free, formal, and universal. Others too, indeed all others, can be identically free, so the unity of moral life or even human life consists in our mutual membership in the kingdom of ends, that is, our mutual membership in the framework of morality and justice that rationalizes and makes free all our usual striving and pursuit of particular goods or goals.

III

The power of Kant's analysis, I believe, derives especially from elements of the two sources I have just outlined. One is his unflinching attempt to ground the (only apparent, I have argued) everyday sense that moral command brooks no exceptions and is unbridgeable. The second is his unflinching understanding that however difficult it is to spell out what freedom is and how it exists in a context of material causality, we must somehow understand how moral action can be free. Without freedom there can be no moral responsibility. Directly related to this point is Kant's uncompromising notion that such moral freedom must be rooted in the power of our reason, in what distinguishes us from animals.

What is odd or questionable, however, is Kant's somewhat narrow or unarticulated discussion of what reason, freedom, causality, and the associated concepts of universality and ends truly are. By this I mean that Kant often does not situate his argument in a

context of alternatives; sometimes he hardly describes his own view.

This is most evident in Kant's discussion of freedom. The scholarly controversy concerns whether by free action Kant means only moral action, action in accord with a successfully universalized maxim, or whether he believes there is a "free choice" (*Willkur*) that precedes moral choice and is governed either by moral choice or by maxims rooted in calculation determined by our attraction to what might satisfy our desires.' One reason this question is hard to decide is because Kant says little about freedom generally, and what he does say is mostly in the context of describing moral choice. Freedom is negative if we are not determined by desires, and positive if we are self-determined morally. Negative freedom is not different from positive freedom, but only how positive freedom looks in terms of desires that do not determine it. Clearly, Kant does not intend freedom to mean arbitrariness because it is legislating the moral law for oneself, that is, allowing it to determine one's choice or making it the law for oneself by successfully universalizing the maxim that commands one's action. Freedom is not creating the law or acting lawlessly. But the exact status of self-determination or self-control in general is unclear: if it means nothing other than moral determination, then we are indeed free only when we are moral and there is, strictly, no other freedom. If self-determination is a wider concept, however, Kant has said nothing about what it might be or mean in "free choice," what the possibilities are that need to be considered, and so on. Positively, that is to say, Kant has not differentiated it from arbitrariness or, indeed, given it any intelligible status at all.

This issue also faces us if we look at freedom not as self-determination but simply as being undetermined or unchained, that is, if we do not look from the standpoint of control or initiating movement but see freedom as being unbound or unhindered. For Kant gives no substantive description of this state or situation such that we could understand how, qua free choice, it stands undetermined (between morality and immorality, say, or simply standing) nor, therefore, how it could control or direct itself or be controlled or directed. Here too Kant does not discuss the range of possibilities,

nor does he clarify if this language of freedom as not being hindered or controlled, not being held back or pushed forward, as it were, is the full way to grasp freedom. In his long discussion of evil in *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, the one thing Kant never makes precisely clear is how the free choice of evil is possible in terms of freedom (or how it is determined by freedom), only that it happens.

These issues are important to Kant's moral thought because if freedom is present outside moral choice, a central ground for Kant's arguing that his view alone captures morality because it alone captures the freedom that moral action must have would be untrue, or, at least, insufficiently demonstrated. Some of Kant's power would be dissipated. Beyond this, of course, the possibility of moral choice would need to be explicated or grasped in terms of these other broader areas that make freedom more generally intelligible. If free choice is arbitrary, and morality can (or cannot) be freely chosen, morality may at root be arbitrary. If morality rests on other grounds of freedom, of not being controlled or hindered, and is not arbitrary, moral reason would nonetheless incompletely determine our freedom; moral choice would not be the only self-determination. If morality can retain its universal obligatory character within free choice which is a process or act that in some way is neither arbitrary nor moral by being, or being grounded in, another set of reasons, this too needs explicating. If, however, Kant in fact means that freedom strictly is moral choice and nothing else, that the appearance of free choice simply is just that, an appearance rooted in moral purity, then questions about our responsibility for choosing immorally remain difficult. How can we freely will evil if the only true freedom is moral choice?⁴

Related issues cloud Kant's analysis of the reason, formality and causality involved in morality. These issues are pertinent to the freedom of moral choice itself, whatever our questions about freedom in Kant more broadly. Kant argues that the self-determination of moral freedom is self-causality. Causality is efficient causality operating according to universal laws. But is this alone what causality is? Traditionally, one speaks of formal, final, and material, as well as

of efficient causality. Might moral causality be of another kind, or also of another kind?

Kant, intentionally or not, deals with this question by amalgamating form and end to efficient causality, and by conceptualizing the "material" of morality either as the area to which morality proper is applied or as the determination that specifies the realm in which moral concepts are intelligible, on the analogy of the relation between the metaphysical principles of "nature" and natural objects in space and time. An "end" as the cause of my moral action is nothing other than my choosing myself as someone who is morally self-determining: to be moral is my end because formality is this universality. In the same way, by choosing myself as moral where this means causing my action according to universal maxims I give myself, I am also acting within or for a pure form. I am causing my action for the purpose of exercising my moral self as grasping this form.'

The result of this amalgamating of efficient, final, and formal cause is that the other elements of causality, (or, if causality seems to us always to mean efficient causality, of living within and for grounds) are not discussed independently. Form as Plato or Hegel mean it, for example, does not enter the discussion. Consider, for example, the Platonic argument that "form" is always present in my actions because these are guided by my discourse or opinion, but present imperfectly or incompletely. Courage or justice are always shaping and inspiring actions I choose to do because they are just or courageous, but they are there imperfectly, as images or imitations. If I seek to do what I understand to be right, I seek something whose presence and power cannot be fully active in ordinary things, in a battle or a code of laws, say, but only for thought. I seek it, am oriented to it, am formed by it, and freely act on it as I reasonably but imperfectly grasp it. Form of this sort is not completely universal as it is in Kant, but it is hardly unintelligible. If freedom means seeing the reason in something and acting for that reason and nothing else, it is unclear why this formality is any less clear than the universal moral shaping that Kant has in mind.

We may say something similar about "ends" as grounding our

choice. As with form, Kant gives no comprehensive substantive or conceptual view in his moral works of the kinds of wholes and ends. To end is to stop, to be over with, to exhaust, to run the course, to complete, to finalize, to finish, to fulfill. "Ends" are what allow or define stopping, being over with, finishing, completing, fulfilling, and so on: they are goals or objectives, last points or steps, peaks, full expressions. In each case, the different kind of end has a different relation to the activity, movement, process, or completed thing that it ends. The end can be apart from it, or apart from it except when the activity is over, as in victory, or pervasive yet still apart as a child is the end or purpose of marriage, or pervasive and never apart as the whole painting as a goal is always among its parts as the finished product. It can be different from those it serves as an end, or the same, as the final number in a count.

These possibilities and more deserve a rich discussion if we are truly to understand what it means to call man an end in himself, or undertake a full metaphysics of human freedom. My point here is that because Kant does not do this he does not address explicitly the various ways we might freely or reasonably choose, or be, our end.

- Kant treats my being an end in itself as if this can only mean treating myself and others as free agents of universal causation.

One might reply here (and earlier) that this criticism overlooks Kant's discussions of teleology, of divine wholeness or purpose in specific events, of the heteronomy of desires, or indeed, of his transcendental perspective generally. But unless we work from a fuller range of possibilities in understanding ends, we cannot know if Kant has considered all the ways that ends might be chosen freely. To take an example: Kant treats the Aristotelian standpoint of morality or virtue as ethical nobility as ultimately unfree because it is beholden to what in the last analysis is the sensibly caused and defined goal of nobility or beauty. But why could we not seek to argue that moral nobility is not a sensible end but, precisely, the sensible shaped rationally, and that it is balance, form, and completeness as such (if imperfectly) that is the freely chosen end? Of course, Kant might argue that such a position would prove to be unintelligible or contradictory because it seeks to isolate this kind of

formal shaping or choosing of oneself as one's own fulfillment, completeness, or perfection from the pleasures, wealth, honors, and fears that give these terms the intelligibility that they enjoy. Such an argument, however, would be arbitrary unless coupled with a demonstration that canvasses the modes of form and end and shows that free self-causality could only mean universal efficient causality. Why can the reason that defines what things are in no way be the free reason for our actions?

This leads to our final topic here, Kant's constricted view of reason and universality. Why is acting reasonably acting only according to universal laws that cover everything equally? Why is a free following of practical reason only legislating a maxim as universal? Why is the reason in or covering something simply universal? Clearly enough, "tree" covers all trees. But is every tree identical as a tree? Perhaps. Is every just act identical as just? We may consider the Platonic and Hegelian alternatives. Concepts are imperfectly encapsulated in the moral and political particulars that they form. They are perfectly encapsulated or present only in a whole to be thought, or in a fully actualized ethical life. Freedom as acting according to reason is, therefore, not acting according to what is fully and identically present but, rather, according to the reason in things that one seeks in knowledge, that one sees in the institutions that call forth different actions from members because they recognize that only the whole of the state or ethical world is fully reasonable, or that is inevitably only partially present because the whole of things is not always simply present in every articulation. Freedom is acting according to reason, but reason is present imperfectly, or dialectically. There may indeed be actions that are equal and complete instances of a universal principal (as, say, not lying would for Kant be identically correct everywhere), but not only these actions are reasonable or free.

One might reply that we are ignoring here Kant's critique of pure reason. Obviously, we are far from fully exploring each element of Kant's thought. Our point is simply that he does not himself explore alternate ways to consider form, reason, freedom, ends, and their connection, and that important alternatives exist.

IV

Perhaps these alternatives exist, but what substantive moral and political difference would they make? Are there shortcomings in Kant's discussions of virtue and justice? If so, are they connected to the points that we have been discussing? Let me explore two areas.

First is the absolutism of Kant's ethics. This issue is often enough remarked but always important to remember. Kant makes clear in the *Metaphysics of Morals* that the inexactitude or imprecision of Aristotle's "mean" hinders or destroys its capacity to serve as the measure of moral choice.⁸ Maxims that bring about virtuous action must be able to be universalized, and brook no exceptions. Morality may allow width within which there is leeway or even allow "casuistry."⁸ But the moral choice as such is inflexible and sometimes quite narrow: never lie, says duty as it speaks with a single, clear voice.

Of course, this voice is less overbearing than it might seem because morality is not identical to legality and therefore cannot be altogether commanded by it. Naturally just laws deal only with the universalizable requirements of externally free and equal choice. We each have ends about which law is neutral, concerning itself only with our equal external freedom, the area of actions we can perform without moral incentive (even if morality might command them) and that "can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law." To do wrong and to deserve punishment is to hinder someone in this freedom. There is therefore no legal requirement to help others to attain happiness or to develop one's own talents (both things that morality requires) because there are no external actions we can command toward these ends that also accord with universal freedom of choice. These two requirements of morality can, of course, be aided by law-laws punishing crime or protecting contracts, for example-or by whatever else makes it easier to do our duty. But law does not as such have enhancing moral choice or moral action as its clear goal, nor does its justice and success seem even to be measured by results that accord with moral choice, let alone results (such as economic growth) that derive from the universal wish to satisfy desire.

The link between law and morality seems, rather, to be that just law commands, or, more clearly, prohibits certain external and punishable actions (e.g., theft) that morality too would command or prohibit because these actions could be universally condemned as interference with the free choice of means to satisfy our desires. Law does not shape a way of life. Perhaps its by-product is to enhance the conditions that enable us more easily to do our duty or to develop the fortitude that helps us allow ourselves to be governed by moral self-legislation. But Kant does not claim this to be law's universal effect or even its governing intention. For law allows the flourishing of our equal free choice of means to satisfy our desires. And as we now know, it is not clear that the result of this flourishing-what we have today come to see as increasing individual attention to material and "psychic" satisfaction and decreasing attention to family, politics, excellence, and many social institutions-is in every respect compatible with affirmative moral action or with the conditions that promote moral choice. Legal actions may always be moral, and both moral and legal actions are compatible with free choice, but Kant leaves unclear or unexplored the degree of compatibility between the conditions of morality and the lives and institutions permitted and implicitly encouraged by law as he understands it, formalism in the service of freedom for satisfaction.'

Another place in which Kant seems at once too absolute (in what alone makes something moral) and too bifurcated (in splitting the internal and external, or moral and natural ends) is in the realm of character and habit. As we have suggested, Kant certainly is concerned with something like Aristotelian virtue. He praises in various places honor, courage, love, and friendship." He does not understand morality as such to involve habit or disposition, however, because these conflict with morality's requirement that the maxim leading to one's action be universalized explicitly.¹² Habit is not free because instigating moral choice cannot be a habit. In general, therefore, although Kant does not intend morality to contradict good character, there is something episodic about its requirements. Morality is our end as human beings, but this end does not shape, organize, or complete a life so much as it recognizes as our goal the

continual recursion to the free starting point of each choice (and, legally, of each external action). Morality is therefore not defined by a completion of character from which actions coherently stem and to which happiness coherently contributes. Kant finds no order or hierarchy of possibly conflicting duties, and "conscience" judges simply, not subtly.¹³ Indeed, although Kant discusses the family and governmental powers in the *Metaphysics of Morals* and individual characteristics in his *Anthropology*, the rich interplay of the functions and limits of particular institutions that is characteristic of, say, Hegel and Tocqueville is missing in Kant. Everything is-or is not-truly moral and legal. Even responsibility (as seriousness, maturity and the like), which we might find to be a particular element of character that links moral freedom and the proper use of free choice within political freedom, is not something that Kant develops.

A second area of question concerns Kant's view of equality, for his argument about morality and politics is in principle egalitarian. Our defining characteristic, our membership in the noumenal world or the world of free will, is one we share equally. We may differ in strength, beauty, and theoretical power, but to use any of these powers, including theoretical reason, for an end and through an incentive other than moral freedom is not to be fully free, and to act through moral freedom is a possibility that is equal for us all. This is why, although we are morally obliged to develop our talents, we are apparently not morally obliged to rank these talents or to sacrifice lower to higher ones. Our external equality under law does not violate or indeed is mandated by our root moral equality, and equal external worthiness for happiness and equality in its pursuit is central to legal equality. All lawfully pursued ends are equally good, and, as lawful, each is equally justifiable when observed with moral eyes.

At the same time, Kant does not argue that each adult in a just community deserves equal citizen rights. One must be independent to deserve the rights of active citizenship, and servants, women, tutors, and apprentices do not stand alone. Kant remarks that "anyone can work his way up to" active citizenship, but he does not clarify the measures this would require, and, in any event, his

statement does not appear to apply to women.¹⁴

The result of this extensive yet politically limited equality is a liberalism that is tougher and less sentimental than ours but one which also shares some questionable elements of liberal regimes generally. The toughness comes from the premium Kant places on individual accountability, however important he believes friendship and family to be. The toughness comes as well from Kant's requiring independence as a condition for political rights and his judgment that many lack this independence. That said, Kant gives no reasons why conditions of dependence need to continue, and, as we said, he suggests that they can be eliminated. The result of this undeveloped argument is that he does not consider the likely future shape or the problems and prospects of liberal institutions such as industry or the family once the logic of individual moral equality spreads. Nor does he consider to any degree the fate of political, romantic, and religious passion-or if he considers their fate, he does not lament it. That is, he does not consider the fate, in liberal democracies, of activities and lives that seek to express whole personalities not so much individually as within structured dependencies and the institutions that support them (even if these structures themselves are always to some degree imperfect and unstable). Can these activities survive the advent of complete moral independence and, if so, can they survive it freely and rationally?

Kant notoriously sees marriage as only a contract for exclusive sex, for example. This notion is not as vulgar or mean-spirited as it seems, for he views marriage as a kind of full, reciprocal possession, because people are not things. I can allow myself to be owned or possessed if I equally possess the other: less than this equality means using myself as an animal or instrument. This unequal possession is self-degradation, however mild-and Kant does not believe it to be mild.'

This view of marriage in fact captures something of the humanity of our physicality because it transforms the bodily into something intellectual or free through mutuality in property which is at root legal or mental. But the full devotion of concern and protection, of nurturing and attentive concentration, let alone of transcendent

union, is missing. Perhaps some of these elements could be recaptured were Kant also to consider marriage as friendship. But even here the true way that family reveals itself to be both greater and smaller than the individual-greater because it is a new whole with a unique product, the child, who is not merely any new member of the species but ours in particular, and smaller because at least some individual talents can reach their height only outside the family—does not come through. The functions and limits of marriage beyond sex and reproduction, its connection to education, dignity, and humanity are not clearly discussed.

In general, the equality that is central to Kant's morality and politics falls short intellectually and practically in two ways. First, it makes us too independent so that restrictions on equality (as with women) seem arbitrary, and the limits and nature of the institutions that we require to enable our equal personality to be expressed (such as the family) are not fully explored or fully defended. Second, the grounds do not become clear on which to recommend not just that one use or develop one's talents but that the ends and activities that employ the fullest talents must be favored and defended, and that we must be taught to pursue or at least to admire and participate in them whatever our other choices. The complexity and nobility (and, therefore, the inequality associated with them) that elevate the dignity of moral and political freedom are not specified or integrated into the argument as a whole.

V

I will close with two other elements of Kant's argument that deserve further consideration and questioning. These link the issues we have just been discussing to those with which we began.

The first element is how Kant sees the connection between reason and body, or reason and the non-reasoning elements of soul such as anger and desire. This question of course dominates Kant's thinking in general. Here I have in mind peculiarities and omissions in his moral and political thought in particular that appear to derive from his characteristic bifurcation of the free and the natural. One is his not exploring the human experience of the movement of the

soul as such, the quality of its desire and longing, its reaching out or yearning, and the quality of its pride and anger, its spirited stiffening and independence. Kant argues that our experience of the soul is phenomenal, a matter of grasping appearances, not things in themselves, similar to how we understand external things as a matter of appearance. He also argues that the ends that satisfy us are merely natural, and not freely willed. Our freedom is found only in purely categorical impulsion to our freedom for its own sake. For these reasons, understanding moral freedom does not require us to examine carefully the dynamics of the soul—it requires only that we properly differentiate life and desire from moral will." One wonders nonetheless whether the consciousness or reality of freedom even in Kant's sense can in fact be made intelligible, and therefore be at all, apart from the individuation defined by the experience of our pride and longing and the ends that might complete or satisfy them. It is not even clear that moral action is rationally intelligible apart from the framework of desire (and pride) to which it belongs. Kant recognizes this issue in a certain sense when he discusses the feeling of respect that we generate for ourselves as immaterial and free. But such respect does not individuate us. It seems only to be the universal recognizing the universal, much as duty and conscience do not speak to a "me" who can be morally universal, but either to what is already universal in me or to the animal in me—but for Kant the animal is as such deaf to morality.

Let us explore these questions further. Kant understands universalizable maxims to cover all rational beings, gods who must be moral as well as men. Only we humans are compelled to do our duty because God senses no merely natural counter-pull. But is moral choice at all intelligible apart from situations in which only natural beings find themselves? Kant's examples in the *Groundwork* involve matters such as promising, cheating, and suicide. Can one begin to make these examples intelligible apart from the world of need, desire, and dependence that occasion them? Perhaps they are not intelligible for creatures without bodies, let alone those without passions of soul. Even Kant's brilliant discussion of property, which shows how the material can be transformed into a matter of imma-

terial ownership fails sufficiently to restore analytically the irreducible root of our particularity, so that particular property falls before the legalisms of property rights in general and happiness winds up taking a back seat to legality.

We may sum up our questions by suggesting that human individuation through (consciousness of) the movement of our passions and body is bypassed in Kant's moral and political work, and that he therefore fails to explore satisfactorily the intelligibility of freedom and morality, and the purpose and nature of property and law. As we have suggested, the link between freedom and reason can be preserved while still accounting for the intelligibility of moral choice and individuation, but this requires that we explore elements of reason, causality, and imperfect rationality that Kant leaves unexplored in his moral works.

Connected, or indeed identical, to these questions but looked at from a different standpoint is Kant's view of the perfection of practice and practical reason." More even than Aristotle, Kant gives practical reason independence from theoretical reason, although he wants finally to see all reason as one. Practical reason is meant to be perfectly accurate and completely true, at least with regard to morality, and this despite the fact that practice deals with what seems to be unavoidably contingent. Contingency however concerns achieving our variable natural ends, not universal moral or juridical laws. Morality is not a matter of discovering impossibly unchanging goals, but of willing universally obligatory means, universally obligatory activities that can often be as narrow as not taking this or that object or telling this or that lie: the only categorical end, in fact, is to treat ourselves and others as moral legislators. For the reasons we have stated, treating our means to satisfaction here and now as if we could elevate these often mundane actions to choices that are correct everywhere and always compels omission and distortion. Kant also is led by this effort at perfection to explore the possibility not only that this or that action can be moral but also that our motives in general can increasingly be purified and our rightful satisfaction increasingly guaranteed. His moral and political idealism take the form of an increasingly approachable perfection and even an achiev-

able one, at least in the afterlife.¹⁹ Inevitable limits or contradictions do not structure his analysis because moral universals cannot contradict each other any more than they can be in any regard self-contradictory. Because the use of talents and the achievement of happiness (or at least, beneficence to others) are moral duties, we must postulate that they can be achieved. Kant ultimately does seek a perfection in the flesh, dealing with things of the flesh, with all the questions that this raises. Perhaps such an idealized completion or union of satisfaction and morality is the whole, the good, which he first glimpses only to at once divide us into free and natural before considering how to put us together again.

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NOTES

1. 4:393; 4:437. Here and hereafter I cite Kant in the English translations of Mary J. Gregor in *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This volume contains translations of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *The Metaphysics of Morals*, to which I will refer, and several other works as well. My page references will be to the marginal volume and page numbers in this edition, which refer to the German original (in the standard Prussian Academy edition) which Gregor is translating. Volume 4 contains the *Groundwork*, and volume 6 contains the *Metaphysics*.

2. 4:402; 4:436.

3. 6:213, 214. I will not engage the scholarly literature. One can find representative discussions of the *Groundwork* in Paul Guyer, ed., *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998). This volume, and Mary Gregor, trans., *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) also contain good bibliographies.

4. 4:437. We may say that free choice is a state determined either by moral freedom or by immoral maxims that are at root accidents from the standpoint of morality-ever-present accidents,

at least on earth, but inexplicable. Such a statement, however, would still leave unanalyzed the precise possibility, characteristics, and presence of such accidents, as well as the status of free choice itself. See Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Allan Wood and George di Giovanni, trans. and eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6:32.

5. 4:436-438.

6. Consider 4:442-444.

7. 6:404.

8. 6:411; 6:458.

9. 6:230.

10. This issue is of course more obvious looking back from Hegel, Nietzsche, and twentieth century political life than it is looking forward from Kant.

11. See, e.g., 6:449 ff.; 6:465.

12. 6:479.

13. 6:224.

14. 6:314, 315.

15. To the degree that Kant recognizes that there are justifiable tensions here and not merely irrational loyalties that can be dissolved in enlightened reason, he appears to believe that these tensions could be overcome at the end of an ideal history.

16. 6:277 ff.

17. 6:211 ff.

18. Consider 5:120 ff., *The Critique of Practical Reason*.

19. See 5:122 ff. and 4:414 (and elsewhere) on "interest."